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	ABSTRACT 
 
CHRISTOPHER HUNTER TRAMEL: Rethinking Cannabis 
Legislation: Insights from Advocacy Groups 
 
  
Prohibition and regulation of substances in the United States transformed throughout the 
20th century namely through the Pure Food and Drug Act, the prohibition of alcohol, the 
Marihuana Tax Stamp Act, and the Controlled Substances Act, with each further 
expanding the amount of substances regulated and the consequences of breaking the 
regulations. The first chapter will briefly outline major events and legislation from 1937 
to the present day and how such events and legislation set the stage for grassroot 
initiatives on the state level seeking to take advantage of the medicinal properties of 
Cannabis sativa and its impact on relative incarceration rates throughout the era. The 
second chapter investigates the ‘three qualifiers’ necessary to be classified as a Schedule 
I controlled substance and challenges such with the findings of federal commissions, 
patents, and programs; similar medicines, and the surge in state-level acceptance as well 
as public support for the medicinal use of Cannabis sativa. The lack of settling of the 
Schedule I classification with regards to Cannabis sativa in the face of such legitimate 
findings has created an environment possibly violating provisions of the Fourth, Fifth, 
Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 
Finally, this thesis will critically approximate the economic impact of the Schedule I 
classification of Cannabis sativa from the commencement of the Shafer Commission in 
1972 to the present day. Such historic, social, and economic impacts around the “War on 
Cannabis sativa” are grounds proving the legitimacy of the movement of cannabis law 
reform seen in the modern landscape of the United States. Likewise, such findings should 
	act as evidence that the Schedule I classification of such is unconstitutional, unethical, 
and thwarted medical progressivism, freedom of choice, and treatment of fellow 
Americans since 1937.	
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1	 	
Introduction 
 
The transition of condoning hemp and cannabis cannot be placed in one specific 
instance; however, the influx of immigrants that the Roaring Twenties encouraged is a 
starting point that makes even alcohol prohibition more clear. “Temperance 
organizations, religious groups, and civic clubs,” (Lee, Smoke Signals, p. 49), caused 
such things as the 18 Amendment to be ratified. Aligned by such temperance 
organizations and religious groups, Harry Jacob Anslinger “became US consul in Nassau, 
Bahamas; he was quickly recognized for his effective work in persuading British 
authorities to cooperate in curbing the flow of intoxicating beverages,” (King, 2001), into 
America. On July 1, 1930, Anslinger’s drug functions were shifted from the Department 
of State to the Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN); he was made acting commissioner of 
the FBN since its inception. On September 23, 1930, President Hoover made Anslinger’s 
appointment permanent. 
The passing of the Volstead (1919) Act was aimed to control the distribution, 
importation, and production of alcohol and to enforce the 18th Amendment. The intended 
effect of the Volstead Act was to increase economic productivity during the American 
Great Depression. In fact, President Herbert Hoover described Prohibition as a “great 
social and economic experiment, noble in motive and far-reaching in purpose,” (Lerner, 
PBS, 2011). The intended purpose of such eradication of alcohol distribution is 
exemplified when Michael Lerner, historian from PBS, writes, “the expected sales of 
clothing and household goods were expected to skyrocket; thereby causing real estate 
values and rent prices to elevate from saloons closing and neighborhoods improving.” 
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 The intended effects of Prohibition and the reality of Prohibition couldn’t have 
been further apart. Lerner goes on to say, “Instead the unintended consequences proved 
to be a decline in amusement and entertainment industries across the board.” The decline 
in these industries, “eliminated thousands of jobs for barrel makers, truckers, waiters and 
other related trades from the closing of breweries, distilleries, and saloons,” (Lerner, 
2011). 
While the private sector of the economy did suffer from the banning of alcohol, 
the public sector, part of the economy controlled by the government, suffered much more 
dismally. Before Prohibition, many states relied heavily on excise tax to fund budgets for 
example, “in New York, almost 75 percent of the state’s revenue was derived from liquor 
taxes,” (Lerner, 2011). How do governments fund their budgets when up to 75 percent of 
lawful state tax base are made illegal? 
Prohibition caused the need for the personal income tax. This is seen when Lerner 
states, “The most lasting consequence was that many states and the federal government 
would come to rely on income tax revenue [having become lawful with the ratification of 
the 16 amendment] to fund their budgets going forward.” The decreased reliance of 
alcohol excise tax that Prohibition caused an increased necessity of personal income tax. 
Prohibition was repealed on February 20, 1933. According to Robert Schlesinger of US 
News, said, “It [Prohibition] was killed by a combination of unenforceability, rising 
lawlessness, and a staggering economy that needed the boost in jobs and tax revenues 
from a revived liquor industry,” (Schlesinger, US News, 2013). 
Prohibition’s intent was to curb supply by making the production, distribution, 
and sale, not consumption of alcohol illegal. However noble the intents of Prohibition, 
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Jane McGrew writer of the National Commission of Marihuana and Drug Abuse states, 
“Statistics demonstrated the increasing volume of the bootleg trade. In 1921, 95,933 
distilleries were seized and 34,175 people were arrested for Prohibition related crimes; 
while in 1930, the number of seized distilleries grew exponentially to 282,122, and 
75,307 total alcohol related arrests were made in 1928,” (McGrew, Schaffer Library of 
Drug Policy, n.d.). This is a 194 percent increase in the number of distilleries and an 
increase of 120 percent in the number of arrests made. The intent of Prohibition was to 
cause a decrease in the number of arrests resulting from the criminalization of such 
offenses, but legislation could not suppress the voracious demand for alcoholic beverages 
and the profits to be made from importing and selling it. The supply of alcohol stopped 
being manufactured from a regulated and taxed supply and came from organized criminal 
groups that were illegal, unregulated, and untaxed. 
Illicit suppliers would often use industrial alcohol to quench demand. To hinder 
the consumption of this industrial supply, “The Treasury Department ordered 
manufacturers of the industrial alcohol to include notable poisons like: kerosene, 
benzene, mercury salts, formaldehyde, chloroform, acetone, and methyl alcohol,” (Blum, 
Slate, 2010). Basic economic principle would confirm that if a demand for something 
exists then someone would supply the demand, whether it is illegal or legal. The illegal 
market only increased the profit and incentive to meet the legal consumption of alcohol. 
This system of illegal supply hindered government tax receipts meanwhile giving rise to 
organized criminals like Al Capone who mentions, “All I do is supply public [legal] 
demand … somebody had to throw some liquor on that thirst. Why not me,” (Capone, 
University of Michigan, 2004). 
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Prohibition, from 1920-1933, is an era in American history that has proven how 
legislation criminalizing ‘unenforceable’ laws does nothing but foster an illicit, 
unregulated, and unsafe supply while giving rise to organized crime, and such things 
caused Prohibition to be repealed. As with the Prohibition of alcohol’s ineffectiveness to 
curb demand, the second wave of substance prohibition, namely the “War on Drugs” 
would follow suit. This war has trampled on the ideals of “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness” by unjustly and unlawfully incarcerating people for drug crimes instead of 
treating them as patients, sick with a health issue, drug addiction. 
 
Methodology 
 I focus much of my research on existing, primary sources including, but not 
limited to Supreme Court rulings, patent applications, uniform crime reports, state house 
bills, petitions, law journals, and personal interviews. I explore sources from advocacy 
groups like the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, Patients Out of 
Time, The Cannabist, High Times Magazine, and Leafly. Alongside seemingly 
conflicting sources from the Office of National Drug Control Policy, the Drug 
Enforcement Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to somewhat paint the path 
of cause(s), effect(s), and sentiment(s) towards Cannabis sativa. I start this path with the 
passing of the Marihuana Tax Stamp Act to present day alongside the increase in both the 
marijuana possession arrests and the incarceration rates independent of the cause, effect, 
and/ or change in sentiment.  
 The findings and recommendation from the Shafer Commission serve as a 
baseline with regards to marijuana reform in the 1970s in response to the signing of the 
Controlled Substances Act. For example, in Marihuana, A Signal of Misunderstanding, 
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Chairman Raymond Shafer defines the purpose of the report as, “to present the facts as 
they are known today, to demythologize the controversy surrounding [cannabis], and to 
place in proper perspective one of the most emotional and explosive issues of our time.” 
As the Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse concluded its report in March 1972 
with the hopes the recommendation would allow for federal and state agencies to 
deemphasize marijuana as a problem, but with the recommendation being ignored, 
marijuana possession arrests increased from, “292 thousand in 1972 to 421 thousand in 
1973,” (FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1925-1981). Adding to my research are studies 
performed by commissions appointed by LaGuardia, Prettyman, and Katzenbach. All 
such commissions find and corroborate on the grounds that marijuana use was not a 
detriment to the degree of other drugs like cocaine or heroin, and treatment of such 
offenders should be lessened because of this.  
 Secondly, I analyze the commissions’ findings alongside the legal definitions of 
the ‘qualifiers’ necessary of a Schedule I controlled substance alongside the court rulings 
of Randall v. United States and the subsequent inception of the Compassionate 
Investigational New Drug Program as well as various patents from pharmaceutical 
companies, universities, and governmental departments to conclude that the 
differentiation of Cannabis sativa as a plant and its synthetic variations is null and should 
not be treated as different. Then, the adoption of medical cannabis through California’s 
Proposition 215 in 1996 seems like an obvious next step when seen in line with the 
claims of such patents analyzed; thereby, making such ‘legalization and regulation’ for 
the medical use of Cannabis sativa necessary and appropriate. After making the case for 
medical cannabis the next ‘logical’ step, I trace how some rights might be in question and 
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how there might be a constitutional basis for cannabis use and legalization. Once the case 
for states to independently escape the implications of the Schedule I classification for 
Cannabis sativa, I use economic models to approximate a high and low estimate for: the 
difference in costs of enforcement, the difference in fine expenditures related to the 
offender in accordance to the recommendation of the Shafer Commission, three aggregate 
models on what the valuation of all cannabis business could expected to be worth, and 
averages of the total tax revenues associated with the aggregate valuation of all cannabis 
business in the United States. These calculations for all years, 1972 to 2016(7) were 
derived from primary sources, then extrapolated for all other years from the relative 
change in gross domestic product from one year to the next.  
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Chapter I 
Major Events in the “War on Drugs” 
In this chapter, I will analyze major ‘events’ and pieces of federal legislation and 
their direct impacts on relative incarceration rates from the passage of the Marihuana Tax 
Stamp Act of 1937 to the present day. H.J. Anslinger became the commissioner of the 
FBN in August of 1930 when 24 states had already forbade cannabis, but there was no 
unifying federal measure like the 18th Amendment with alcohol that fully prohibited the 
production, distribution, and sale of hemp. Before 1934, Anslinger thought that trying to 
eradicate something that grows “like dandelions,” (Musto, The American Disease, p. 221- 
22), to be extremely foolish. His sentiment, however, changed, “when the FBN was 
floundering. Tax revenue plummeted during the Great Depression, the bureau’s budget 
got slashed… and Anslinger set out to convince Congress and the American public that a 
terrible new drug menace [which alcohol was just 14 years prior], requiring immediate 
action by a well-funded FBN,” (Lee, p. 49).  
Anslinger demonized cannabis and hemp preparations by describing use of 
marijuana, “leads to pacifism and communist brainwashing,” (Anslinger, LibraryQuotes, 
2005), as well as, “is the most violence-causing drug in the history of mankind,” (Gerber, 
Legalizing Marijuana, p. 7). Anslinger petitioned, “temperance organizations, religious 
groups, and civic clubs,” (Lee, p. 49), while trying to convince Congress and the 
American public of these irate beliefs, as well as preachers to stir up support of 
eradicating an herb with the historic support of Washington, Adams, and Jefferson alike, 
8	 	
was now denounced as “the Devil’s Weed,” (Lee, p. 49). Anslinger became extremely 
overworked while doing such convincing, that he became hospitalized for exhaustion and 
insomnia on April 1, 1935. The medical director of the U.S. Marine hospital in Norfolk, 
Virginia states that Anslinger was, “suffering from a form of nervous strain incident to 
his professional duties,” (Jill Jonnes, Hep-Cats, Narcs, and Pipe Dreams, p. 104).  
While recovering, William Randolph Hearst, publisher of, “20 daily and 11 
Sunday papers that one-fourth of all Americans read,” (William Randolph Hearst, 
Bio.com, n.d.) filled the gap that Anslinger was unable to do. Hearst used tactics like, 
“fabricating stories, doctoring photos, and having a contempt for facts gave rise to the 
expression of ‘yellow journalism,’” (Lee, p. 50). Hearst’s continuation of these tactics, 
stigmatized Mexicans using cannabis. The stigmatization of these users worsened the 
already damaged view of Mexican immigrants during the Great Depression. White 
Americans at this time “were competing with brown-skinned migrants for scarce jobs,” 
(Lee, p. 51). In the Roaring Twenties, two million Mexicans were gladly welcomed into 
America, but were deported when the economy stuttered after Black Friday’s stock 
market collapse. Sentiment of these immigrants changed quickly, making these minorities 
more susceptible of racial profiling by Hearst’s yellow journalism. Commissioner 
Anslinger knew that the likelihood of prohibitory legislation increased if the substance in 
question [cannabis] was associated with ethnic minorities. Anslinger released such 
pertinent details that would solidify his political agenda of making cannabis illegal 
stating, “50 percent of violent crimes committed in districts occupied by Mexicans, 
Greeks, Turks, Filipinos, Spaniards, Latin Americans, and Negroes may be traced to the 
use of marihuana,” (Union Signal in Bonnie and Whitebread, The Marijuana Conviction, 
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p. 106) [Anslinger changed the vernacular of cannabis to make it appear like a different 
substance all together and to further associate its use to Mexican immigrants]. 
Such targeting and profiling of ethnic minorities in America gave Congress a 
foothold to influence the public through mass media films like Reefer Madness (1936). 
Reefer Madness gives the viewers a flawed [Anslinger’s] perception of how cannabis 
intoxicates the body and the user. Throughout the ‘documentary’, undertones of 
cannabis’ addictiveness are being made. This addiction causes users to wreck cars, to 
engage in violent outbreaks, and to descend into madness. The federal government of the 
1930s is not as informed about cannabis as today. Typical users of cannabis in the 1930s 
consisted of ethnic minorities in port cities. These ethnic minorities would be integrated 
with White culture with the uprising of speakeasies during Prohibition. Drinking, 
dancing, and a Jazz environment that was almost exclusively Black musicians typified 
the environments of speakeasies. This is how the knowledge of marihuana [cannabis] was 
first exposed to the ‘typical’ American in the 1930s. The intent of Reefer Madness is to 
increase awareness and to develop hysteria among the American public, giving support 
for a ‘unifying federal measure’. 
This unifying federal measure that would extinguish the herb that grows ‘like 
dandelions’ would be introduced before Congress only a year after the creation of Reefer 
Madness. The Marihuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937, a United States Act placed an 
inordinate tax on the sale of cannabis [hemp] preparations. HR 6385 was drafted by 
Anslinger himself and introduced by Representative Robert Doughton of North Carolina 
on April 14, 1937. “The purpose of the act is to levy a token tax of approximately one 
dollar on all buyers, sellers, importers, growers, physicians, veterinarians, and any other 
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persons who deal in marijuana commercially, prescribe it professionally, or possess it,” 
(Solomon, Schaffer Library of Drug Policy, n.d.). The implications of this act were to 
bankrupt the hemp industry holistically because the tax on the hemp preparation itself 
cost more than it was worth. Solomon goes on to argue that the taxes and regulations of 
the Marihuana Tax Stamp Act implemented by the FBN, “made it far too risky for 
anyone to have anything to do with marijuana [hemp and cannabis] in any way 
whatsoever,” (Solomon, Schaffer Library). 
The Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 not only attacked the ethnic minorities that were 
using cannabis as an intoxicant, but also destroying a growing hemp industry that could 
potentially develop a domestic supply of papers, ropes, and garments. In the infancy of 
discovering the industrial advantages of hemp, Anslinger and influential colleagues came 
together to investigate the: agricultural, economic, and industrial aspects of hemp and the 
chemical, pharmacological, and sociological aspects that Marihuana [cannabis] had with 
people on December 5, 1938, during the Marihuana Conference. Such discussions 
explain the nature of hemp production in the United States when Dr. B.B. Robinson, 
Bureau of Plant Industry under the Department of Agriculture, informs the Conference: 
 The fact of the importance that hemp played in our earlier Colonial days  
 before the introduction of the cotton gin…The culture of hemp in the United 
 States [has decreased] because of the cheap competitive fiber and it is because of 
 this cheapness that they are substituted for hemp in many cases, and not because 
 of the fact that they have characteristics that are better. The average world 
 production between the years 1930 and 1938 [this year] for hemp was about 
 750 thousand tons. And now, during that same period in the United States in this 
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 small industry we have produced about 500 tons, (Robinson, Marihuana 
 Conference, 1938). 
The testimony of Robinson further solidifies and informs Congress and the FBN 
commissioner that the culture of hemp has been an integral part of American history, but 
cheaper fibers like DuPont’s nylon has caused domestic hemp production dwindling 
leaving no need for the Marihuana Tax Act. The hemp industry would have been less 
restricted if the drug was not active. Dr. S. Loewe, Pharmacologist at Cornell University 
Medical College states at the Conference, “I have tried Marihuana's action on a monkey, 
the observations were that the monkey reacts like the dog, and is one more of the few 
laboratory species which really show the ataxia action,” (Loewe, Marihuana Conference, 
1938). Ataxia is a condition in which an animal or person loses full and total control of 
body movement. Loewe goes on to explain that he has never witnessed these things with 
any human by saying, “I have no experience; I never saw it.” The objective of this 
conversation is to impose that cannabis use could lead someone to lose control of his or 
her own body and mind altogether. This combination would then make the user become 
delirious enough to commit heinous crimes.  When Loewe was doing such observations 
on monkeys and dogs, he was using a “pure form” of the drug, “to inject in his samples 
introducing it by intravenous injection.” However, promising this ‘pure form’ of cannabis 
is, Nico Escondido, writer for High Times, states that, “Dr. Raphael Mechoulam and his 
colleagues were the first to synthesize the primary psychoactive compound delta9-
tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in 1964 at the Weizmann Institute of Science in Rehovot, 
Israel,” (Escondido, High Times, 2011). Such allegations of Loewe injecting this ‘pure’ 
synthesized form of cannabis into samples is an outright lie that only added to the cause 
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of the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937. This lie stigmatized the use of cannabis as an 
intoxicant among the ethnic minorities that tended to use cannabis at this time in 
American history; all while creating a bureaucracy, FBN, to fight the hemp industry, 
which was shrinking. The ability to see if hemp was ‘free of the drug’ was impossible as 
well. The racial subtext behind the FBN and its eradication of cannabis is seen further in 
the Marihuana Conference when Dr. Robinson states in conjunction with Dr. Walter 
Bromberg, Senior Psychiatrist Department of Hospitals New York City. Robinson states, 
“The native home of hemp is Central Asia, China or India. Indian hemp has been of the 
narcotic type… and what I have been able to learn from others, hemp does not appear to 
constitute a narcotic problem in China.” Bromberg adds, “We must also note that there 
are many racial types in our material. This is important, because the British investigators 
have noted in India that Cannabis does not bring out the motor excitement or 
hysterical symptoms among Anglo-Saxon users that occurs among natives,” (Marihuana 
Conference, 1938). The idea of people having biologically different tolerances to 
substances on the basis of race is baffling and is without any psychiatric expertise of 
Bromberg.  
In the years following the Marihuana Conference, the American Medical 
Association (AMA) removed cannabis from the United States pharmacopoeia in 1942, 
where it had been since 1851. The U.S. Pharmacopeial Convention (USP), “is a scientific 
nonprofit organization that sets standards for the identity, strength, quality, and purity of 
medicines, food ingredients, and dietary supplements manufactured, distributed and 
consumed worldwide,” (US Pharmacopeial Convention, 2016). Debra Borchardt 
explains, “Eli Lilly, Parke-Davis (now owned by Pfizer) and Abbott Laboratories all sold 
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medical marijuana tinctures at the turn of the century,” (Borchardt, Forbes Magazine, 
2016). With the passing of the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937, the supply of hemp to make 
such products was lessened severely likewise the number of prescriptions fell as well. 
The Tax Act levied a tax on any doctor and pharmacist that was using cannabis or hemp 
extracts in medicine. The impact of the tax can be seen when Borchadt states, “almost six 
percent of all manufactured drugs at the turn of the century contained cannabis in one 
form or the other,” (Borchardt, 2016).  The AMA was pressured then to remove 
Cannabis sativa and all of its derivatives from its medicines. Along with extreme costs in 
prescribing cannabis, tactics made by the FBN made the general public more apt to 
believe that cannabis users typically, “Mexicans, Greeks, Turks, Filipinos, Spaniards, 
Latin Americans, and Negroes,” (Bonnie, p. 106) would commit violent criminal acts that 
are more typical of users of other narcotics [cocaine and heroin]. This view of cannabis 
users was the standing fact pertaining to drug policy in America until the LaGuardia 
Commission report in 1944.  
Fiorello LaGuardia’s long career in politics began when elected as a Republican 
to the House of Representative in 1916 to the Sixty-fifth Congress for New York. His 
tenure of being a Representative extended through the grips of Prohibition, which, “he 
opposed and also supported woman suffrage and child-labor laws,” (“LaGuardia Is 
Dead,” New York Times, 2010). LaGuardia was elected as the Mayor of New York City 
in 1933, the same year Prohibition was repealed. In his eleventh year of New York City, 
“Fiorella LaGuardia called upon The New York Academy of Medicine to produce a 
report about marijuana,” (“Marijuana and Drug Policy Reform in New York,” Drug 
Policy Alliance, 2014). LaGuardia states in the motive of the full report made in 1944 
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when he states, “Rumors were recently circulated concerning the smoking of marihuana 
by large segments of our population and even by school children, I sought advice from 
The New York Academy of Medicine… I appointed a special committee to make a 
thorough sociological and scientific investigation, and secured funds from three 
Foundations with which to finance these studies,” (LaGuardia, New York Academy of 
Medicine, 1944). This study was the first scientific and sociological investigation of 
cannabis use by a source other than the FBN. The findings of the report are:  
The cost of marihuana is low and therefore within the purchasing power of most 
 persons [leading an explanation as to why the FBN could attach the use to poor, 
 ethnic minorities], the majority of marihuana smokers are Negroes and Latin-
 Americans, the practice of smoking marihuana does not lead to addiction in the 
 medical sense of the word, the use of marihuana does not lead to morphine or 
 heroin or cocaine addiction [‘stepping stone’ or gateway theory is disproved], and 
 Marihuana is not the determining factor in the commission of major crimes, 
 (LaGuardia, New York Academy of Medicine, 1944). 
The LaGuardia Commission Report would be the first of many reports to be 
ignored by the FBN to change legislation of Marihuana and hemp. LaGuardia’s final 
position in government was the director general of the United States Relief 
Administration (UNRRA) whose purpose is to, “plan, co-ordinate, administer… the relief 
of victims in any area under the control of the United Nations through the provision of 
food, fuel, clothing, and medical and other essential services,” (UNRRA, 1943). 
LaGuardia did not get to see his progressive ideal of legalizing cannabis before his death 
in 1947. 
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The points of the LaGuardia Report being ignored would continue the cannabis 
prohibition. Cannabis criminals would in fact be lumped together with offenders of 
heroin and cocaine crimes when in 1952 the Boggs Act was passed. Hale Boggs, a 
Louisiana Democrat, sponsored the Act. The Boggs Act outlined harsher mandatory 
minimums, prescribed sentence lengths that judges cannot lower, for cocaine, heroin, and 
cannabis offenders. “Under the Boggs Act, simple possession of such narcotics carried a 
two-year mandatory minimum sentence for the first offense, a subsequent offense would 
carry a five-year sentence, and a third offense would carry a minimum of a ten-year 
sentence,” (A Brief History, Tilem & Associates, 2009). This legislation was motivated 
by the apparent increase in drug addiction and trafficking offenses. The increase in 
offenses can be explained by, “the abnormal postwar drug splurge and the increased force 
of [FBN] agents now in the Narcotics Bureau. Congress provided funds last year to add 
87 agents bringing the total to 270, and the increased efforts [coordination and 
cooperation] of states and communities to wipe out the drug menace,” (Byrd, Health 
Instructions Yearbook, 1952). Such legislation did not, however, make a difference 
between addicts and traffickers. Regardless of intent, everyone convicted of drug crimes 
received the same mandatory minimum sentence only depending on how many prior 
offenses one had been convicted of. Such legislation is ironic and hypocritical at its very 
roots. The hypocrisy is Anslinger himself, “arranged a regular supply of morphine,” 
(Anslinger, The Murderers, p. 181), for, “none other than Senator Joseph McCarthy,” 
(McWilliams, The Protectors, p. 98-99). Anslinger even mentioned to a congressional 
hearing in 1951, “They started there and graduated to heroin; they took the needle when 
the thrill of marijuana was gone,” (Sullum, Forbes Magazine, 2015). In 1952, the total 
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number of people incarcerated was 168,233 and the national incarceration rate was 107 
people per 100,000. (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1981).  
Just two years later, in 1954 President Dwight Eisenhower called for, “a new war 
on narcotics addiction at the local, national, and international level,” (Jonnes, Hep-Cats, 
p. 262); to emphasize that narcotic drugs were a matter of immediate concern to his 
administration. In 1956, the Narcotics Control Act of 1956 was passed. This Act 
increased the mandatory minimum for the first-time drug offender from two years to five 
and any subsequent offenses from five years to ten years, (A Brief History, Tilem & 
Associates, 2009). These mandatory had little impact on the number of drug traffickers 
and the number of drug addicts in the country. In fact, the only indication that such thing 
was being affected is the rising number of people incarcerated in America. By 1957, only 
six years after the Boggs Act was passed, the number of people incarcerated rose to 
195,414, a 16 percent increase, (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1981), while the total US 
population only increased nine percent in the same time period. The total prison 
population increased 1.5 times as fast as the population, showing either the increase in 
drug addiction or the increase in the FBN’s incentive to arrest such people. 
The dramatic foil to the 1950s increase in mandatory minimums is seen with the 
Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, more commonly known as the 
Prettyman Commission, set forth by Executive Order 11076. The design of this advisory 
commission is to, “design and put into operation a master research plan that would permit 
a comprehensive program of research to be carried out on all aspects of narcotics and 
drug abuse,” (President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug Abuse, 1963). 
This was the first national, presidential ‘program of research’ that would investigate 
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alternatives to dealing with narcotics and drug abuse in the United States. The 
commission recommends treating individual drug abusers instead of forcing them into a 
jail sentence that, “made rehabilitation of the convicted narcotics offender virtually 
impossible, since there is no incentive for rehab where there is no hope for parole,” 
(President’s Advisory Commission, 1963). This commission suggests that the ‘peddlers 
of small quantities’ and ‘traffickers’ be treated differently in any legislation that may be 
formed. This was one of the many issues with both the Boggs Act and the Narcotics 
Control Act of 1956; the user and trafficker were treated the same with mandatory 
minimums. Additionally, and most importantly, the commission states, “Any legislation 
providing for [needing] Federal regulation should not be limited to barbiturates and 
amphetamines alone, but ones…that can result in psychotoxic [pertaining to certain drugs 
that can damage the brain] or antisocial behavior,” (President’s Advisory Commission, 
1963). This definition of substances that would require ‘federal legislation’ should not 
require cannabis. Mahmoud ElSohly published Potency Trends for Ole Miss in 2010, 
stating, “The nonpsychotropic cannabinoid Cannabidiol (CBD) displays antipsychotic, 
antihyperalgesic, anticonvulsant [for patients with epileptic seizures], neuroprotective, 
and antiemetic properties,” (ElSohly, Potency Trends, 2010). Additionally, the LaGuardia 
Commission Report done 19 years before the Prettyman Commission, states, “The use of 
marihuana, the individual experiences increased feelings of relaxation, disinhibition, and 
self-confidence. This new feeling of self-confidence induced by the drug expresses itself 
through oral activity rather through physical activity [an increase in sociability not 
antisocialism],” (LaGuardia, New York Academy of Medicine, 1944). If the two properties 
of drugs that need ‘federal legislation’ namely being a psychointoxicant and something 
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that elicits antisocial tendencies are not met, then cannabis should not need such ‘federal 
legislation’ as outlined in the President’s Advisory Commission on Narcotics and Drug 
Abuse.  
While the Prettyman Commission was monumental in the treatment of low-level 
‘peddlers of small quantities’ of narcotics, its ideals did not come to fruition because of 
President John F. Kennedy’s death only seven months after the interim report was made. 
Further advances came in 1966 with the Commission on Law Enforcement and 
Administration of Justice, commonly known as the Katzenbach Commission. The goal of 
this Commission of President Lyndon B. Johnson is, “to develop far broader range of 
alternatives for dealing with offenders-is based on the belief that, while there are some 
who must be completely segregated from society, there are many instances in which 
segregation does more harm than good,” (The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 
1966). This Commission goes on to inform the readers about the rise in cannabis seizures 
and arrests, “use appears to be increasing. Bulk seizures of marihuana by Federal 
enforcement authorities totaled 5,641 kilograms in 1965 as against 1,871 kilograms in 
1960. Bureau of Narcotics arrests for marihuana offenses about doubled over the same 
period of time,” (The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 1966). While the Prettyman 
Commission suggests that rehabilitation is a better alternative than incarceration, this 
Commission suggests otherwise by saying, “The enforcement and related staff of the 
Bureau of Narcotics should be materially increased. The need for more funds and more 
staff are necessary. Yet the simple fact is that the Bureau has numerous complex tasks to 
perform. It bears the major Federal responsibility for suppression of traffic in illicit 
narcotics and marihuana,” (The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 1966). The idea 
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that more money given to the FBN would lower drug crimes is ludicrous. With more 
agents ‘suppressing the traffic in illicit narcotics and marihuana’, the incentive in 
becoming a trafficker of such illicit narcotics and marihuana becomes higher. The 
ultimate goal of the Katzenbach Commission is for; “state and federal drug laws should 
give a large enough measure of discretion to the courts and correctional authorities to 
enable them to deal flexibly with violators, taking account of the nature and seriousness 
of the offense, the prior record of the offender and other relevant circumstances,” (1966). 
Such ‘flexibility with violators’ would ultimately be the idea that would repeal the 
mandatory minimums set by the Boggs Act and the heightened mandatory minimums of 
Narcotics Control Act of 1956. Regardless of the efficacy of both these Commissions, the 
total number of people incarcerated decreased from a relative high in 1962 with an 
incarceration rate of 117 per 100 thousand citizens and a total prison population of 
218,830 to 111 per 100 thousand in 1964 and a total prison population of 214,336, the 
total prison population decreased two percent, one year after the Prettyman Commission, 
(Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1981), while the United States population grew at 2.9 
percent in the same time period, Likewise, the time between the Prettyman and the 
Katzenbach Commission saw a reduction in total prison population of 12.3 percent from 
1964 to 1968, “the total prison population from these time periods decreased from 
214,336 to 187,914,” (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 1981). 
 The University of Mississippi (Ole Miss) has had cannabis lawfully and legally 
growing since 1968. “The project began in 1968, when the National Institute of Drug 
Abuse (NIDA) gave the university and the Research Institute of Pharmaceutical Sciences 
its first contract,” (Garrett, Ole Miss News, 2012). Currently, “it is the nation’s only 
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federally sanctioned marijuana farm, producing a research supply through a contract with 
[the University of Mississippi] in Oxford,” (Shen, Nature.com, 2014). The Prettyman 
Commission suggested that substances needed ‘legislation if they can result in 
psychotoxic and antisocial behavior,’ (1963). Other reasons behind this contract awarded 
to Ole Miss includes the increased social acceptance of the use of cannabis as well as it 
being, “essential to have this resource available to researchers so that we can continue to 
make progress in understanding the endogenous cannabinoid system, as well as 
marijuana abuse and dependence,” (Garrett, 2012). While this essential resource is at Ole 
Miss, the NIDA does have specific instructions before an institution is granted a contract 
to study marijuana abuse and dependence. These specific instructions can be seen in the 
NIDA’s “Request for Proposals Notice” (2014). The institution must be able to:  
 Cultivate, harvest, process, analyze, store, and distribute cannabis for research; 
 extract  cannabis to produce and standardized extracts containing varying 
 concentrations of THC and CBD; isolate current Good Manufacturing Practices 
 (cGMP-grade) and research grade THC, CBD, and other cannabinoids; supply 
 research investigators and/or to the NIDA Drug Supply program upon NIDA 
 authorization; analyze confiscated cannabis samples submitted by the Drug 
 Enforcement Agency (DEA); maintain a secure and video monitored outdoor 
 facility and an indoor growing facility; and secure storage (vault) facility to 
 maintain an inventory of approximately 400 to 700 kilograms, (Request for 
 Proposals Notice, NIDA, 2014). 
At the time when the NIDA opened up the research supply of cannabis, Dr. Timothy 
Leary brought his three federal marijuana crimes to the Supreme Court of the United 
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States on the grounds that the Marijuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937, compelled himself and 
all others in question of a possible violation of the Act, to expose him or herself to a real 
and appreciable risk of self-incrimination. His three counts consisted of, “smuggling 
marijuana into the United States, charged transportation, facilitation of transportation, 
and concealment of marijuana after importation in violation of Title 21 United States 
Code, Section 176a, and charged transportation and concealment of marijuana by 
defendants as transferees, required to pay the transfer tax imposed by the Internal 
Revenue Code, in violation of Title 26 United States Code, Section 4744(a), and was 
given the maximum penalties and fines provided for such offenses,” (Leary v. United 
States Supreme Court, 1969). These fines and penalties, “provides for a maximum fine of 
not more than $20,000 and shall be imprisoned not less than five years or more than 
twenty years for a first offense,” (21 U.S.C. Section 176), for the charge of concealment 
of marijuana after importation, and the “maximum fine of $20,000 and imprisonment of 
ten years for a first offense violation,” (26 U.S.C., Section 4744(a)). 
 These charges happened in 1965 when Leary and his family drove across the 
international border into Mexico. After crossing into the Republic of Mexico, Leary was 
stopped at the immigration station and told to come back the next morning to secure 
tourist permits. Leary had to go back into the United States through Laredo, Texas, where 
he was searched and three partially smoked marijuana cigarettes were found. 
 Leary challenged that such charges under the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937 denied 
him Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and due process. Leary would 
be put in a legal “double jeopardy” with paying such transfer tax of the Marijuana Tax 
Act of 1937. Leary would be put in a position to pay a legal tax on an illegal substance or 
22	 	
to pay an illegal tax on a legal substance; either of which caused strife on users of 
cannabis. The legal “double jeopardy” associated with use of cannabis under the 
Marijuana Tax Act would be defined by this court case. Justice Marshall Harlan II’s 
opinion swayed other justices to make a unanimous decision repealing the Act. After the 
repeal of the Marijuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937, Congress quickly introduced new 
legislation, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. 
 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 was 
introduced on September 24, 1970, only 14 months of Leary v. the United States 
Supreme Court. This Act’s primary function was to outline, “the illegal use of legally 
manufactured drugs, such as amphetamines and barbiturates,” (Comprehensive Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, FindLaw, 2016). The two main components 
of this Act include the Controlled Substances Act and the Importation and Exportation, 
Criminal Forfeiture, and Drug Law Amendments, Title II and Title III respectively. The 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), “provides the legal basis for the government’s war on 
drugs. This law consolidated laws on manufacturing and distributing drugs of all kinds, 
including narcotics, hallucinogens, steroids, and chemicals when used to make controlled 
substances, etc.,” (Title II, 1970). The CSA outlined drugs into five different schedules, 
with higher schedules being considered less addictive and having a more widely accepted 
medical use in the United States. Schedule I drugs are defined as, “a high potential for 
abuse, no current accepted medical use in the United States, and lack of accepted safety 
for use of the drug,” (CSA). Some drugs in this schedule include lysergic acid 
diethylamide (LSD), a powerful hallucinogen; heroin, a highly addictive painkiller 
derived from morphine; ecstasy; and marijuana and all of its derivatives. Schedule II 
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drugs are defined as, “having a lessened potential for abuse when compared to Schedule I 
drugs, currently have accepted medical treatment in the United States, and abuse of the 
drugs in this schedule may lead to severe psychological and physical dependency,” 
(CSA). Some drugs in this schedule include cocaine, methamphetamine, prescribed for 
extreme obesity; Methadone, used for opiate and heroin withdrawals; OxyContin, a 
medication used to relieve moderate to severe pain; Adderall and Ritalin, an 
amphetamine used to treat Attention Deficit Disorder and narcolepsy. Schedule III drugs 
are defined as, “having a moderate to low potential for physical and psychological 
dependency,” (CSA). Some drugs in this schedule include Vicodin, ketamine, anabolic 
steroids, and dronabinol, synthetically derived THC used to treat nausea and to increase 
appetite among patients undergoing cancer and AIDS treatment. Schedule IV drugs are 
defined as, “having a low potential for abuse and low risk of dependency,” (CSA). Some 
drugs in the schedule include Xanax, used to treat anxiety; Soma, a muscle relaxant; and 
Ambien, a medication used to treat insomnia. Schedule V drugs are defined as, “having 
the least potential for abuse and contain limited quantities of certain narcotics,” (CSA). 
The medications are usually used for, “antidiarrheal, antitussive, analgesic purposes, and 
may not require a prescription,” (CSA). Title III of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970, “changed the law and penalties regarding 
importation and exportation of controlled substances and criminal forfeiture,” (Title III, 
1970). Criminal forfeiture is the government confiscating assets of drug criminals to fund 
the drug agency that arrests the person possessing the different scheduled controlled 
substances.  
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Once the CSA was signed into law, specific political activists like Ralph Nader 
and attorney Keith Stroup aspired to create an organization to lobby for changes to 
cannabis laws. Stroup was denied by every major foundation for funding until he met 
with Hugh Hefner and the Playboy Foundation. Hefner gave Stroup the first $5,000 to 
fund the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) in 1970, 
(Reuteman, CNBC, 2010). NORML at its core beliefs represents the voice that was not 
heard in the 1960s after the Prettyman Commission.  
 In signing the Comprehensive Act of 1970 on October 27, 1970, Nixon launched 
the National Commission on Marihuana and Drug Abuse, Shafer Commission, in 1972. 
The Shafer Commission broadened the scope of knowledge on cannabis much like the 
LaGuardia Commission did almost 30 years prior. The Shafer Commission “conducted 
the most extensive and comprehensive examination of marijuana ever performed by the 
US government,” (Nixon Tapes Show…, CDSP, 2002). The LaGuardia Commission in 
effect did the same thing but on a much narrower demographic of people confined to only 
New York City. “Both sets of findings are strikingly similar in the three areas that have 
historically created public apprehension about marihuana use, namely that marihuana, in 
itself, is physically addictive, produces insanity, and leads to crime. Both reports 
dispelled such allegations and myths,” (Pike, Marijuana, 2014). Since the allegations of 
marijuana being physically addictive, producing insanity, and imminent crimes being laid 
to rest, the Shafer Commission’s recommendation was, “the decriminalization of 
possession and non-profit transfer of marijuana,” (Shafer Commission, 1972, p. 151). 
Decriminalization of marijuana would be treated more like a traffic citation whose 
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punishment includes a small fine and no arrest record. Regardless of such conclusive 
evidence compiled from: 
 Thousands of pages of transcripts of formal and informal hearings, solicited all 
 points of view, including those of public officials, community leaders, 
 professional experts and students…. they conducted separate surveys of opinion 
 among district attorneys, judges, probation officers, clinicians, university health 
 officials and ‘free clinic’ personnel. They commissioned more than 50 projects, 
 ranging from a study of the effects of marijuana on man to a field survey of 
 enforcement of the marijuana laws in six metropolitan jurisdictions, (Pike, 
 Marijuana.com, 2014). 
President Nixon states to his aide H.R. Aldeman, “I want a goddamn strong statement 
about marijuana. Can I get that out of this of sonofa-bitching, uh, domestic council 
[Shafer Commission]? I mean one on marijuana that just tears the ass out of them,” 
(Smoke Signals, Lee, p. 121).  Nixon hated and not only marijuana but also marijuana 
users and the ideology that was typified from them. Nixon goes on to say, “You see, 
homosexuality, dope, immorality in general. These are the enemies of strong societies. 
That’s why the Communists and the left-wingers are pushing the stuff; they’re trying to 
destroy us,” (Oval Office Tape, 1971). Within one year of Nixon and the White House 
ignoring the findings of the Shafer Commission, the Drug Enforcement Agency is formed 
in 1973. The Drug Enforcement Agency was created with the joining responsibilities of 
the FBN and the Bureau of Drug Abuse Control. Such agency’s effects can be seen in the 
total number of marijuana arrests climbing from, “292,179 in 1972 to 420,700 in 1973 [a 
44.03 percent increase],” (Federal Bureau of Investigation, Uniform Crime Reports, 
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1972-2000). It would take another 22 years of the “War on Drugs” to see that increase in 
marijuana arrests again.  
 Since the sentiment of the Shafer Commission, one of federally decriminalizing 
marijuana was not equated in the scheduling of marijuana shortly after in the CSA of 
1970, “NORML led the successful efforts to decriminalize minor marijuana offenses in 
11 states and significantly lower marijuana penalties in others,” (A Voice for Responsible 
Marijuana Smokers, NORML, 2013). In 1973, Oregon became the first state to apply such 
laws on the state level. By 1980, 10 other states followed suit. “Alaska, California, 
Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, New York, Nebraska, North Carolina, and Ohio have in 
some manner altered their existing laws to reduce the penalties for marijuana 
possession,” (Austin, NORML, 2016). The decriminalization movement’s central 
argument is that avoiding a criminal offense saves money in three main fields, court and 
judicial costs; police and enforcement costs; and corrections and incarceration costs. 
While costs of enforcing marijuana laws decrease immensely under decriminalization, 
opponents of decriminalization argue that decreased punishment heightened the incentive 
to use it. “In Ohio, where decriminalization was instituted in 1975, use of marijuana rose 
from 27 percent to 33 percent from 1974 to 1978 among those aged 18 to 24, and from 
six percent to 19 percent among those aged 25 to34 during the same period (pp. 458-
459). In California, which decriminalized marijuana use in January 1976, adult marijuana 
use rose from 28 percent to 35 percent from February 1975 to November 1976,” (Single, 
Journal of Public Health Policy, p. 456-66). More objectivity is needed to see the true 
scope of these statistics because these statistics were taken from a time when in general 
marijuana consumption was increasing and peaked in 1979, (Goode, 1990). When 
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comparing decriminalized states to states that had the strictest illegality of cannabis, “the 
group of states with the most severe punishments had the highest proportionate increases 
of the groups,” (Single, p. 459). This system of regulating cannabis in this fashion did 
protect citizens in such states from a criminal action, but medical marijuana did not come 
to fruition until the court cases involving Robert Randall. 
 The court case of United States v. Randall is the beginning of medical marijuana 
in the United States since the Marihuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937. Robert Randall was 
arrested for marijuana cultivation. Suffering from glaucoma, Randall used the, “Common 
Law doctrine of necessity to defend himself against criminal charges,” (Alliance for 
Cannabis Therapeutics, 1999). On November 24, 1976, federal Judge James Washington 
ruled that Randall could use marijuana for his medical condition out of ‘medical 
necessity.’ Judge Washington ruled: 
 While blindness was shown by competent medical testimony to be the otherwise 
 inevitable result of defendant’s disease [glaucoma], no adverse effects from the 
 smoking of marijuana have been demonstrated…. Medical evidence suggests that 
 the medical prohibition is not well founded, (Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 
 1999). 
 Upon the decision of the court case, Randall was, “subsequently allowed access to 
the federal cannabis supply through the Compassionate Investigational New Drug (IND) 
Program that was under the authority of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA),” 
(“Federal IND Patients,” Medical Cannabis, 2016) from Ole Miss. Shortly after the court 
ruling, federal agencies, namely the ones that administer the ‘federal cannabis supply’ 
[FDA, DEA, and NIDA] attempted to stifle the supply. Randall filed suit (Randall v. 
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United States, 1978) against such agencies. “With an out-of-court settlement whose 
results allowed Randall prescriptive access to marijuana through a federal pharmacy 
located near his home,” (Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, 1999). This court decision 
set the legal precedent for medical use of marijuana through the FDA’s Compassionate 
IND program. This program, however, was extremely limited in the patients that could 
have access to the ‘federal cannabis supplies.’ With actions for medical use of marijuana 
under the Compassionate IND program, the annual marijuana arrests declined from, “446 
thousand in 1978; to 392 thousand in 1979; to 405,600 in 1980; to 400,300 in 1981,” 
(FBI, 1972-2000). 
  While arrests for marijuana were decreasing in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
sentiment for, “adolescent drug prevention became a movement in the 1980s,” 
(Lilienfeld, Arkowitz, Scientific American, 2014). First Lady Nancy Reagan became the 
face of such movement when she uttered, ‘Just Say No,’ in 1982, “in response to a 
schoolgirl who wanted to know what she should say if someone offered her drugs,” 
(Lilienfeld, Arkowitz, 2014). This approach was made to increase awareness regarding 
drug use and abuse. To increase such awareness of drug use, adolescent drug prevention 
program, Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) was created in 1983 by the Los 
Angeles Police Department. The DARE program has become the most prominent 
program on educating pupils the dangers of using drugs which also uses a, “uniformed 
law enforcement officer, meeting the minimum requirement training standards for peace 
officer status in their state of residence, and who has completed the equivalent of two 
years as a peace officer with full police powers,” (Starting a DARE Program). The 
gateway theory, the use of less harmful substances precede and eventually lead to the use 
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of more harmful substances, was tantamount in DARE’s approach. The less harmful 
substance that DARE often disposes as the gateway drug to harder drugs is marijuana. 
This is seen when DARE still states; “marijuana is both an illegal and harmful drug to the 
youth of this nation,” (“Incorrect Posting on Position of Marijuana”, DARE America, 
2016). With the American youth being educated by a ‘minimally trained peace officer’ on 
drug use and the overly simple response to drug abuse of ‘Just Say No’, the apparent 
need for more legislation and control of people that are guilty of these criminal offenses 
approaches a new height. Such increases in the number of people guilty of these crimes 
led to an expansion of the criminal justice system. 
 This expansion hit a major obstacle in 1984; the American taxpayer no longer 
would no longer buy local or state bonds to fund the building of new prisons. “Lack of 
public funding led to the Federal Bureau of Prisons to turn to venture capital, with the 
formation of Corrections Corporation of America (CCA),” (“The Prison Boom”, 
Corrections Project, 2008). CCA could lease their beds to the state or federal 
governments for a profit making opportunity. Critics of prison privatization accuse such a 
model of, “corruption, corrosive incentives like maximizing profits by removing essential 
services within the prison – from medical care, food, and clothing to staff cost and 
security,” (Corrections Project, 2008). Additionally, this perverse symbiotic relationship 
between legislators and privatized prisons brings an overwhelming racist demographic of 
inmates. Such racist demographics can be seen when one analyzes, “the demographic 
make-up of today’s prisons in the US being roughly 50 percent African-American, 35 
percent Latino, and 15 percent White,” (Corrections Project, 2008), while the US 
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population is roughly, “70 percent White, 12 percent African-American, and 15 percent 
Latino,” (Gibson, United States Census Bureau, 2012). 
While venture capital was funding the expansion of the criminal justice system, 
pharmaceutical companies made synthetic cannabinoids legal with the introduction of 
Marinol. “Marinol is the only US FDA-approved synthetic cannabinoid and is prescribed 
for the treatment of cachexia (weight loss) in patients with AIDS and for the treatment of 
nausea and vomiting associated with cancer chemotherapy in patients,” (Armentano, 
NORML, 2005).  The function of the medicine matches the medical ailments that patients 
of the Compassionate IND program had. While Marinol does offer, “limited relief to 
select patients,” (Armentano, 2005), the medication only includes one of the 66 
analogous cannabinoid compounds. The cannabinoid compound that is present is 
synthetic THC. Marinol only offers a limited spectrum of benefits when compared to 
natural cannabis, (Armentano, 2005). The FDA classifies Marinol as a Schedule III drug, 
which “has a moderate to low potential for physical and psychological dependency,” 
(CSA). If the limited ability of synthetic derived THC has an accepted medical treatment 
in the United States, then the medical benefits of natural cannabis should be treated as the 
same class. The additional cannabinoids that are present in natural cannabis include, 
“CBD, naturally occurring terpenoids (oils), and flavonoids (phenols),” (Armentano, 
2005). The medical properties of CBD include analgesic, antispasmodic (suppressing 
muscle spasms), anxiolytic (suppressing anxiety), antipsychotic, antinausea, and anti-
rheumatoid arthritic properties, (Mechoulam, Journal of Cannabis Therapeutics), 
whereas Terpenoids exhibit anti-inflammatory properties and flavonoids possess 
antioxidant properties, (McPartland and Russo, Journal of Cannabis Therapeutics, 2002). 
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Natural cannabis has a wider scope of treatment potential than Marinol as well as natural 
cannabis can be genetically selected to have a combination of such properties to more 
properly address different medical conditions.  
 The 1980s drug war took flight after the death of Len Bias from a cocaine 
overdose just two days after getting signed to the Boston Celtics. Then, “Democratic 
House Speaker O’Neill saw this as the perfect opportunity to ‘get tough on crime.’” 
(Sterling, PBS, 2014). The death of Len Bias further solidified the existence of the 
crack/cocaine epidemic that the United States faced in the early to mid-1980s. The 
atmosphere in the political realm at this time was one that allowed for The Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986 to pass before the November elections. This Act had provisions to 
reintroduce mandatory minimums that were repealed in 1970, even though, “no hearings 
were held with no experts on the relevant issues, no judges, no one from the Bureau of 
Prisons, or from any other office in the government, provided advice on the idea before it 
was rushed through the committee and into law,” (Sterling, 2014). The Act did make a 
distinction between “major” and “serious” traffickers, with sentencing based on the 
amount of the controlled substance possessed at the time of the arrest. “Major” traffickers 
received a mandatory minimum sentence of 10 years while “serious” traffickers received 
a minimum sentence of 5 years. The only exception to receiving these mandatory 
minimums would be to give “substantial assistance”. This practice is typified by 
testifying against another drug offender in exchange for a more lenient sentence, 
(Sterling, 2014). This bill, “shifted power away from judges- who are impartial- to 
prosecutors, who are not,” (Sterling, 2014). 
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 In 1988, The Anti-Drug Abuse Act was amended whose purpose is to have, “new 
and increased penalties for offenses related to drug trafficking, reducing drug demand 
through increased treatment and prevention efforts, and applies sanctions to put added 
pressure on drug users,” (Anti-Drug Abuse Act, 100th Congress, 1988). The 1988 Anti-
Drug Abuse Act achieved its purpose by, “denying certain Federal benefits for specific 
periods, imposed mandatory life imprisonment of certain three-time drug offenders, 
requiring the revocation of parole, probation, and other supervised release for anyone 
found to be in possession of an illegal drug, and included asset forfeiture amendments,” 
(Act of 1988, 100th Congress). These additions to federal drug policy caused a 300 
percent increase in the number of drug cases by 1994, (Sterling, 2014). The amending of 
the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act caused the federal government’s stance on drug abuse to 
become less rehabilitative as well as created unlawful incentives to seize and forfeit 
property of people in unwarranted cases. The profits that come from such asset forfeitures 
go to the law enforcement agencies that made the seizure. These Acts were one of the 
main causes of the: 
150 percent increase in total jail populations from 1978 to 1989 as well as the 
transition from jails operating at 65 percent of rated capacity in 1978 to 108 percent of 
rated capacity in 1989.  Data from the 1989 survey indicate that drug violations were 
directly responsible for 40 percent of the increase in jail populations between 1983 and 
1989 which led to the building of 263 State prisons [which adds up to] 13 million square 
feet, a 58 percent increase in total housing space,” (Greenfield, US Department of Justice, 
1992). 
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The last provision of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 that was implemented in 
January 1989 is the Office of National Drug Policy (ONDCP). The ONDCP, “develops 
and coordinates the policies and objectives of the federal government’s program for 
reducing the use of illegal drugs by producing the National Drug Control Strategy, 
directing the United States anti-drug efforts and establishes a program, a budget, and 
guidelines for cooperation among federal, state, and local entities,” (Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, 2008). The goals of such cooperation between these entities are to 
reduce illegal drug use, manufacturing and trafficking, and drug-related health 
consequences. This extension of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 also requires 
employers contracting with the federal government in any way to meet certain 
requirements for providing a ‘drug-free workplace.’ The ONDCP makes compliance with 
its policies a precondition for receiving a federal grant or contract. Non-compliant 
contractors can have federal payments suspended indefinitely and having such federal 
payments suspended also makes non-compliant contractors unable to receive another 
grant for a period of up to five years. The ONDCP’s initial budget was 7.864 billion 
dollars in 1989, (Foley, ONDCP, 1989). By the end of 1989, the total number of inmates 
in Federal and State prisons and local jails stood at, “773,919 with an increase of 84,764 
from 1988,” (Beck, Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2007). The increase of 84,764 is a 13.5 
percent growth, the highest rate increase in the Bureau of Prisons records. This year also 
had the most crowded prisons when compared to rated capacity. “Federal prisons, by 
1990, were 151 percent of rated capacity where State prisons were 115 percent of rated 
capacity, and a total incarceration rate of 460 per 100,000 citizens, (Beck, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, 2007). The Anti-Drug Abuse Acts of 1986 and 1988’s provisions 
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increased the total populations of local jails by 58 percent, state prisons by 52 percent, 
and federal prisons by 64 percent, and the incarceration rate by 47 percent by 1990.  
Such increases in the criminal justice system fostered the support of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 which is the, “the largest crime bill in 
the history of the United States. The Act provided for 100 thousand new police officers, 
$9.7 billion in funding for expanding prisons that were extremely overcrowded, $6.1 
billion in funding for prevention programs, and $2.6 billion in additional funding for the 
FBI, DEA, … and other Justice Department components, (Violent Crime Control and 
Law Enforcement Act of 1994). The government’s intention with such increases in 
budgets is clear. Its belief is consistent in that drug users and traffickers’ prevalence is 
best combated through long sentencing versus rehabilitative programs. Furthermore, this 
Act established Drug Courts which provide supervision and specialized services to 
offenders with rehabilitation potential with $29 million dollars available in funding for 
1995, (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994).  These specialized 
services include the parole and probation instead of a jail sentence, but such measures are 
stripped with mandatory minimums explaining why the funding is nominal when 
compared to the increase in funding for incarceration efforts. The privatization of prisons 
through venture capital is more profitable than offering services rehabilitating drug 
offenders/abusers.  
With the federal government passing the ‘largest crime bill in United States’ 
history, the state of California passed Proposition 215 also known as the Medical Use of 
Marijuana Initiative on November 6, 1996, (Proposition 215, CA NORML, 2013). This 
Proposition would be in direct conflict with federal legislation specifically the Schedule I 
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classification of cannabis. This would allow the points of the Shafer Commission and the 
LaGuardia Report to possibly come to fruition after 24 and 52 years of legislation that 
went against their findings. Proposition 215, “exempts patients and defined caregivers 
who possess or cultivate marijuana for medical treatment recommended by a physician 
from criminal laws which otherwise prohibit possession or cultivation,” (California 
Proposition 215, Ballotpedia.org, 2008). The Proposition outlines special medical 
conditions to be able to receive a doctor’s recommendation of medical marijuana. The 
medical conditions outlined by Proposition 215 are as follows, “Acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), anorexia, arthritis, cachexia, cancer, chronic pain, 
glaucoma, migraine, persistent muscle spasms, seizures, severe nausea, or any other 
chronic or persistent medical symptom that substantially limits the ability of the person to 
conduct one or more major life activities as define in the Americans with Disability Act 
of 1990 (Public Law 101-336),” (Proposition 215, 2008). 
California Proposition 215 was the first medical marijuana ballot initiative passed 
at the state level; causing a conflict in the United States between medical marijuana 
advocates and those in support of a stronger federal presence with regards to the 
enforcement of domestic marijuana possession laws would be the cornerstone of States’ 
rights issues for the coming century.  
The federal government subsequently, yet independently passed the Aid 
Elimination Provision of the Higher Education Act in 1998. This “excludes students with 
drug convictions from receiving federal financial aid to attend institutions of higher 
education,” (Angell, Students for Sensible Drug Policy, 2006). With the lack of federal 
financial aid, students are often so discouraged to return back to the two-year or four-year 
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university that was attended before the drug conviction. Angell’s report goes on to say, 
“The Department of Education reports that 36 percent of those who left four-year 
institutions did not return within five years [of conviction]; 50 percent of those who left 
two-year institutions did not return within five years.” The Aid Elimination Provision is 
fiscally irresponsible and accomplishes a goal that is the exact opposite intention of 
‘deterring drug use.’ Its fiscally irresponsibility is seen with, “high school graduates are 
almost three times as likely to rely on costly public assistance programs [when compared 
to college graduates],” (Angell, 2006).  Additionally, “the US Government 
Accountability Office indicated that it could find no evidence the penalty ‘actually helped 
to deter drug use,’” (Angell, 2006). The breadth and impact of the Aid Elimination 
Provision is seen when Doug McVay Director of Research at Common Sense for Drug 
Policy mentions, “One in every 400 students applying for federal financial aid is rejected 
because of a drug conviction. While an analysis of Department of Education’s numbers 
by a drug policy overhaul group found, a total of almost 200 thousand students have been 
denied financial aid from the 2000 to 2001 academic to the when the report was written 
in 2009. Indiana Representative Mark Souder, a Republican and sponsor of the legislation 
states, “The principle remains the same: The American taxpayer should not be 
subsidizing the educations of those students who are convicted of dealing or using illegal 
drugs,” (McVay, CSDP, 2009). For example, “incarcerating one prisoner cost taxpayers 
$26,000 a year, while the average annual cost of a four-year public college is $5,836,” 
(Angell, 2006). Representative Souder’s contributors Sallie Mae, a publicly traded 
company that specializes in private student loans, has contributed over $22 thousand to 
Souder’s campaign. Sallie Mae would not want people guilty of drug convictions to have 
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access to federal loans, which typically have a lower interest rate than private loans, but 
would rather drug offenders fund their college experience by its loans. The Aid 
Elimination Provision added that if convicted, “a student would be eligible before the end 
of the ineligibility period if he/she satisfactorily completes a drug rehabilitation 
program,” (Aid Elimination Provision, 1998), but such rehabilitation program is grossly 
unavailable and often inadequate to aid with addiction because instead the American 
government fights this war through incarceration instead.  
With the need of rehabilitation programs instead of incarceration for American 
citizens and students alike, “Proposition 36 passed with 61 percent approval in November 
2000, through direct referendum, with $120 million allocated to drug treatment 
programs,” (Ehlers, Justice Policy Institute, 2006). The goal of Proposition 36 was to 
divert nonviolent defendants, probationers, and parolees from incarceration into 
community-based substance abuse treatment programs,” (Substance Abuse and Crime 
Prevention Act). Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger was questioning the success of 
Proposition 36 because only one-half of the drug offenders completed treatment. The 
success of Proposition 36 can be seen from total drug possession offenders. “The total in 
December 2000 was 19,736 and five years later in December 2005 the total was 14,325, a 
27.4 decrease,” (Ehlers, 2006). A recent cost analysis on Proposition 36 by UCLA’s 
Integrated Substance Abuse Programs found that the state saved at least two and one-half 
dollars for every dollar spent on the program each year and saved four dollars for every 
person who successfully completed treatment. Total savings for the five years that 
Proposition 36 was funded, total savings for taxpayers of California amounts to $2.4 
billion, a savings of $480 million a year. The efficacy of treating drug offenders with 
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rehabilitation versus incarceration keeps human rights in tact in addition costing less to 
state governments; Proposition 36 is the proof that the intent of the Prettyman 
Commission in 1963 is in fact true. Rehabilitation is part of a plan to develop a, “far 
broader range of alternatives for dealing with offenders-is based on the belief that, while 
there are some who must be completely segregated from society, there are many 
instances in which segregation does more harm than good,” (The Challenge of Crime in a 
Free Society, 1966).  
 The story of retaliation between the federal and the state government of California 
seems to be the new States’ rights issue of the 21st century. In 2001, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected its own standing of the Randall v. United States case in 1978. 
Then, the Supreme Court acknowledged the common law doctrine of medical necessity 
and permitted the Compassionate IND program for Randall to use medical marijuana. 
Now, 23 years later, the same institution that gave Randall and so many others hope 
changed their stance even though California legalized medical marijuana. The case came 
to, “recognize that the Court has discussed the possibility of a necessity defense without 
altogether rejecting it,” (US v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 2001). The Court 
argues that a codified statute defines federal crimes not by common law; this viewpoint is 
reflected in a legal precedent established by the case of US v. Hudson (1812). Since the 
case, the Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative made the popularized medical 
marijuana card that registers each patient as part of the entire system of dispensaries of 
the Bay Area of California and has since issued over 200 thousand medical cards. The 
Cooperative is a, “not-for-profit organization that operates with a physician serving as a 
medical director. For a patient to become a member of the Cooperative, [he/she] must 
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provide a written statement from a treating, licensed physician assenting to marijuana 
therapy as outlined as Proposition 215. If accepted, the patient receives an identification 
card entitling [such individual] to obtain marijuana from the Cooperative,” (US v. 
Oakland, 2001). The 1990s saw an overwhelming expanse in the number of people 
incarcerated in Federal and State prisons as well as local jails. For example, the total 
number of prisoners in Federal custody in 1990 was 58,838; in State custody totaled 
684,544; and the number in local jails was 405,320. By 2000, the number of prisoners in 
Federal prisons climbed 127.6 percent to 133,921; the number in State prisons was 
1,178,433; a 72 percent increase; while inmate populations in local jails climbed 53 
percent to 621,149, (Beck, Prisoners in 2000, 2001). Additionally, at yearend 2000, 
privately operated facilities 87,369 inmates (5.8 percent of State and 10.7 percent of 
Federal inmates), (Beck, 2001), while marijuana arrests climbed from 326,850 to 734,497 
in the 1990s as well.  
 With the inauguration of George W. Bush, the “War on Drugs” momentum was 
still in force. The 2000 Presidential race was the first time on the national level promoted 
decriminalized marijuana. “When President George W. Bush took office in 2001, drug 
use had risen to unacceptably high levels. Drug use by young people had doubled from 
11 percent had used drugs in the past month in 1991 to 19 percent in 2001,” (Robinson 
and Scherlen, “Lies, Damned Lies, and Drug War Statistics,” SUNY Press, 2014). Under 
his presidency, the ONDCP would make itself accountable by producing short-term and 
longer-term goals in that statistic.  One figure of the 2006 Strategy states, “a 10 percent 
reduction after two years and a 25 percent reduction in five years concerning the drug use 
among young people,” (Robinson, 2014). Between 2001 and 2005, the ONDCP reports 
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demonstrates that, “19.4 percent of teens used an illicit drug in 2001, followed by 18.2 
percent in 2002, 17.3 in 2003, 16.1 in 2004, and 15.7 in 2005, during the Presidency of 
George W. Bush, there was a 19 percent decrease in current drug use among grade 8, 10, 
and 12 students combined,” (Robinson, 2014). The ONDCP accomplished its 5-year plan 
by a success of 76 percent, a fairly remarkable feat in such a short amount of time.  
 George W. Bush’s legacy concerning drug policy includes the expansion in drug 
coverage for senior citizens through Medicare Part D in 2006.  While the expansion in 
drug coverage for senior citizens is beneficial towards beneficiaries and, “Part D costs are 
$349 billion less than initial ten-year projections,” (Funk, “Medicare Monday,” The 
Catalyst Pharma, 2016), such has created some unintended externalities like bringing on 
a prescription opioid epidemic to those other than the beneficiaries of Medicare Part D. A 
team of economists, Pacula, Powell, and Taylor from the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) did an exhaustive study to see if there is a correlation between the 
increased legal, prescribed opiates to senior citizens through, “Medicare Part D 
enrollment and the increase in per capita opioid treatment admissions,” (Pacula; Powell; 
Taylor, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2015). The first frame of reference is 
that ONDCP stated that its five-year goal ending in 2006 was more or less accomplished. 
Americans especially its ‘young people’ were using illicit drugs less frequently. In that 
same time period, however, “drug overdose deaths have risen steadily, and by 2009 they 
became a leading cause of death from injuries in the United States, exceeding deaths 
from motor vehicles, (Paulozzi, 2012), where opioids being the primary driver behind 
this upward trend,” (Jones, Mack and Paulozzi, 2012). If ‘young people’, as stated by the 
ONDCP, were using illicit drugs less, then it would be understood that drug overdoses 
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would be decreasing as well. Senior citizens are legitimate medical users of the Medicare 
expansion in opioid coverage, but “nearly two-thirds of people who report nonmedical 
use of prescription drugs either get them or take them [without consent] from a friend or 
relative [who has Medicare Part D coverage],” (Jones, Mack and Paulozzi, 2014), while 
older family members with more than one opioid prescriptions would be easy targets for 
‘nonmedical users’ to take these opioids from. The questionable correlation that Pacula, 
Powell, and Taylor have is well intended with these facts. The team from NBER build, “a 
measure of the seven most commonly abused opioid analgesics: fentanyl, hydrocodone, 
hydromorphone, meperidine, methadone, morphine, and oxycodone (as OxyContin as 
well as in other forms),” (NBER, 2015).  Using data from the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services, per capita Medicare Part D enrollment numbers were construed by 
this data. Their findings show: 
 Data on the sale of the seven problematic opioid analgesics grew 62 percent 
between 2005 and 2010, opioid overdose deaths rise on average across the states 45 
percent within  the time period, and substance abuse treatment admissions more than 
doubled in the same five-year period. [These economists noted that,] upon 
implementation of Medicare Part D, the above median states incur a relative increase in 
per capita substance abuse treatments, providing further evidence of an increased in 
opioid abuse in states with high elderly share resulting from Part D. [Additionally], they 
estimate that each 10 percent increase in Part D enrollment caused a 7.4 percent increase 
in substance abuse treatment growth. The focus on the age groups between 12 and 54 
because they are not directly impacted by the introduction of Part D. The results suggest 
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the introduction of Part D increased access to those not eligible for prescription drug 
coverage through Medicare, (NBER, 2015). 
 From 2001-2007, “total drug arrests increased from 1,586,902 with 723,628 of 
those for marijuana offenses,” (Crime in the United States, FBI, 2002), to, “1,841,182 
with 872,720 arrests coming from marijuana offenses in 2007,” (Crime in the United 
States 2007, United States Justice Department, 2008). The ONDCP goals may have been 
improper and misguided when by 2007 total drug arrests increased 16 percent and 
marijuana arrests increased by 21 percent. Bush made his statement on reducing drug use 
25 percent by 2006 when arrests increased by almost that amount. The Strategy made by 
George W. Bush have been similar to other Presidents which consists of decreasing drug 
use, but all have led to more drug arrests as well as marijuana arrests when more and 
more states have legalized medical marijuana.  
The Medicare Part D expansion explains the increase in the supply of 
‘nonmedical’ opioid use and its increase in opioid overdose and abuse. The research 
implies that ‘nonmedical’ users of these drugs typically start out on the legally prescribed 
opioid of a Medicare Part D recipient, then thereby becoming addicted and abusing the 
‘nonmedical’ properties of such opioids. Once the cycle of addiction takes over the user, 
the family typically cuts the individual off from fears of enabling. The addict then turns 
to the cheaper supply of illegal and unregulated heroin available on the market.  
As Bush was leaving office in January 2009, America was in the middle of the 
worst economic recession since the Great Depression all while embarking on a drug 
epidemic that was hitting young adults like nothing in modern history. The citizens of the 
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United States elected President Barrack Hussein Obama on the platform of CHANGE, 
who stated in 2008 that he supported the, “basic concept of using medical marijuana for 
the same purposes and with the same controls as other drugs [and was] not going to be 
using Justice Department resources to try to circumvent state laws,” (DeAngelo, “The 
Cannabis Manifesto: A New Paradigm for Wellness, 2015). The irony and false 
intentions of Obama could not be more obvious when one realizes that the total amount 
of marijuana seized by the DEA nearly doubled in Obama’s first year as President. 
Marijuana seizures by the DEA went from, “1,539 metric tons in 2008 to 2,980 metric 
tons in 2009, according to numbers disclosed by the agency as part of its budget request 
for 2011,” (Elliot, Toke of the Town, 2010).  If Obama and his administration truly 
supported the ‘basic concept of using medical marijuana with the same controls as other 
drugs’, then he would insist that Attorney General Loretta Lynch use her ability to, 
“transfer any drug between such schedules or remove any drug or other substance from 
the schedules if he/[she] finds that the drug or other substance does not meet the 
requirements for inclusion in any schedule [on the basis of] the findings prescribed by 
subsection (b) of section 812 of this Title,” (Title 21 United States Code (USC) 
Controlled Substance Act, Section 811). Throughout the rest of Obama’s first term, the 
DEA consistently raided lawful medical marijuana cooperatives. By 2012, 19 states had 
legalized medical marijuana use, but the DEA and other agencies still thwarted states’ 
laws to enforce the Schedule I classification outlined by the Controlled Substance Act. 
Upon the reelection of President Obama in 2012, the states of Colorado and 
Washington brought legalization of marijuana for recreational use to the ballot through 
direct referendum. Colorado, if passed, would add Amendment 64 to the State 
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Constitution, “permitting a person twenty-one of age or older to consume or possess 
limited amounts of marijuana while requiring the general assembly to enact an excise tax 
to be levied upon wholesales sales of marijuana; requiring that the first $40 million in 
revenue raised annual by such tax to be credited to the public school capital construction 
assistance fund,” (Colorado Amendment 64, 2012). Washington had a similar 
opportunity arise in 2012, but this direct referendum stemmed from a ballot initiative. A 
ballot initiative is a process where valid signatures of registered voters are required to 
submit the proposal to the state legislature. Once an initiative gains approval of the state 
legislature it is then put on the state ballot in the general election. Initiative 502 was 
Washington’s marijuana legalization and regulation proposal. Initiative 502 would also 
allow a ‘person aged twenty-one or older to consume or possess limited amounts of 
marijuana’ while, “generating new state and local tax revenue for education, health care, 
research, and substance abuse prevention,” (Washington Marijuana Legalization and 
Regulation, 2012). Since the landmark decisions by the people of Colorado and 
Washington on legalizing cannabis in America since 1937, Alaska, Oregon, and 
Washington, D.C. have followed suit and 5 other states have legalized medical marijuana. 
 The federal government has amended the Farm Bill of 2014 to include Industrial 
Hemp Research. This amendment, “allows State Agriculture Departments, colleges, and 
universities to grow hemp, defined as the non-drug oilseed and fiber varieties of 
Cannabis, for academic or agricultural purposes,” (Stansbury, Vote Hemp, 2014). The bill 
defines hemp, “as having less than .3 percent THC,” (Stansbury, 2014). The introduction 
of this Farm Bill in 2014 and the subsequent change in the legal definition of ‘marihuana’ 
caused states to introduce CBD-exclusive medical marijuana bills within two months.  
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On March 25, 2014, Utah became the first state to legalize CBD oil which allows, 
“the growth of industrial hemp to aid with treatment resistant epileptic seizures,” (Bloom, 
Celeb Stoner, 2015) to aid with epileptic seizure. Within three months of Utah legalizing 
CBD oil, 15 states follow behind. The order in which the states passed its own CBD bills 
are as follow: Alabama, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Mississippi, Tennessee, South Carolina, 
Iowa, Florida, North Carolina, Missouri, Virginia, Georgia, Oklahoma, Texas, Wyoming 
was the last state to pass its bill. Wyoming passed, “House Bill 32 on June 30, 2015, 
becoming the 16 state to legalize CBD oil,” (Bloom, 2015). While these bills for CBD oil 
are not as expansive as Proposition 215 or Colorado’s Amendment 64, it is a step in the 
right direction. Additionally, the efficacy of the medical treatment of such patients varies 
greatly state by state. For example, HB 1231 Mississippi’s CBD oil bill, specifically 
Harper Grace’s Law has not adequately supplied any medicine to any patients in the state 
despite being passed in 2014 even though Ole Miss has had a ‘federal monopoly’ on 
growing cannabis through the NIDA since 1968, and supplies the Compassionate IND 
Program and has done so since 1978.  
Since Harper Grace’s Law has not properly fulfilled the legislative 
accommodations, the people of Mississippi introduced Ballot Initiative in 2015. This 
measure would have legalized recreational marijuana as well as medical marijuana in 
similar conditions as Colorado, Washington, Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, D.C., but 
would have also required the Governor, “to pardon persons convicted of any and all 
nonviolent cannabis crimes against the State of Mississippi,” (Ballot Initiative 48, 2015). 
BI 48 is the most progressive drug policy bill to date on the state level if it got the, 
“required number of certified signatures in each state congressional district, but was not 
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on the ballot the following year,” (Ballot Initiative 48, 2015). In this chapter, I have 
analyzed major pieces of legislation and events with regards to the “War on Drugs” to set 
the stage of how and why the environment of cannabis law reform has grown into being 
accepted as widely as it is now.  
In this chapter, I have analyzed major ‘events’ and pieces of federal legislation 
and their direct impacts on relative incarceration rates from the passage of the Marihuana 
Tax Stamp Act of 1937 to the present day events set the stage for the grassroots 
initiatives citizens throughout the United States employed seeking to find ‘loopholes’ 
around the Schedule I classification of Cannabis sativa.  
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Chapter II 
The Schedule I Classification of 
Cannabis Sativa 
 In this chapter, I will investigate the ‘three qualifiers’ as outlined by the 
Controlled Substances Act of 1970, with regards to Cannabis sativa, and disqualify such 
allegations based on: the findings of the LaGuardia and Shafer Commission; the creation 
of the Compassionate Investigational New Drug Program; the use of Marinol for similar 
medical uses; the use of patents identifying and claiming ‘medical appropriations’ of 
Cannabis sativa; and the use of petitions from the National Organization for the Reform 
of Marijuana Laws in 1972, Dr. Jon Gettman and High Times Magazine in 1995, and the 
Coalition for Rescheduling for Cannabis in 2002. Additionally, while such findings have 
disqualified the allegations that Cannabis sativa has, ‘a lack of accepted safety for use 
under medical supervision, no currently accepted medical use in the United States, and a 
high potential for abuse,’ Cannabis sativa is still a Schedule I controlled substance. 
 While the move for the national decriminalization of cannabis has echoed since 
the LaGuardia Committee in 1944, the largest hindrance to the widespread use and 
research of cannabis is the Schedule I classification of it and of its derivatives. Again, the 
Schedule I classification is defined as having: a high potential for abuse, no currently 
accepted medical use, and a lack of accepted safety for its use (Controlled Substances 
Act, 1970). While these defining terms have dictated the legality of cannabis; several 
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federal commissions, federal programs, court decisions, patents, and change in public 
sentiment of cannabis have caused much strife with the scheduling of cannabis before, 
during, and after the passing of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970. 
The history of cannabis laws in America begins in 1937 with the passing of the 
Marihuana Tax Act acting as a ‘unifying federal measure,’ (Smoke Signals, Lee), which 
endorsed a national prohibition of the medical aspects of cannabis and the industrial 
aspects of hemp. Once this Act was passed, Anslinger and influential colleagues 
convened the Marihuana Conference to discuss the agricultural, economic, and industrial 
aspects of hemp and the chemical and pharmacological uses and effects that Marihuana 
[cannabis] had on its users. The evidence gathered from the Marihuana Conference 
caused the prohibition of cannabis; its controversy is still relevant to this day. The 
evidence that would support the passing of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 is as follows:   
Hemp was imperative to colonial America but its culture had naturally decreased 
from the increased prevalence of cheaper, competitive fibers like nylon, and the use of 
cannabis in its ‘pure form’ would show the ‘ataxia action’, (Loewe, Marihuana 
Conference, 1938).  
If the market of hemp was shrinking caused from the introduction of cheaper 
alternatives, then the passing of the Marihuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937 is not necessary 
and the forces of economics would have lessened the need for such legislation. 
Additionally, Dr. S. Loewe, Pharmacologist at Cornell University Medical College, states 
that the ‘pure form’ of Marihuana was used intravenously on monkeys and dogs, and this 
method of ingestion presented an ‘ataxia action.’ This ‘pure form’ of Marihuana 
[cannabis], however, was not scientifically available until 1964, almost 30 years later. 
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Nico Escondido writer for High Times, a New York-based monthly magazine that 
advocates the legalization of cannabis, states that, “Dr. Raphael Mechoulam and his 
colleagues at the Weizmann Institute of Science were the first to synthesize [in its pure 
form] the primary psychoactive compound found in cannabis, THC, in 1964. The true 
intention of the Marihuana Conference is identical to the goal Marihuana Tax Stamp Act 
which include creating an artificial economic environment that allows for the cheaper 
alternatives to hemp while prohibiting the use of cannabis and all of its derivatives as a 
medicine. The contradictions between the truth and the façade of truth proposed by the 
federal government on cannabis begin with the Marihuana Conference. These 
contradictions are the building blocks of what would eventually outline the Controlled 
Substance Act of 1970, whose definition of cannabis and its derivatives has become the 
largest impediment to the use of cannabis as a medicine.  
The first defining characteristic of a Schedule I drug is, “having a high potential 
for abuse,” (CSA, 1970) According to Center for Drug Evaluation and Research, abuse 
potential refers, “to the likelihood that abuse will occur with a particular substance with 
central nervous system activity,” (“Assessment of Abuse Potential of Drugs,” US 
Department of Health and Human Services, January 2017). The ‘ability’ is caused from 
how quickly the substance enters the blood stream and how the drug is ingested. For 
example, drugs ingest intravenously are given a higher abuse potential than substances 
ingested orally. This is seen with the Schedule I classification of heroin, which is ingested 
intravenously, and the Schedule II classification of Oxycodone, which is ingested orally, 
even though these substances having similar composition and effects. To compare 
cannabis’ abuse potential to other commonly used ‘substances’, Dr. Jack Henningfield, 
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chief of clinical pharmacology at the Addiction Research Center of the Government’s 
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA) and Dr. Neal Benowitz, professor at the 
University of California at San Francisco, ranked six substances (nicotine, heroin, 
cocaine, alcohol, caffeine, and marijuana) from 1 to 6, with one being the most serious, 
based on five areas. These areas include withdrawal, reinforcement, tolerance, 
dependence, and intoxication. Withdrawal defined as the presence and severity of 
characteristic withdrawal symptoms like irritability, fatigue, insomnia, and nausea; 
reinforcement is a measure of the substance’s ability to get users to take substance 
[repeatedly], and in preference to other substances; tolerance as being the amount of a 
substance needed to satisfy increasing cravings for it, and the level of stable need that is 
eventually reached; dependence as being the difficulty to quit, the relapse rate, and the 
degree to which the substance will be used in the face of evidence that it causes harm.  
The findings were as follows:  
 
(Henningfield and Benowitz, 1994). 
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In summation of their findings, the most similar substance compared to 
marijuana, based on the five areas as outlined by Henningfield and Benowitz, is caffeine. 
Caffeine, an unregulated and unmonitored substance, is something an average American 
consumes daily. Also, there have been minimal studies showing the long-term effects of 
caffeine when compared to the studies available for marijuana.  
The LaGuardia Committee of 1944, the Prettyman Commission of 1963, and the 
Shafer Commission of 1972 were formed to: “appoint a special committee to make a 
thorough sociological investigation concerning the smoking of marihuana by large 
segments of our [New York City’s] population,” (LaGuardia, NY Academy, 1944), 
“design and put into operation a master research plan that would…be carried out on all 
aspects of narcotics and drug abuse,” (Papers of John F. Kennedy, 1963), and, “conduct 
and record the most extensive examination of marijuana performed by the US 
government,” (Nixon Tapes Show…, CDSP, 2002). These commissions challenge the 
‘high potential for abuse’ that the Schedule I classification outlines for marijuana. For 
example, the LaGuardia Committee found that, “its [marijuana’s] use does not: lead to 
addiction in the medical sense of the word or [to] morphine, heroin, or cocaine addiction, 
(LaGuardia, NY Academy, 1944). This finding of the LaGuardia Committee suggests that 
use of marijuana does not lead to the NIDA’s definition of addiction, which includes, “a 
chronic, relapsing brain disease characterized by compulsive drug seeking and use, 
despite harmful consequences,” (The Basics, NIDA, 2014). 
The Prettyman Commission sought to reform treatment of drug offenders that the 
mandatory minimums of the 1950s brought. The reform that this commission is seeking 
for is seen with; “any legislation providing for [needing] federal regulation should not be 
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limited to barbiturates and amphetamines alone, [and] … to all other drugs having a 
potential for abuse that results in in psychotoxic and antisocial behavior,” (Papers of John 
F. Kennedy, 1963). The Prettyman Commission argued that ‘any legislation’ should 
‘cover all drugs’ including marijuana, but the existing conditions that would qualify for 
‘federal regulation’ namely causing psychotoxic or antisocial behavior cannot be met for 
marijuana. This can be seen when Dr. ElSohly published Potency Trends in 2010 stating, 
“Cannabidiol (CBD) displays antipsychotic properties, [not psychotoxic properties], and 
where the LaGuardia Committee finds, “the use of [marijuana] the drug expresses the 
new feelings of self-confidence primarily through oral expression, [not resulting in 
antisocial behavior],” (Winslow, San Roman: CA, 1972).  
The second characteristic of a Schedule I substance, as defined by the CSA of 
1970, is ‘having no currently accepted medical use.” Prior to the passing of the CSA 
1970 and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 evidence would exemplify the accepted 
medical use of cannabis. For example, Borchardt states, “almost six percent of all 
manufactured drugs… contained cannabis in one form of another,” (Borchardt, Forbes 
Magazine, 2014). The use of cannabis extends beyond pre-1937 manufactured. This point 
is articulated when Lecia Bushak writer for Medical Daily states, “In ancient times, 
cannabis was used to alleviate pain and other ailments, [its use extends back to] 2737 BC, 
when Emperor Shen Neng… officially prescribed marijuana tea to treat various illnesses 
– including gout, rheumatism, malaria, and poor memory,” (Bushak, 2016). During the 
Marihuana Conference of 1938, Dr. William Woodward, Legislative Council from the 
American Medical Association (AMA) states, “the medicinal use [of marijuana] has 
greatly decreased… because of the uncertainty of the drug… [But] to say… that the use 
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of the drug should be prevented by a prohibitive tax, loses sight of the fact that future 
investigation may show that there are substantial medical uses for cannabis,” 
(Woodward, Taxation of Marihuana). Contrary to the ‘ancient’ accepted medical use of 
cannabis, the American Medical Association (AMA) removes cannabis from the US 
Pharmacopeia in 1942. The removal of cannabis from the US Pharmacopeia was caused 
by the creation of alternate medicines lessening the medical relevance of cannabis. 
Likewise, “physicians slowly turned away from using cannabis because of complex 
[regulations outlined by the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937],” (Health Impact News, 2014). 
The removal of cannabis derivatives from the US Pharmacopeia caused [cannabis], “to 
lose its remaining mantle of therapeutic legitimacy,” (American Medical Association, 
Procon.org, Autumn 1970).  
Questions began to arise concerning the typical qualities like its addictiveness, 
likelihood to be an agent in subsequent crimes, and ability to produce insanity among 
users proposed by the propaganda film Reefer Madness with the LaGuardia Committee. 
The Commission was accompanied by the New York Academy of Medicine. The first 
figure to acknowledge the questionable facts Reefer Madness alleged was Fiorello 
LaGuardia. As the Mayor of New York City, he appointed the New York Academy of 
Medicine to investigate the, “rumors [that] were recently circulated concerning the 
smoking of marihuana by large segments of [New York’s] population and even by school 
children,” (LaGuardia Committee Report New York, USA (1944). The findings of this 
report are:  
Its use does not lead to addiction; act as a gateway substance or stepping stone to 
 use of other substances like cocaine or heroin; and is not a determining factor of 
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 major crimes, (LaGuardia, 1944), and under the influence of marijuana the basic 
 personality structure of individual does not change but some of the more 
 superficial aspects of his behavior show alteration, (LaGuardia Committee Report 
 New York, USA (1944). 
 With the occurrence of the Great Depression, the unemployment rates of every 
demographic of people rose especially those among ethnic minorities. Even though the 
New York Academy of Medicine regarding marihuana as a relatively safe substance that 
is not addictive in the medical sense nor is it a gateway substance, The Boggs Act of 
1952, The Narcotics Control Act of 1956, and testimonies of Anslinger caused marihuana 
offenders to receive punishment equal to that of cocaine and heroin offenders.  
 The creation of two different Presidential Commissions would create a, ‘master 
research plan to be carried out on all aspects of narcotics and drug abuse,’ (Papers of 
John F. Kennedy, 1963), would investigate alternatives between marijuana offenders and 
other drug offenders. Prior legislation made no difference between ‘small peddlers’ and 
‘traffickers’, and the mandatory minimums enacted by President Eisenhower, “made 
rehabilitation of the convicted… virtually impossible, and since there is no hope of 
rehabilitation where there is no hope for parole,” (Papers of John F. Kennedy, 1963). 
These Commissions’ intent was to make rehabilitation of the convicted possible through 
parole or supervise probation. 
 The research of Dr. Raphael Mechoulam in the 1960s included the isolation of 
CBD in 1963 and tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) in 1964 in the ‘pure form’ as described by 
Dr. Loewe in the Marihuana Conference in 1938. Upon these discoveries by Mechoulam 
in the early 60s, Anthony Wile journalist for The Daily Bell interviews Dr. Mechoulam in 
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2014 to investigate further findings of his research. Dr. Mechoulam indicates, “the work 
on the plant [cannabis] has now led to the identification of a major physiological system, 
the endocannabinoid system (ECS), which seems to be involved with many human 
diseases,” (Wile, The Daily Bell, 2014). The ECS is a group of endogenous cannabinoid 
receptors located in the mammalian brain and throughout the central and peripheral 
nervous systems.  Dr. Mechoulam goes on to include that since isolating THC, scientists 
have discovered that, “THC mimics endocannabinoids (anandamide and 2-AG) [which 
are] of immense importance in the working of our body,” (Wile, 2014). Wile and Dr. 
Mechoulam discuss the efficacy of synthetic [derived] cannabinoids against the natural 
plant including multiple natural cannabinoids.  Mechoulam argues, “synthetic 
cannabinoids are… different than those in the plant (or the brain) and may be toxic 
[psychotoxic],” (Wile, 2014). 
 Shortly after the isolation of CBD and THC, the then National Institute on Mental 
Health awarded the University of Mississippi a contract making it, “the sole producer of 
federally legal marijuana [and has been] since 1968,” (Rogers, TIME Magazine, 2015), 
which is capable of, “producing a research supply [of cannabis],” (Shen, Nature.com, 
2014). To obtain the ‘research supply’ of cannabis, “researchers… must gain approval of 
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) or the National Institute on Drug 
Abuse (NIDA) [controlled by the Drug Enforcement Agency] as well as the Food and 
Drug Administration. The research center at Ole Miss, namely the Thad Cochran 
National Center for Natural Products Research, is capable of the, “cultivation, growing, 
harvesting, analyzing, and storing of research grade cannabis,” (Rogers, 2015).  
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 Josiah Hesse journalist for Mass Roots, described as the social network for the 
cannabis community, notes, “In 2016, marijuana is now more legal than ever… yet 
federal law prohibits scientists [and researchers] from conducting research using anything 
other than the government-grown [cannabis from Ole Miss]. When Dr. Kent Hutchison, 
professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder, conducted a study using the 
government-grown cannabis as; it was described “disgusting and low-potency,” by 
participants. The government-grown ‘research supply’ of cannabis, “from Mississippi, 
[was] freeze dried for years or months, then rehydrated before being smoked,” (Hesse, 
MassRoots, 2016), in Hutchison’s study. After participants smoked the cannabis in the 
lab, users made remarks like ‘what are you giving me’ and ‘I would never smoke this 
stuff,” (Hesse, 2016). The distaste of the Mississippi-grown cannabis supply caused Dr. 
Hutchison to suspend his studies. He argues, “the research [at Ole Miss] loses its validity 
[because participants] are not having a pleasant experience, like they do when 
they…smoke their medical-grade marijuana,” (Hesse, 2016). If the only ‘federally legal’ 
agent, the Thad Cochran National Center for Natural Products Research, cannot supply 
research, medical-grade marijuana, then other universities or agents should be able 
supply cannabis that is more adequate in supporting medical and research studies.  
 The court case of Leary v. United States examined the constitutionality of the 
Marihuana Tax Stamp Act. Leary faced charges of, “smuggling marijuana into the United 
States, charged transportation, facilitation of transportation, and concealment of 
marijuana after importation,” (Leary v. United States Supreme Court, 1969). Leary was 
in violation of Title 21 United States Code, Section 176a which required him to pay the 
transfer tax imposed by the Internal Revenue Code and was given the maximum penalties 
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of up to 20 years and fines up to $20,000 for such offenses,” (Leary v. United States 
Supreme Court, 1969). Justice Harlan II repealed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 on the 
basis of the issuance of the tax stamp violated Americans’ Fifth Amendment rights to due 
process and freedom against self-incrimination. The Tax Act of 1937 required citizens 
and Leary to be in a legal “double jeopardy.” The Tax Act would cause people to 
incriminate themselves when trying to pay the transfer tax on cannabis/ hemp that they 
had. This situation would cause the user to pay a lawful tax on an illegal substance or to 
pay an illegal tax on a legal substance. The repeal of the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 
should have opened an area where cannabis derivatives could be used in ‘manufactured 
drugs’ and return to the US Pharmacopeia since the restrictions and regulations 
prohibiting its use was deemed unconstitutional, but the passing of the Comprehensive 
Drug Abuse Prevention and Controlled Act of 1970 closed the window on cannabis 
reform.  
The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 is the piece 
of legislation in America that came after the repealing of the Marihuana Tax Act and, 
“provides the legal basis for the government’s war on drugs while consolidating laws on 
manufacturing and distributing drugs including narcotics, hallucinogens, steroids, and 
chemicals used to make controlled substances,” (Title II, 1970). Title II of this Act is the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) outlines drugs into five different schedules or levels, 
higher schedules are perceived as being less addictive and have a more widely accepted 
medical use in the United States. With its inception, cannabis and all of its derivatives is 
placed in Schedule I that is defined as a substance that has, “a high potential for physical 
or psychological abuse, no accepted medical use in the United States, and a lack of 
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accepted safety for use of the substance,” (CSA, 1970). This classification was, is, and 
will be the biggest hindrance on medical and recreational cannabis users alike throughout 
the United States. 
With the strict classification of cannabis derivatives, Robert Randall was facing a 
lengthy incarceration sentence when he was charged with cultivation of marijuana in 
1974. Randall was cultivating the marijuana plants on the basis of a ‘medical necessity’. 
According to the American College of Medical Quality, Medical necessity is defined as, 
“accepted health care services and supplies provided by health care entities, appropriate 
to the evaluation and treatment of a disease, condition, illness or injury and consistent 
with the applicable standard of care,” (American College of Medical Quality, 2010). 
District of Columbia Superior Court Judge James Washington dismissed the cultivation 
charges on the grounds that Randall’s glaucoma was no longer treatable, “with an array 
of conventional drugs [because the drugs] became increasingly ineffective as [Randall’s] 
tolerance increased [while under the care of ‘local ophthalmologist’ Dr. Benjamin 
Fine]…but after his arrest [Randall] participated in an experimental program conducted 
by Dr. Robert Hepler under the protection of the US government,” (Gardmer, Counter 
Punch, 2009). Judge Washington argued: 
[Randall’s] blindness was shown by competent medical testimony to be the 
otherwise inevitable result of defendant's disease, no adverse effects from the smoking of 
marijuana have been demonstrated.... Medical evidence suggests that the medical 
prohibition is not well founded, (Alliance of Cannabis Therapeutics, 1999). 
 The dismissal of Robert Randall’s charges granted and opened access to the 
‘research supply’ of cannabis from Ole Miss. Randall became the first patient of medical 
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marijuana since the Tax Act of 1937. The decision of US v. Randall in 1976 allowed 
Randall ‘prescriptive access’ to marijuana. Shortly after, federal agencies disrupted this 
access. Facing imminent blindness, Randall, “brought suit against [the] FDA, DEA, the 
[NIDA], the Department of Justice, and the Department of Health, Education & 
Welfare,” (Significant Legal Cases, 1999). The suit brought on an ‘out-of-court 
settlement’ (1999), providing a continuation of the ‘prescriptive access’ through the 
newly addressed Compassionate Investigational New Drug (IND) program. The court 
decision opened the Compassionate Investigational New Drug Program; thereby 
acknowledging cannabis’ ‘currently accepted medical use’ for Randall’s glaucoma which 
negates and diverts the Schedule I classification of cannabis derivatives. This program 
was created to allow ‘patients afflicted by marijuana-responsive disorders [like Randall’s 
glaucoma] and some orphan drugs’, a medicine developed specifically to treat rare 
medical conditions. The Compassionate IND program expanded to allow patients with 
cancer, HIV/AIDS, and multiple sclerosis to have access to the ‘research supply’ of 
cannabis grown at Ole Miss. Currently, there are four patients that are still receiving this 
supply of cannabis. These patients are: Barbara Douglass, George McMahon, Elvy 
Musikka, and Irvin Rosenfeld. All of whom have been receiving over 320 pre-rolled 
marijuana cigarettes every month since the last patient was admitted in 1992, ("Who Are 
the Patients Receiving Medical Marijuana?", Procon.org, 2008). The Compassionate IND 
program’s continuation shows explicitly how such federal agencies have been playing 
both sides of marijuana’s illegality. These federal agencies [NIDA, FDA, and DEA] 
acknowledge some medical attributes of cannabis and harvest it for the disorders of a few 
while maintaining cannabis derivatives have no ‘currently accepted medical use’. The 
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hypocrisy of these federal agencies begins with the Compassionate IND program and 
expands with years to come. 
 The divergence in the use of the medicinal properties of the plant and the potential 
to synthesize synthetic cannabinoids is seen when federal agencies allowed Solvay 
Pharmaceuticals, a Belgian chemical introduced Marinol in 1985, which contains, “ a 
synthetically manufactured THC in sesame oil encapsulated in a soft gelatin capsule,” 
(Gettman, The Bulletin of Cannabis Reform, 2007). Marinol was given a Schedule II 
classification following, “the FDA approval of the drug for marketing [in 1985],” 
(Gettman, 2007). Marinol was prescribed to treat the nausea and vomiting symptoms of 
cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy. The action of the FDA ‘approving the drug for 
marketing’ is hypocritical. Natural cannabis possessing THC is ruled as a Schedule I 
substance, while a synthetically derived cannabinoid has a ‘currently accepted medical 
use’. The FDA’s approval of Marinol shows how this scheduling of natural cannabis 
values profits of the treatment of patients. Marinol’s efficacy is lower than natural 
cannabis when treating the prescribed uses. Marinol’s synthetic composition contains 
only one of the over, “66 naturally occurring cannabinoids,” (National Academy of 
Sciences, Institute of Medicine, 1999). Marinol is a useful medication, but its limited 
applications can be explained by the ‘entourage effect’, a phrase introduced by 
cannabinoid scientist Dr. Mechoulam. This effect is, as follows, “cannabinoids within the 
plant work together, or possess synergy, and affect the body [more similarly] to the 
body’s own endocannabinoid system [than compared to isolated synthetic pharmaceutical 
drugs like Marinol],” (Burnett, Medical Jane, 2014). If the efficacy of natural cannabis is 
greater than the legal synthetic pharmaceutical drugs like Marinol, then natural cannabis 
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should have a greater ‘currently accepted medical use’ than Marinol. But the opposite of 
this is true for natural cannabis. 
 The medical uses of cannabinoids expanded in 1987 with US Patent 4876276. 
The Yissum Research Development Company of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
which includes the research of Dr. Mechoulam, filed this patent. The patent involves, 
“the invention [of] (3S, 4S)-7-hydroxy-Δ6-tetrahydrocannabinol homologs and 
derivatives,” (Yissum Research Development Co. of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 
Patent 4876276, 1987). This invention removes, “the undesired side effects of [other] 
compounds,” while being of, “special utility in cases of acute and of chronic pain,” 
(Patent 4876276, 1987). This patent acknowledges cannabinoids are useful in treating 
debilitating pain. The motive behind applying for a patent is to have a protected interest 
in the discovery. The protected interest that the Yissum Research Development Company 
earned from Patent 4876276 is that no other researching agency can do identical research 
on this cannabinoid or its ‘homologes or derivatives’. Once again, if cannabis has ‘no 
currently accepted medical treatment, then this protected interest would have no utility to 
the research community. Patents that challenge the Schedule I classification of cannabis 
derivatives explain the pharmaceutical industry’s goals of maximizing profits at the 
expense of people who could benefit from their discoveries. The patents’ impact could 
potentially save lives if its discovery were used to treat acute and chronic pain. For 
example, the most widely used medicines to treat these ailments are opioids, drugs that 
are derived from opium. In 2014, there were, “18,893 overdose deaths related to 
prescription pain relievers [opioids] and 10,574 overdose deaths related to heroin,” 
(Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). The number of deaths that is 
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associated with pain treatment far outnumbers the 16,121 deaths attributed to homicide in 
the United States in 2013, (Center for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). US Patent 
4876276 has the ability to save lives and restore balance to countless more lives if 
cannabis was not a Schedule I substance.  
 By 1990, federal agencies were using natural cannabis to treat patients with 
glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, nail patella syndrome, hereditary multiple exotoses, and 
HIV/AIDS through the Compassionate IND program, (Procon.org, 2008), and approved 
synthetic dronabinol to treat the nausea and vomiting that is associated with 
chemotherapy. In 1992, the FDA expanded, “Marinol's approved indications to include 
treatment of anorexia associated with weight loss in patients with AIDS,” (Marshall, 
Drug Enforcement Agency, 1999). At this time the FDA, “was compelled to expand the 
nation’s Compassionate IND program for medical marijuana to HIV+ people and 
Americans afflicted by neurologic disorders,” (“What Is The Compassionate IND 
Program?",Procon.org, 2016). Instead of being granted access, “[the] FDA dumped 
hundreds of Compassionate IND applications in the trash and scores of patients were 
arbitrarily denied promised access to medical care,” (Procon.org, 2016). The intent on 
closing the Compassionate IND program to new applicants while still supplying medical 
marijuana to existing patients should be clear. The intent was to quiet the growing 
community of people that would be eligible to the same privilege of Robert Randall’s 
medical necessity of cannabis. This privilege was denied to all applicants on the basis of 
the, “profound contradiction in federal policy brought the medical prohibition into crisis,” 
(Procon.org, 2016), so to avoid such crisis, the program was closed by President George 
H. W. Bush.  
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 By this time, the court decisions of Robert Randall pointed to the medical 
necessity of marijuana for the symptoms of glaucoma by opening the research program 
for ‘marijuana-responsive disorders’, known as the Compassionate Investigational New 
Drug Program. This program was eventually expanded to treat symptoms of cancer, 
HIV/AIDS, and multiple sclerosis. The program’s effectiveness and the approval of 
Marinol for treating symptoms of similar ailments caused the program to expire to new 
applicants in 1992. Cannabinoids’ medical efficacy was expanded after the closing of the 
Compassionate IND program with US Patent 4876276 to include treating acute/chronic 
pain. The Yissum Research Development Company’s discovery of the (3S, 4S) 
configuration of certain cannabinoids went on to deliver more medical opportunities for 
such molecules. The filing of US Patent 5538993 made claims that certain 
tetrahydrocannabinol-7-oic acid derivatives have, “analgesic, anti-emetic, sedative, anti-
inflammatory, anti-glaucoma, or neuroprotective activities which contains as an active 
ingredient therapeutically effective quantity of a compound of claims 1, 9, 10, and 11 
[pertaining to individual compound’s structure],” (Mechoulam, Patent 5538993, 1994). If 
such discoveries made by the Yissum Research Development Company are true, then 
almost 650 thousand cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy suffering from nausea and 
vomiting (“Information for Health Care Providers," CDC, 2015), 9 million Americans 
being prescribed prescription sleep-aids (CBS News, 2013), 23 million Americans using 
Nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs daily (Wilcox, Cryer, Triadafilopoulous, 2005), 
three million glaucoma patients (The Eye Diseases Prevalence Research Group, 2004), 
and 5.4 million Alzheimer’s patients(Alzheimer’s Association, 2017), a total of 41 
million Americans would achieve some medical benefit from the claims of US Patent 
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5538993. With such expansive medical attribution claimed by US Patents 4876276 and 
5538993, the state of California put Proposition 215 on the ballot in 1996 offering 
patients with similar medical symptoms the ability to use medical marijuana with a 
physician’s recommendation.  
 Proposition 215 of 1996 outlined what medical conditions would be considered as 
‘marijuana-responsive disorders’ and how patients suffering from these disorders would 
receive their medical marijuana. The 10 ‘serious medical conditions’ outlined are, 
“Acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS), anorexia, arthritis, cachexia, cancer, 
chronic pain, glaucoma, multiple sclerosis and the muscle spasms associated with it, 
migraines, and severe nausea,” (Proposition 215, 2013). These conditions that are 
included by Proposition 215 are merely a comprehensive inclusion of the discoveries of 
the Yissum Research Development Company (Patents 4876276 and 5538993), the 
diagnoses receiving treatment through the Compassionate IND program, and the 
disorders Marinol was approved for treating. For example, cannabinoids effectively treat 
arthritis, chronic pain, and migraines with the literature and claims of the patents above. 
Likewise, Barbra and Kenny Jenks’ applications were approved in 1991, allowing them 
to receive cannabis for AIDS, (Procon.org, 2008). Robert Randall’s glaucoma gained 
access to the program in 1978, (Procon.org, 2008), Barbara Douglass gained access for 
her multiple sclerosis in 1991, and Irvin Rosenfeld became a patient for his Multiple 
Congenital Cartilaginous Exostoses, a form of benign cartilage-capped bone tumors, in 
1982, (Procon.org, 2008). Additionally, the FDA to treat extreme nausea approved 
Marinol and vomiting associated with chemotherapy in 1985; its approval was expanded 
to treat the cachexia and anorexia of HIV/AIDS patients in 1992. The only inclusion of 
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Proposition 215 that was not available through federal literature is the clause stating, “any 
other chronic or persistent medical symptom that limits the ability of the person to 
conduct one or more major life activities as defined in the Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA) [Public Law 101-336],” (Proposition 215, 2013). This inclusion gives 
patients wider access to medical marijuana without a prescribed medical condition. This 
clause allows patients to receive a medical opinion from recommending physicians to use 
or not use marijuana for their ‘chronic or persistent medical symptom’. Since the 
recommending doctors are not prescribing medical marijuana outside of the federally 
accepted ‘marijuana-responsive disorders’, rather they are simply giving patients having 
symptoms of common medical disorders advice with their health. A recommendation of 
marijuana by a physician then allows a patient to use marijuana legally in the state of 
California. With the protection of state law, neither patient nor recommending doctors are 
in conflict of federal law. The introduction of Proposition 215 in 1996, brought the use of 
‘prescriptive access’ of marijuana from a few isolated patients, to a more ubiquitous 
arena for patients throughout the state. Additionally, with Proposition 64, The Adult Use 
Marijuana Act, expanded the legal access of marijuana to beyond medical use to include 
the legalization of use for all adults over the age of 21. 
 Subsequently, Aidan Hampson, Julius Axelrod, and Maurizio Grimaldi, all 
researchers at the National Institute of Health (NIH), published a study in 1998 finding, 
“cannabinoids protect [cells] from exposure to toxic levels of glutamate- a 
neurotransmitter that plays a role in a number of neurodegenerative disorders,” 
("Cannabis: A Powerful Antioxidant," TruthOnPot.com, 2012). The NIH researchers 
were studying the antioxidant and neuroprotectant qualities of cannabinoids. Glutamate 
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and other oxidants, “attack macromolecules like protein, DNA, and lipids causing 
cellular/tissue damage,” (Irshad, Chaudhuri, Pubmed.gov, 2002). Both antioxidants and 
oxidants are produced inside the body, but antioxidants can be ingested, “exogenous 
sources like enzymes…, minerals…, and vitamins like vitamin A, C, and E,” 
(Pubmed.gov, 2002). The imbalance of glutamate and antioxidants, “remains the cause of 
several [disorders] like cardiovascular, neurological, renal, skin, respiratory, and liver 
diseases, malignancies, diabetes, inflammatory problems, aging, and different types of 
viral infections,” (2002). Findings of the 1998 study found that both, “THC/CBD to be 30 
to 50 percent more effective than either antioxidant vitamins C and E [at protecting 
neurons from glutamate],” (Truthonpot.com, 2012). These findings pressured Hampson, 
Axelrod, and Grimaldi to file US Patent 6630507. This patent claims, “cannabinoids are 
found to have particular application as neuroprotectants, [and become] useful in the 
treatment and prophylaxis of wide variety of oxidation associated diseases,” (The 
Department of HHS, Patent 6630507, 1999). Later trials, “confirmed the therapeutic 
potential of [cannabinoids’] antioxidant properties in a variety of neurodegenerative and 
inflammatory disease models, including collagen-induced arthritis, infarction, 
Alzheimer’s [and Parkinson’s] disease, diabetes, myocardial ischemia, and 
atherosclerosis,” (Truthonpot.com, 2012). The extension of the medical appropriations 
for cannabis derivatives by the US Department of Health and Human Services shows 
how the federal government is playing both sides of the legality of cannabis. Federal 
agencies are arresting hundreds of thousands of citizens for treating ailments while 
governing bodies have approved patents acknowledging cannabis’ effectiveness for 
treating such ailments. Judge Washington’s ruling on Randall v. US included the medical 
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necessity defense of, “the evil sought to be averted was less heinous than that preformed 
to avoid it,” (United States v. Aguilar, 883 F. 2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989). This ruling 
became the basis for the Compassionate IND program. The ruling insisted that using 
marijuana illegally is ‘less heinous’ that the ‘evil’ that is medical ailments. The inclusion 
of US Patent 6630507’s ‘prophylaxis’ clause extends the medical necessity defense Judge 
Washington ruled in favor of in 1978. The inclusion of marijuana being a preventative for 
a ‘wide variety of oxidation diseases’ would extend the medical necessity defense to 
patients using cannabinoids to ‘self-medicate’ symptoms that could lead to these diseases.  
 The expanded application of the ‘medical necessity’ of cannabis through various 
patents and Proposition 215 of California brought up a modern states’ rights issue 
concerning the CSA of 1970. The Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative (OCBC) 
became the largest entity in California that distributed and dispensed medical cannabis to 
qualified patients. In 1996, California passed Proposition 215 allowing physicians to 
recommend cannabis for a number of ‘serious medical conditions’. This recommendation 
would then be used to grant a patient access to the dispensaries of medical cannabis 
grown by state-approved caregivers or growers. In 1998, the United States Court of 
Appeals Ninth District filed a petition against the OCBC and its executive director under 
the CSA. The Ninth District filed the injunction against the OCBC on the grounds that 
the CSA establishes, “a ‘closed’ system of drug distribution,” (United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers' Coop, 2016), for all controlled substances and, “authorizes transactions 
within ‘the legitimate distribution chain’”, (US v. OCBC), and while making the 
manufacture, distributing, or dispensing, or possession with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense,” (Section 401, CSA), of any controlled substance unlawful. The 
68	 	
OCBC understood the violation but insisted the Ninth District modify the injunction to 
permit, “medically necessary distributions,” (US v. OCBC), but no such appropriation 
exists on the manufacturing or distributing of medical cannabis in the CSA. The court 
ruled with the CSA 1970 on the basis that marijuana has no ‘currently accepted medical 
use’ thereby having no ‘medical necessity’ because of the absolute language of the CSA. 
Since the ‘medical necessity’ defense exists under common law, the District Court of 
Appeals does not enjoy ‘sound discretion’, (Herman, Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology, 2002) because, “this discretion does not allow federal courts to ignore 
Congress’ judgment expressed within legislation,” (Herman, 2002). This breach of 
‘discretion’ undoubtedly makes the injunction, “more limited in scope than the CSA,” 
(Justia Law, 2006). The District Court’s failure to weigh factors like public sentiment, the 
effect of depriving patients of cannabis, and the constitutionality of the CSA concerning 
intrastate cultivation of cannabis shows how federal agencies and courts are usurping 
powers not enumerated by the Constitution. The inclusion of ‘having no currently 
accepted medical use’ in the Schedule I classification of cannabis makes the challenge of 
defining ‘medical necessity’ perpetual. The District Court ruled in 2001, with the 
majority opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas who ruled, “the statute reflects a 
determination that marijuana has no medical benefits worth of an exception; therefore, 
medical necessity is not a defense to manufacturing and distributing marijuana,” 
(Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2016). The majority opinion of Justice Thomas is 
strengthened by the ruling of Justices David Souter and Ruth Ginsburg who added, 
“because necessity was raised in this case as a defense to distribution, the Court need not 
venture an opinion on whether the defense is available to anyone other than distributors,” 
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(Chicago-Kent College of Law). The ruling of US v. OCBC uphold the legal definition of 
a Schedule I controlled substances without any additional evidence other than the original 
qualifiers of a Schedule I controlled substances. This decision, however, does not 
explicitly remove a ‘medical necessity’ defense from patients; rather it just upholds that 
there is no inclusion for protection or exemption to parties aiding patients obtaining their 
medicine.  
 Shortly after the decision of US v. OCBC, Sumner Burstein, Robert Zurier, and 
Lawrence Recht of the University of Massachusetts file US Patent 6448288. The claims 
of the patent include, “non-psychoactive THC derivatives can decrease cell proliferation, 
a balance between cell divisions and cell loss, [whose] effect is not dependent on an 
increase of apoptosis,” (Burstein, US Patent 6448288, 2001). Patent 6448288 includes the 
claim of THC derivatives inhibiting cell proliferation occur on the same receptor sites 
associated with psychoactivity, CB1 receptors, (Burstein, Pharmacol. Ther. 82:87-96, 
1999). Thus, cannabinoids that do not bind to CB1 receptors will not inhibit cell 
proliferation or psychoactive effects on the use. In summation, Patent 6448288 claims, 
‘non-psychoactive THC derivatives’ must bind to CB1 receptors to inhibit cell 
proliferation, or patients enduring the psychoactive effects of other THC derivatives 
present in natural cannabis will also achieve cell proliferation. In 1985, Marinol was 
approved to treat the nausea and vomiting associated with chemotherapy, but this patent 
claims that cannabinoids are an effective treatment instead of chemotherapy. The ongoing 
research by Sumner Burstein, from 1994, includes being an assignee with Dr. 
Mechoulam for US Patent 5538993. Both, Dr. Burstein and Dr. Mechoulam are pioneers 
in the endocannabinoid field. The effect of this patent is monumental in today’s modern 
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medical arena. For example, 1 in 3 Americans will get cancer during their lifetime and 
more than 100 billion dollars was spent on chemotherapy and other cancer-related 
treatments in 2014, (Snyder, SOTT, 2015).  
Federal agencies’ intent is seen when patents are approved acknowledging 
medicinal appropriations for cannabinoids, but the tide shifted from researchers acquiring 
intellectual property to a milieu of pharmaceutical interests racing at the potential medical 
discoveries of cannabinoids.  The approval of US Patent 20130059018 should promote an 
environment where patients could use such medical discoveries in the form of 
pharmaceutical compounds or the natural plant, but such agencies permit pharmaceutical 
companies to make profits, all while would-be patients are being incarcerated for using 
the plant that made such pharmaceutical discoveries possible. The invention of this patent 
includes, “the use of phytocannabinoids, either in an isolated form or in the form of a 
botanical drug substance (BDS) as a prophylactic or in the treatment of [prostate, breast, 
skin, glioma, colon, or lung] cancer,” (Parolaro, Patent 20130059018, 2011). 
Phytocannabinoids are cannabinoids that originate from nature and can be found in the 
cannabis plant that can be isolated or present as a botanical drug substance (BDS). The 
approval of US Patent 20130059018 shows Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. and GW 
Pharmaceuticals’ intent to promote an environment where patients are left to decide 
between health and money The inventions of patent 20130059018 relate to a, “ method of 
treating a patient [by] administering a therapeutically effective amount of a cannabis 
plant extract comprising of a phytocannabinoid (PC) and a non-phytocannabinoid 
component, where the PC component comprises more than 50 percent (w/w) of the 
extract and the principle [main cannabinoid present in extract] is not THC or CBD 
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[instead it is Cannabichromene (CBC), Cannabichromenic acid (CBCV), Cannabidiolic 
acid (CBDA), Cannabidvarin (CBDV), Cannabigerol (CBG), Cannbigerol propyl variant 
(CBGV), Cannabicyclol (CBL), Cannabinol (CBN), Cannabinol propyl variant (CBNV), 
Cannabitriol (CBO), Tetrahydrocannabinolic acid (THCA), Tetrahydrocannabivarin 
(THCV), or Tetrahydrocannabivarinic acid (THCVA)], (Patent 20130059018, 2011). The 
inventions add to the list of medical conditions in which cannabinoids is a prophylactic. 
The claims made by this patent include cannabinoids, “are able to promote the 
reemergence of apoptosis so that some tumors will heed the signals, stop dividing, and 
die,” and, “turn off the signals tumors send out to promote angiogenesis, growth of new 
blood vessels,” (Patent 20130059018, 2011). The findings of Patent 20130059018 would 
eventually lead to the approval of Sativex (nabiximols), a botanical drug that contains 
both THC and CBD. The inventions of this patent could allow patients to use such 
medical discoveries in the form of pharmaceutical compounds or the natural plant, but 
federal agencies approve pharmaceutical companies to make profits, all while would-be 
patients are being incarcerated for using the plant that made such pharmaceutical 
discoveries possible.  
GW Pharmaceuticals’ findings do not stop with Patent 20130059018 concerning 
cannabinoids. GW Pharmaceuticals filed US Patent 20150359755 in 2015 shortly after 16 
states legalized CBD oil for the treatment of epileptic seizures. The patent closely 
followed the legislation pursued by these states. The patent’s invention, “relates to the 
use of CBD for the reduction of total convulsive seizure frequency in the treatment of 
‘treatment-resistant epilepsy’ (TRE),” (Guy, Patent 20150359755, 2015). The invention 
of this patent is to be used in conjunction with common anti-epileptic drugs (AED) like, 
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“clobazam, levetiracetam, phenobarbital, and zonisamide,” (Patent 20150359755, 2015). 
One study done during research included a sample of, “27 children and young adults with 
severe, childhood onset TRE were tested with a highly purified extract of CBD obtained 
from a cannabis plant. After 12 weeks of CBD therapy, 48 percent of patients had an 
equal to or greater than >50 percent reduction in seizures. Additionally, none of the 27 
subjects withdrew during the 3-month treatment period,” (Patent 20150359755, 2015). 
As with the prior patent of GW Pharmaceuticals, this patent led to the eventual approval 
process of Epidiolex, a CBD pharmaceutical composition in sesame oil. Currently, 
Epidiolex is in the process of being approved by the FDA, and is estimated by, “Analysts 
[at] GW Pharmaceuticals to cost $2,500 to $5,000 a month,” (Pollack, New York Times, 
2016). With such high prices, one could see why natural cannabis extracts are still being 
used even though extracts are now legal. Programs like the Compassionate IND, patents 
by various organizations, court decisions, and ballot initiatives by states legalizing 
medical marijuana show how federal agencies are playing both sides of the illegality of 
cannabis. Such things challenge and even show how illegitimate the ‘having no currently 
accepted medical use’ claim to cannabis and its cannabinoids is. Profits of the 
pharmaceutical industry is keeping cannabis illegal and out of the United States 
Pharmacopeia. Since the opening of the Compassionate IND program in 1978, the 
medical appropriations of cannabis has expanded to treat the ailments of AIDS, anorexia, 
arthritis, cachexia, chronic pain, glaucoma, multiple sclerosis, muscle spasticity, 
migraines, nausea, a ‘wide variety of oxidation associated diseases’ like Alzheimer’s and 
Parkinson’s disease, inhibits cell proliferation, insomnia, cancer, and epilepsy. 
Additionally, it has been acknowledged that cannabis and cannabinoids act as a 
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prophylactic to these ailments as well. The claim of ‘having no currently accepted 
medical use’ is asinine when there are 25 states permitting medical marijuana for a wide 
variety of ailments similar to California, 16 states that permit the use of CBD to treat 
epileptic seizures, and multiple pharmaceutical drugs consisting of cannabinoids.  
 The passing of the CSA in 1970 gave the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous 
Drugs and now the DEA, “the authority to schedule drugs (alongside other federal 
agencies) and to license facilities for the production and use of scheduled drugs in 
federally-approved research [like the M-Project at Ole Miss that is licensed to produce 
and use cannabis]. [The DEA and ‘other federal agencies] may initiate proceedings [to 
reschedule]. Additionally, interested parties including medical or pharmacy associations, 
public, interest groups, state or local governments, or individual citizens may petition the 
DEA and ‘other federal agencies’ to add, delete, or change the schedule of a drug or 
substance,” (21 USC CSA, Section 811). The guidance of the Shafer Commission 
suggested the federal decriminalization of cannabis, but federal agencies with the support 
of President Nixon kept cannabis a Schedule I drug. In response to this staunch 
disapproval of the findings by the Commission, public interest group the National 
Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), “filed the first petition to 
reschedule marijuana…[and] the DEA assumed responsibility for rescheduling petitions 
[after its establishment in 1973],” (“The DEA: Four Decades of Impeding and Rejecting 
Science,” Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, 2014). NORML sought 
redress of the original petition with the lawsuit of NORML v. E Ingersoll in 1974. The 
lawsuit was filed because, “the petition which sought to initiate a role-making proceeding 
looking toward a change in the control applicable to marihuana under the CSA, but the 
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petition was not accepted for filing on the ground that outstanding treaty commitments 
[Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs] precludes any executive relief, and that becomes 
the crucial question before the court,” (NORML v. E Ingersoll, 1974). The lawsuit filed 
in 1974 was to redress the ‘outstanding treaty commitments’ of the Single Convention. 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, “orders the DEA to fulfill the 
requirements to review and act on such petitions,” (“The DEA: Four Decades of 
Impeding and Rejecting Science,” Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, 
2014). After years of not ‘fulfilling procedural requirements’, NORML sought redress 
through two lawsuits filed in 1976 and 1980. The case NORML v. DEA, “represents yet 
another phase in the ongoing controversy between NORML and DEA. The respondent 
has resisted these efforts by citing United States treaty obligations under the Single 
Convention on Narcotic Drugs, which prescribes different [Scheduling] for various parts 
of the cannabis plant,” (NORML v. DEA, 1977). The discrepancies of the Single 
Convention concerning cannabis is one that that excludes, “the separated leaves from the 
[flowering or fruiting tops] from the defining characteristics of ‘cannabis’ and ‘resin,’” 
(NORML v. DEA). This exclusion of the leaves separated from the ‘flowering tops’ of 
the plants suggests that the [DEA], “agency should separately consider rescheduling on 
the specific distinguishing factor outlined by the Single Convention,” (NORML v. DEA). 
This ‘separate rescheduling’ eliminates the original claim made by respondent of 
‘outstanding treaty requirements’ as the reason to not accept the original petition. DEA 
Administrator Law Judge (ALJ) Parker ruled in favor of NORML by stating, “cannabis’ 
and ‘cannabis resin’ as defined by the treaty could be rescheduled to CSA II, cannabis 
leaves could be rescheduled to CSA Schedule V, and cannabis seeds and ‘synthetic 
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cannabis’ could be decontrolled,” (NORML v. DEA).  Regardless of the 
recommendations of ALJ Parker, “Acting Administrator Henry Dogin denied NORML’s 
petition for rescheduling ‘in all aspects,’” (NORML v. DEA). Ultimately, through this 
lawsuit and the unpublished lawsuit between NORML and the DEA, the Court of 
Appeals, “ordered the DEA to begin the scientific and medical evaluations required by 
the NORML petition,” (“The DEA: Four Decades of Impeding and Rejecting Science,” 
Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, 2014). Once the years of 
‘scientific and medical evaluations’ were completed through the Department of HEW, 
Opinion and Recommended Ruling, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision 
of ALJ by ALJ Francis Young would, “determine whether the marijuana plant considered 
as a whole may lawfully be transferred from Schedule I to Schedule II, and such 
placement would mean physicians in the United States would not violate federal law by 
prescribing marijuana for their patients for legitimate therapeutic purposes,” (Statement 
by ALJ Francis Young, US Department of Justice, 1988). The hearings in 1988 would 
allow the Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, Cannabis Corporation of America, and 
NORML to see the transfer of marijuana to Schedule II, and the Agency [DEA], the 
National Federation of Parents for Drug-Free Youth, and the International Association of 
Chiefs of Police contending marijuana should remain in Schedule I,” (Statement by ALJ 
Francis Young, 1988). The principle issue as stated by ALJ Young includes, “whether the 
marijuana plant… may lawfully be transferred from Schedule I to II, arguing whether the 
plant has a currently accepted medical treatment and whether there is a lack of accepted 
safety for use of the marijuana plant under medical supervision,” (ALJ Young, 1988). 
These ‘scientific and medical evaluations’ amend the original petition by NORML to 
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reschedule the plant to Schedule II not Schedule IV or V, “thus the dispute between the 
two sides in this proceeding is narrowed to whether or not marijuana has a currently 
accepted use in treatment in the US, and whether or not there is a lack of accepted safety 
for use of marijuana under medical supervision,” (1988). Concerning the ‘acceptance of 
use in treatment’, “it is clear that many people find marijuana to have, in the words of the 
CSA, an ‘accepted medical use’ in effecting relief for cancer, glaucoma, and multiple 
sclerosis patients…and the Act [CSA] does not specify by whom a drug or substance 
must be ‘accepted [for] medical use in the treatment’ in order to meet the Act’s 
‘accepted’ requirement for placement in Schedule II,” (1988).  Originally, it was 
determined that the Act’s basic determination is made by the medical community not any 
part of the federal government, thus the medical community should be the agents voicing 
for the ‘acceptance’ of the marijuana plant as a viable medicine treating some relief for 
cancer patients. The statement by ALJ Young goes on to state, “this record shows a great 
many physicians, and others, to have ‘accepted’ marijuana as having medical use in the 
treatment of cancer, and the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence in this record 
establishes that marijuana has a currently accepted medical use in the treatment for 
nausea and vomiting resulting from chemotherapy patients in some cancer patients. To 
conclude otherwise, on this record, would be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious,” 
(1988).  Evidence goes on say the same for the medical condition of glaucoma. 
Ophthalmologists, Dr. John C. Merritt and Dr. Richard D. North, “serving as a medical 
officer in ophthalmology for the Department of HEW and has worked with the Public 
Health Service and FDA,” (1988), have experience with Robert Randall, whose court 
case’s decision opened the Compassionate IND program in 1978. Regardless of the 
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experience of both doctors, ALJ Young decides, “that marijuana for the treatment of 
glaucoma falls far, far short of the quantum of evidence that shows marijuana is accepted 
for treatment of emesis in cancer patients,” (1988). The findings for marijuana being 
‘currently accepted’ for the treatment of multiple sclerosis and accompanying muscle 
spasms would be like that of cancer. The statement prepared by ALJ Young states, “the 
administrative law judge concludes that, within the meaning of the Act, 21 USC, Section 
812, marijuana ‘has a currently accepted medical treatment for spasticity resulting from 
multiple sclerosis and other causes. It would be unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious to 
find otherwise. These decisions determining the ‘accepted use’ of marijuana as part of a 
medical treatment sides with the ongoing federal Compassionate IND program. In fact, 
some of the patients that testified were approved applicants to the program, namely Irvin 
Rosenfeld and Robert Randall.  
The second ‘subsidiary issue’ to be argued with this statement is, “with respect to 
whether or not there is a ‘lack of accepted safety for use of [marijuana] under medical 
supervision,” (1988). The one determining factor mentioned in the report by ALJ is, 
“when dealing with drug safety possibility of lethal effects is the most obvious concern,” 
(1988). The contrast between legal drugs that do not have a ‘lack of accepted safety’ and 
marijuana is exemplified by the statement, “nearly all [lawfully prescribed] medicines 
have toxic, potentially lethal effects, but marijuana is not such a substance. There is no 
record in the extensive medical literature describing a proven, documented cannabis-
induced fatality,” (1988). If one medicine that has never had described ‘lethal effects’, 
then its ‘lack of accepted use under medical supervision’ is ‘unreasonable, arbitrary, and 
capricious’. The therapeutic ratio is a typical medical way to measure the safety of a 
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substance. This ratio defines the difference between a normal effective dose and a dose 
that is capable of inducing adverse, often lethal effects. For example, “the therapeutic 
ratio of the commonly used over-the-counter analgesic, aspirin, is 1:20, meaning 
someone who takes 20 times the normal dose of aspirin will experience some adverse 
effects. Additionally, the therapeutic ratio for prescribed drugs is commonly around 1:10, 
and many prescriptive drugs used to treat patients with cancer, glaucoma, and multiple 
sclerosis are highly toxic, with ratios around1: 1.5. By contrast, marijuana’s therapeutic 
ratio is around 1: 20,000- 40,000,” Francis Young states directly on the record, “in strict 
medical terms marijuana is far safer than many foods we commonly consume. Marijuana, 
in its natural form, is one of the safest therapeutically active substances to man. By any 
measure of rational analysis marijuana can be safely used within a supervised routine of 
medical care,” (Francis Young, 1988). This statement on marijuana exemplifies the 
reason why the DEA and other federal agencies are so timid to move forward on 
reclassifying. If a viable medicine that has been used for a period of over 4000 years with 
never causing a lethal overdose existed, then pharmaceutical companies’ profits would 
dwindle instantaneously. On the grounds of marijuana being accepted as safe in the use 
of medical supervision, “acceptance by a significant minority of doctors is all that can be 
reasonably required, and this record makes it abundantly clear that such acceptance exists 
in the United States,” (1988). If the two ‘subsidiary issues’ of marijuana are resolved, 
namely its lack of safety under medical supervision and its lack of accepted medical uses 
is overruled, then marijuana, as a whole plant, should be rescheduled to a minimum of a 
Schedule II drug, where the therapeutic dose is quantifiable and astronomically lower 
than that of marijuana. The findings, “based upon the foregoing facts and reasons, the 
79	 	
administrative law judge concludes that the provisions of the Act permit and require the 
transfer of marijuana from Schedule I to II, a scheduling that it would be employed in 
treatment by physicians in proper cases,” (1988). The collective findings of various 
doctors allowed marijuana to have an ‘accepted medical uses’ for the conditions of 
muscle spasticity and cancer, while maintaining an acceptance for the safety of use of 
marijuana under medical supervision. ALJ Young’s final statement includes, “that it be 
unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious for the DEA to continue to stand between those 
sufferers and the benefits of this substance in light of the evidence in this record,” (1988). 
Such ‘evidence in this record’ made the administrative law judge, “recommend that the 
[DEA] Administrator [John Lawn] conclude that the marijuana plant considered as a 
whole has a currently accepted medical use in treatment, that there is no lack of accepted 
safety for use of it under medical supervision, and that it may lawfully be transferred 
from Schedule I to II,” (1988). Similar to prior legislative acts that would lessen the 
prohibition of marijuana, the ruling of ALJ Francis Young was ultimately denied. DEA 
Administrator denied the request of NORML, Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, and 
Cannabis Corporation of America in December 1989. The case of Alliance for Cannabis 
Therapeutics v. DEA was the final attempt to petition governing bodies to reschedule the 
marijuana plant as a whole from Schedule I to Schedule II, but the Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia, “affirmed the DEA Administrator’s power to overrule Judge 
Young’s decision,” (“The DEA: Four Decades of Impeding and Rejecting Science,” 
Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, 2014). The case of Alliance for 
Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA was decided on February 18, 1994, for the reasons that, 
“the findings are consistent with the view that only rigorous scientific proof can satisfy 
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the CSA’s ‘currently accepted medical use’ requirement,” (Alliance for Cannabis 
Therapeutics v. DEA, 1994), and the statement by ALJ Francis Young recorded only one 
instance where a doctor relied on ‘rigorous scientific proof’ instead of anecdotal evidence 
from patients. The petitioned originally filed by NORML ends nearly 22 years after its 
inception. Meanwhile, the FDA reschedules synthetically-derived THC, dronabinol, 
(Marinol) from Schedule I to Schedule II in 1985, and approves to be marketed for the 
treatment of nausea and vomiting of chemotherapy (cancer) patients (“The DEA: Four 
Decades of Impeding and Rejecting Science,” Multidisciplinary Association for 
Psychedelic Studies, 2014). 
Only 18 months lapsed between the Alliance of Cannabis Therapeutics v. DEA’s 
decision and the second petition’s filing to reschedule marijuana. On July 10, 1995, Jon 
Gettman, contributor to High Times Magazine, petitioned the DEA, “to initiate role 
making proceedings under the provisions of the CSA,” (Denial of Petition, US DOJ, 
2003). The petition filed by Jon Gettman, “focused primarily on challenging whether 
cannabis has the ‘high potential for abuse’ required for [Schedule I and II of the CSA],” 
(Gettman, Rescheduling Cannabis, 2004). If the argument made by Gettman was 
supported by the DEA, then marijuana would have been transferred to Schedule III, IV, 
or V.  The petition was denied on the grounds that its, “contention is that, marijuana has 
less than a ‘high potential for abuse’ commensurate with Schedules I and II and, 
therefore, it cannot be classified in either of these two schedules,” (Denial of Petition, US 
Department of Justice, 2003). The petition failed to assert that marijuana has either a 
currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States or an accepted safety for 
use under medical supervision. Since there was no contention made by the petition 
81	 	
concerning the other two defining characteristics the DEA denied the claim that 
marijuana has less than a ‘high potential for abuse’ by stating, “it is undisputed that the 
drug has at least some potential for abuse sufficient to warrant control under the CSA, the 
drug must remain in Schedule I,” (US DOJ, 2003). The Court of Appeals eventually 
upheld the decision made by the DEA on the basis that, “John Gettman was not a medical 
marijuana patient and [he] did not have standing to take the case to federal courts,” 
(Gettman, High Times Magazine, 2012). The CRC is the, “association of public-interest 
groups, medical cannabis patients, and additional supporters,” (Gettman, Marijuana 
Research, 2006). The members of CRC include, “the American Alliance for Medical 
Cannabis, Americans for Safe Access, Drug Policy Forum of Texas, High Times 
Magazine, NORML, OCBC, and Patients Out of Time,” (Gettman, 2006). These 
members represent patients from the largest medical marijuana patient coalition in the 
United States, OCBC, an organization that represented the patients of the Compassionate 
IND program through the works of Robert Randall, and the largest nonprofit lobbying 
organization working on the reform of marijuana [cannabis laws, NORML. The CRC is 
arguably the largest coalition whose interest is the reform of marijuana laws. 
To combat the decision made by the Court of Appeals, John Gettman created the 
Coalition for Rescheduling Cannabis (CRC) and, “submitted a new petition to the DEA 
in October, 2002 whose purpose is to have marijuana removed from Schedule I and 
rescheduled as ‘cannabis’ in either Schedule III, IV, or V,” (Petition to Reschedule 
Cannabis (Marijuana), CRC, 2002). This new petition filed by the CRC challenged the, 
“accepted medical use in the United States, the safety of use, dependence liability, and 
abuse potential [of cannabis],” (CRC, 2002). The Petition to Reschedule Cannabis (PRC) 
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was filed by the CRC on October 9, 2002. The critical difference between the PRC and 
the other petitions previously filed is the fact that the CRC is a coalition of high-ranking 
reform agencies and the timing. At this point in 2002, California, Alaska, Oregon, 
Washington (state), Maine, Hawaii, Colorado, and Nevada had allowed and 
acknowledged the medical use of cannabis. The PRC, “argued that [cannabis] should be 
rescheduled because it does have some accepted medical use in the United States, that it 
is safe to use, and that it has relatively low dependence and abuse liabilities [as compared 
to less regulated substances in the US Pharmacopeia],” (“The DEA: Four Decades of 
Impeding and Rejecting Science,” Multidisciplinary Association for Psychedelic Studies, 
2014). The petition’s intent is not to declassify and leave cannabis unregulated, “but to 
have marijuana removed from Schedule I and rescheduled as ‘cannabis’ in either 
Schedule III, IV, V,” (Petition to Reschedule Cannabis, CRC, 2002). The petition argues 
that the federal scheduling of marijuana is not well endorsed by state or local 
governments by stating, “only 6 states [have] marijuana scheduling that conforms to 
federal status and 39 have a separate schedule labeled ‘marijuana,’” (Holden, Criminal 
Justice Association, 1991). A majority, 78 percent, of states has marijuana classified in a 
less restrictive than the federal status. Conversely, a vast minority of states, 12 percent, 
has legislation that in accordance with the federal regulation of marijuana. The divide in 
public between state and federal government should be a kindling for reform.  The DEA 
and the Department of HHS ascertains that marijuana has no accepted medical use in the 
United States even though, “the right of doctors to recommend marijuana for medical use 
under state law has been upheld in federal court,” (Conant v. McCaffrey, 2000). In this 
case the court recognized that physicians had a, “right to recommend or discuss medical 
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marijuana use with their patient, and such actions could not [be used in consideration] by 
the federal government as a basis to revoke [a] physician’s license to dispense [and 
prescribe other, lawful] controlled substances,” (PRC, 2002). If federal courts give 
protection to physicians recommending medical cannabis to patients, then these doctors 
would argue that marijuana does have an accepted medical use.  
Cannabis’ acceptance for medical cannabis has increased since the people of 
California passed Proposition 215 in 1996. In the 6 years after Proposition 215, 7 other 
states elected to the do the same concerning marijuana reform. Additionally, its 
[cannabis] acceptance is, “increasingly recognized by health care professionals and the 
medical community, include the Institute of Medicine [1982 and 1999],” (PRC, 2002). 
Along with the Institute of Medicine, notable organizations that express support to grant 
access for therapeutic cannabis include the, “Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics, the 
American Civil Liberties Union, Kaiser Permanente, the National Association for Public 
Health Policy, the National Association of Attorneys General, and Patients Out of Time,” 
(PRC, 2002). The widening breadth of acceptance of ‘access to therapeutic [medical] 
cannabis is seen when one notices that the range includes health insurance companies to 
associations for medicine, public policy, and criminal law. The acceptance and shift in 
public sentiment is also seen when the ‘country’s largest physician’s organization,’ (“The 
DEA: Four Decades of Impeding and Rejecting Science,” Multidisciplinary Association 
for Psychedelic Studies, 2014), the American Medical Association (AMA) and the, “547 
delegates…asserted its opposition to criminalizing patients [who use cannabis] and 
doctors [who recommend it],” (PRC, 2002), making them in compliance with Conant v. 
McCaffrey.  
84	 	
The PRC then goes on to describe patients’ experiences with medical cannabis. 
The changing sentiment of medical cannabis can be observed by the anecdote from Lynn 
Nofziger, former White House director of communication and chief speechwriter of 
President Ronald Reagan, who states, “here is one right-wing Republican who supports… 
medical access to [cannabis because] my daughter was undergoing chemotherapy and 
suffering from vomiting and nausea, and the synthetic Marinol [did not] help her 
situation, [but] the illegally obtained marijuana [helped] her keep her food down and even 
gain weight. A doctor should have ever possible medication – including marijuana—in 
[their] armamentarium,” (Nofziger, 1999).  
The statement above shows the ever-entrenched metamorphosis in public 
sentiment concerning medical cannabis. Likewise, a report from the Institute of Medicine 
done in 1999 found that, “all [100 percent of the patients surveyed] reported that 
marijuana relieved nausea and vomiting [as well as] improving their appetite; about half 
the patients who reported using marijuana for chronic pain found relief,” (Joy, 1999). 
Another survey done by the International Cannabinoid Research Society in 1998 found, 
“cannabis improved spasticity, chronic pain, emotional dysfunction, weight loss [from 
chemotherapy], double vision, and memory loss [among multiple sclerosis patients],” 
(Consroe, 1997). 
The PRC then seeks to redress ‘reviews of earlier studies.’ The ‘review of earlier 
clinical studies’ outlines the ‘established effects’ of Marinol and the ‘relatively well-
confirmed effects’ of medical marijuana [cannabis]. ‘Established effects’ are defined as 
disorders that have, “been approved for Marinol to treat. Marinol (dronabinol) is 
approved for the medical use in refractory nausea and vomiting caused by antineoplastic 
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drugs in cancer…and for appetite loss in anorexia and cachexia of HIV/AIDS patients… 
These effects can be regarded as ‘established effects’ for THC and cannabis,” 
(Grotenhermen, 2002). Grotenhermen uses the approved medical conditions of Marinol 
and prescribes those ailments as being the most confirmed conditions that medical 
cannabis has the highest efficacy. Grotenhermen then outlines the most common ailments 
among medical cannabis patients. Medical cannabis is said to have ‘well-confirmed 
effects’ with, “spasticity due to spinal cord injur[ies], multiple sclerosis, neurogenic pain, 
movement disorders, asthma, and glaucoma,” (Grotenhermen).  
The petition continues with ‘clinical research’ with medical cannabis. The 
‘clinical research’ that was cited by the PRC comes from, “research programs [from] 6 
different states, [but] only one of which had been published in peer-reviewed journals 
before 1995,” (Vinciguerra, 1988). In their 2001 review, Musty and Russi wrote: 
Data [was] available on 748 patients who smoked marijuana prior to and/or after 
cancer chemotherapy and 345 patients who used the oral THC capsule [Marinol]… 
Patients who smoked experienced 70 to 100 percent relief from nausea and vomiting, 
while those who used [Marinol] experienced [up to] 88 percent relief,” (Musty and Rossi, 
2001).  
Another study of the ‘clinical research’ of medical cannabis is one done by 
Abrahamov where he used, “delta-8-THC [a less psychotropic cannabinoid compared to 
THC] was administered… to eight children aged 3 to 13 undergoing cancer 
chemotherapy… and vomiting was completely prevented in all eight children,” 
(Abrahamov, 1995). 
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The broad evidence provided throughout the PRC shows how imperative 
reclassification is. With the current Schedule I classification, providing ample studies to 
determine ‘an accepted medical use in the United States’ is extremely difficult because it 
must gain the approval of both the DEA and the FDA. If the FDA and DEA do approve 
the study to gain empirical evidence, then the researchers must use the ‘research supply’ 
of sub-par cannabis grown from Ole Miss. The supply of cannabis grown at Ole Miss 
contains, “seven percent [THC], even though in Colorado the average marijuana flower is 
17.1 percent THC,” (Hesse, 2016). If ‘clinical research’ were allowed to study medical 
cannabis from dispensaries, then gaining empirical evidence on the efficacy of medical 
cannabis would be easier as well as more comprehensive in comparison to current 
supplies available at Ole Miss.  
The second legitimating quality outlined by the PRC is the ‘safety of use’ of 
[cannabis]. This quality is then broken down into three subsections, ‘acute side effects’, 
‘the documented safety of long-term cannabis use,’ and ‘an argument concerning the 
alleged quality of cannabis being a gateway drug.’ The general consensus that marijuana 
use, whether medical or recreational, has, “adverse effects [that] are within the range of 
effects tolerated for other medications,” (Joy, 1999). These side effects, “relate mainly to 
psychological [not physiological] effects (cognitive impairment and altered perception) 
and an [apparent] decrease in blood pressure,” (Joy, 1999). The IOM Report of 1999 did 
not include human subjects for its research, but a 2001 study made by Hart did. Hart’s 
study found that, “marijuana use had no effect… on measures of cognitive flexibility, 
mental calculation, and reasoning. Additionally, heart rate and several subjective-effects 
rating (‘Good Drug Effect’, ‘High,’ ‘Mellow’) were increased in a [THC-Δ9] 
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concentration-dependent manner,” (Hart, 2001). The findings by Hart conclude by 
deductive reasoning that cannabis has less potential for abuse than other controlled 
substances. For example, Schedule II, III, and IV opioids and benzodiazepines (BZO) as 
well as alcohol have an effect on ‘cognitive impairment and altered perception’ while 
lowering blood pressure as well as respiration and heart rate. Additionally, Schedule II 
cocaine and [meth] amphetamines as well as nicotine and caffeine increase heart rate in a 
stimulant ‘concentration-dependent manner.’ The findings suggest and conclude that 
cannabis is a psychoactive substance capable of acting as an intoxicant on users, but to a 
lesser extent than less regulated controlled substances like cocaine, [meth] amphetamines, 
opioids, and BZOs and unregulated substances like caffeine, nicotine, and alcohol. If 
cannabis exhibits less severe psychological effects than Schedule II, III, and IV opioids 
and Schedule IV BZOs along with less severe physiological symptoms than Schedule II 
stimulants like cocaine and [meth] amphetamine, than the PRC’s claims on the safety of 
use of cannabis is well-founded and scheduling cannabis as a Schedule III, IV, or V 
controlled substance is the most sensible course of action by the DEA.  
The Missoula Chronic Clinical Use Study’s goal was to determine the validity of 
claims that, “long-term cannabis use [is] safe and [that long-term cannabis use] does not 
harm the stomach, liver, kidneys, and heart in contrast to many other medicinal [lower 
scheduled] drugs,” (PRC, 2002). The Missoula Chronic Cannabis Use Study investigated 
these claims by examining the holistic health of the four surviving Compassionate IND 
program patients (Douglass, McMahon, Mussika, and Rosenfeld). The findings results 
are:  
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[Medical cannabis] demonstrates clinical effectiveness… on patients who have 
used a known dosage of a standardized…quality-controlled supply of low-grade 
[cannabis] for 11 to 27 years… in treating glaucoma, chronic musculoskeletal pain, 
spasm and nausea, and spasticity of multiple sclerosis. All four patients are stable with 
chronic conditions, and are taking many fewer standard pharmaceuticals than previously. 
These results would support the provision of clinical cannabis to a greater number of 
patients in need and believe that [cannabis] can be a safe and effective medicine with 
various suggested improvements in the existing [expired] Compassionate IND programs. 
(Russo, 2002).  
Once again, extra-governmental studies on the medical efficacy of cannabis 
suggest some amending of current federal legislation. The findings by Russo suggest that 
cannabis can be used for long-term use [11 to 27 years] by patients without damaging 
their ‘stomach, liver, kidneys, and heart’ in patients having lifelong, chronic ailments. If 
the success of ‘low-grade cannabis on lifelong, chronic ailments is irrefutable, then the 
use of ‘high-grade’ cannabis on less severe conditions would be exponentially more 
irrefutable in both the short- and long-term.  
The final legitimating quality concerning the ‘safety of use’ of cannabis is the 
claim that such use will lead to the use of ‘harder’ drugs like cocaine, heroin, and [meth] 
amphetamines. The Institute of Medicine describes cannabis’ role as a ‘gateway drug’ as 
follows: 
Most drug users begin with alcohol and nicotine before cannabis- usually before 
they are of legal age. [Since] underage smoking [of tobacco] and alcohol usually precede 
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[cannabis] use, [it] is not the most common, and is rarely the first ‘gateway’ to illicit use. 
There is no conclusive evidence that the drug effects of [cannabis] are casually linked to 
the subsequent abuse of other illicit drugs, (Joy, 1999).  
The use of cannabis is safer to use in the short- and long-term when compared to 
other common controlled substances and its use does not lead to the use of the other 
common controlled substances, then cannabis should be seen as a viable medicine and/or 
substance to be used by a populous much like alcohol, caffeine, and/ or nicotine. Also, 
the ‘gateway theory’ of cannabis use is only magnified with the illegality of it. For 
example, cannabis users would not be in the market or supply chain of ‘harder drugs’, if 
users of cannabis could access it safely and legally like other controlled [medicines] 
substances or like other unregulated, recreational substances like alcohol, caffeine, and 
nicotine.  
The PRC transitions from describing the ‘safety of use’ of cannabis to providing 
ample evidence concerning the ‘dependence liability’ of cannabis use compared to the 
use of other illicit substances. The evidence on whether cannabis ‘produces tolerance and 
withdrawal’ is demonstrated first by Tanda. His research states, “[Upon] many attempts 
to obtain reliable self-administration behavior by laboratory animals with THC have been 
unsuccessful…These studies seem to indicate that [cannabis] has less potential for 
abuse…[than] almost all other psychoactive drugs [including] nicotine,” (Tanda, 2000). 
The ‘laboratory animals’ used in Tanda’s study were monkeys that were previously 
trained to ‘self-administer cocaine by pressing a lever 10 times’ and when THC replaced 
the cocaine solution the monkeys ‘gave themselves…roughly the dose received by a 
person smoking a joint [cannabis cigarette].’ The findings of Tanda suggest that there is 
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an eventual plateau cannabis will give the user making short-term cessation of use almost 
certain. Other medical findings suggest that, “the use of cannabis [much] like caffeine, 
tobacco, and amphetamines is associated with increased mesolimbic dopamine activity,” 
(Brody and Preut, 2002). To test whether cannabis increases ‘mesolimbic dopamine 
activity’ researcher Stanley-Cary injected rats with CP 55,940, a cannabinoid agonist. 
The findings were, “CP 55,940 significantly reduced basal activity, increased startle onset 
latencies, and increased prepulse inhibition, effects opposite to amphetamines, [caffeine 
and nicotine],” (Stanley-Cary, 2002). The PRC then describes the dependency factors of 
cannabis compared to other drugs. Findings by Smith suggest that withdrawal symptoms 
are relatively mild by stating, “Cannabis cannot be said to provide as clear a withdrawal 
pattern as other drugs of abuse, such as opiates, but discontinuation of chronic THC use 
may cause rebound phenomena (a transient increase in intraocular pressure and loss of 
appetite),” (Smith, 2002). Cannabis use also has dependency rates lower than tobacco, 
opiate, and alcohol users. For example, “9 percent of lifetime cannabis users met DSM-
R-III criteria for dependence at some point in their life, compared to 32 percent of 
tobacco users, 23 percent of opiate users, and 15 percent of alcohol users,” (Hall, 1999). 
The PRC then outlines the ‘abuse potential’ of cannabis and whether prior 
governmental reviews of cannabis’ rescheduling, “distinguished between use and abuse 
according to the professional standards… of the medical and scientific community,” 
(PRC, 2002). The PRC goes on to state that with all psychoactive substances including 
cannabis, “employ the standard three-stage conceptualization of drug-taking behavior 
whether licit [or] illicit. Each stage—use, abuse, and dependence—is marked by higher 
levels of use and increasing serious consequences,” (Committee on Opportunities in Drug 
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Abuse Research, 1996). The findings made by the Institute of Medicine with this report 
affirm that individuals, whose consumption of cannabis can be described as use, rather 
than abuse or dependence, do not pose a significant risk of using more dangerous drugs. 
Additionally, “[the] findings affirm that users of medical [cannabis] are not at risk to use 
other illicit drugs due to their regular use of cannabis,” (PRC, 2002). Regardless of the 
characteristics of cannabis use, the College on the Problems of Drug Dependence 
questions whether, “the social costs associated with the [medical] prohibition of 
[cannabis] are warranted by its actual harm to individuals [consuming it] and society and 
whether imprisonment for mere possession… is appropriate,” (College on the Problem of 
Drug Dependency, 1997). 
If the use of medical cannabis specifically does not warrant the use of other illicit 
substances, then rescheduling cannabis would only solidify the evidence presented by the 
College on the Problem of Drug Dependency. The harms warranted by medical 
prohibition are greater than the harms warranted under the medical appropriation of 
cannabis. This prohibition forces patients and recreational users into an environment of 
more illicit substances. If the prohibition of cannabis ceased to exist, then these patients 
and users alike could consume cannabis in a safer, more regulated environment with the 
advice of a professional with expertise in the use of cannabis to treat any ‘persistent 
medical condition’ as outlined by the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.  
The PRC as filed by the Coalition for Rescheduling Cannabis is the most holistic 
approach made by individuals to change the view associated with the use of cannabis as a 
medicine. The claims made by the PRC assert that cannabis is a substance that does not 
have a ‘high potential for abuse’ and has an ‘accepted medical use for treatment in the 
92	 	
United States.’ The PRC used the most up-to-date information from medical cannabis 
patients and medical organizations in favor of the medical use of cannabis. As the DEA 
stalled to provide a refusal or an acceptance of the petition, “the two largest physician 
groups, the American College of Physicians and the American Medical Association, 
came out in support of [cannabis’] placement in Schedule I,” (DEA: Four Decades, 
MAPS). The first group to support the PRC was the American College of Physicians who 
called for an, “evidence-based review of [cannabis’] status in February 2008; the 
American Medical Association reversed its long-standing position that [cannabis] should 
remain in Schedule I,” (DEA: Four Decades, MAPS, 2014). The AMA took its historical 
stance concerning cannabis. The AMA transitioned from being the first and only 
institution to stand against the opinion of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics when passing 
the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 to being the last and largest medical agency to endorse, 
“short term controlled trials indicating that smoked cannabis reduces neuropathic pain, 
improves appetite, and… may relieve spasticity and pain in patients with multiple 
sclerosis,” (Head, American Medical Association, 2009). The updated statements from 
the American College of Physicians and the AMA came almost 7 years after the original 
filing of the PRC while the DEA failed to act on ‘fulfilling procedural requirements’ 
outlined by the Single Convention. The Coalition for Rescheduling Cannabis filed suit 
against the DEA because this delay was similar to the “paradigmatic example of 
unreasonable delay under Telecommunications Research and Action Center v. FCC,” 
(DEA: Four Decades). Within weeks, the DEA notified the Coalition with a letter 
denying the petition and, “formalized the decision on July 8, 2011 with the Final 
Determination on the Petition for Rescheduling,” (DEA: Four Decades). The PRC was 
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denied on the grounds of, “there being no adequate and well-controlled studies proving 
efficacy; the drug is not accepted by qualified experts, and the scientific evidence is not 
widely available,” (Department of Justice, DEA, 2011). Following the decision of the 
DEA, Governors Christine Gregoire and Lincoln Chafee of Washington State and Rhode 
Island filed a petition similar to the PRC. The petition filed by the Offices of the 
Governors was filed only four months after the rejection of the PRC, and the DEA has 
yet to officially respond. The petitions filed by NORML, Jon Gettman alongside High 
Times Magazine, and the Coalition for Rescheduling Cannabis shows the lack of 
prudence by the DEA. Over the course of 44 years, the DEA only responds to petitions of 
rescheduling when lawsuits are filed to enforce the agency’s obligation to ‘[fulfill the] 
procedural requirements’ by the Single Convention on Narcotics. Every petition has been 
rejected on the grounds that there are no studies proving the medical efficacy of cannabis 
when the DEA is one of the only agencies to grant permission to do research studies on 
such matters. The only research facility in the United States to gain such permission to do 
research matters in accordance with the FDA, DEA, NIDA, and the Department of HHS 
is the Coy Waller Laboratory Complex at the University of Mississippi and has been that 
since 1968. The power the DEA has to reschedule and to grant permission of grounds on 
rescheduling puts respected petitioners and patients alike in a catch-22. This scenario 
leaves patients to use the ‘disgusting and low-potency’ cannabis from Ole Miss if the 
DEA does approve their relevant study. Additionally, this restriction to patients hinders 
the relevant information pertaining to the medical efficacy of cannabis to getting to the 
controlling agencies granted the powers to prescribe the ‘accepted medical use’ of 
cannabis in the United States. The efforts of state and federal commissions (LaGuardia, 
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Shafer, and Prettyman), petitions, lawsuits, and various patents show the hypocrisy with 
the DEA and cannabis specifically. These various efforts have provided overwhelming 
evidence that cannabis carries less than a ‘high potential for abuse’, has some ‘accepted 
medical use for treatment in the United States’ by various medical and scientific 
communities, and has an accepted ‘safety for use under medical supervision.’ In addition 
to depriving patients of an opportunity to lawfully use cannabis as a medicine, the 
relevant federal bureaucracies deprive citizens their fundamental, constitutional rights.  
In this chapter, I have critically analyzed various historical references that greatly 
invalidates the Schedule I classification of Cannabis sativa as a controlled substance 
through state and federal commissions, patents filed, petitions and federal lawsuits being 
ignored, and the inclusion in 29 states and the District of Columbia having legislation 
permitting the ‘broad use’ of Cannabis sativa for medical purposes as well as the 
inclusion of 14 states permitting the ‘limited use’ of a non-psychoactive form of 
Cannabis sativa for treatment resistant epilepsy.  
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Chapter III 
The Constitutional Provisions for Use of 
Cannabis sativa 
In this chapter, I will investigate how the lack of settling of the dispute with 
regards to the Schedule I classification of cannabis has created an environment that 
violates the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth amendments of the 
United States Constitution. In this chapter, I will analyze relevant, historic legal 
precedent from the Supreme Court on common defenses used to perpetuate the “War on 
Drugs”, and how such legal precedent legitimizes the movement of cannabis law reform. 
 The first piece of federal legislation that was formed to prohibit and penalize the 
production of cannabis is The Marihuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937. The Act of 1937 states 
that marihuana, “means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; 
the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds, or resin,” 
(Marihuana Act of 1937). This definition of marihuana and all of the Act of 1937 were 
deemed unconstitutional with the court decision of Leary v. United States in 1969. The 
court found that the Act of 1937 infringed on 5th Amendment privilege of not 
incrimination oneself via the double jeopardy clause. With the Act of 1937 being 
removed from the United States federal code entirely, the federal government formed the 
Controlled Substance Act to take its place on regulating the production, cultivation, and 
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manufacturing of cannabis. The CSA of 1970 included the same verbiage that remained 
consistent to the unconstitutional definition, as defined by Leary v. United States, of 
marihuana outlined in the Act of 1937.While the intent of the CSA and the Act of 1937 
operate differently, both remain to infringe on rights of the same sort. If one, the Act of 
1937, can be found stripping providers of constitutional rights, then the CSA could also 
be charged with the same unconstitutionality. In the first petition to reclassify cannabis, 
NORML suggested that the grounds for reclassification be done to be in compliance with 
the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs placement of cannabis. The Single Convention 
does stray away in verbiage when defining the plant. The Single Convention defines 
marihuana as, “cannabis means the flowering or fruiting tops of the cannabis plant… 
from which the resin has not been extracted,” (Single Convention, 1961). The Single 
Convention also distinguishes between, “the fruiting or flowering tops and the seeds and 
leaves when not accompanied by the tops,” (Single Convention, 1961). The fruiting tops 
of the cannabis plant is placed in Schedule I while the seeds or leaves not accompanied 
by the fruiting tops are in Schedule IV. The differentiation between the Schedule I and IV 
classifications of cannabis imply that the Single Convention was well aware of the uses 
of cannabis. The Schedule IV version of cannabis allows for the seeds and leaves to be 
used in an industrial way much like hemp was used in the United States before the 
passing of the Act of 1937, where the Schedule I definition of cannabis was more in line 
with the medical/ non-medical use of cannabis through smoking or through the use of 
tinctures or extracts. These uses of cannabis are seen explicitly when the Single 
Convention states, “This convention shall not apply to the cultivation of the cannabis 
plant exclusively for industrial or horticultural purposes, and a party may reserve the right 
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to permit temporarily in any one of its territories: the use of cannabis, cannabis resin, 
extracts and tinctures of cannabis for non-medical purposes,” (Single Convention, 1961). 
The goal of the Single Convention with regards to cannabis is one that ensures that 
individual parties be able to be utilize cannabis for industrial purposes as well as the 
regulation of ‘temporary use of non-medical cannabis.’ The Single Convention also 
provided that if two parties were in dispute of the application of any part of the 
convention, “the said Parties shall consult together with a view to the settlement of the 
dispute by negotiation, investigation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, recourse to 
regional bodies, judicial process or other peaceful means of their own choice,” (Single 
Convention, 1961). The two parties that were in ‘consult together’ were the DEA and 
NORML with the first rescheduling petition, the DEA and High Times Magazine with the 
second, and the DEA and the Coalition for Rescheduling Cannabis, but the DEA refused 
to consult with the petitioners in every instance and additional lawsuits were filed which 
forced the DEA to ‘fulfill procedural requirements’ to reschedule a substance in 
accordance with the CSA.  
The first of many constitutional amendments that have been modified in recent 
decades includes the changing interpretation of the Fourth Amendment with specific 
regards to the ‘search and seizure clause.’ The first Supreme Court case that is relevant to 
the old form of Prohibition is Taylor v. United States. The case by the Supreme Court 
upheld a court doctrine that is wildly imperative to the current prohibition of cannabis. 
The case held, “the smell of whisky alone was not sufficient to allow police officers to 
search the garage of a house without a warrant,” (Taylor v. United States, 1932). This 
Supreme Court of the United States’ decision made precedent of the Plain Smell 
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Doctrine. This doctrine refers to a situation in which an officer makes a determination of 
reasonable and probable grounds for a search based solely on the detection of some 
distinctive odor. This doctrine is still widely contested throughout the United States 
where law enforcement officers in 28 states now have to ‘allow’ the odor of fresh 
cannabis to not be grounds for a reasonable search. Officers must allow this odor to 
permeate because motorists could be using cannabis as a medicine and not as an illicit 
substance. Such ‘odor’ is no longer considered preponderance to a criminal activity.  
Since the repeal of Prohibition of alcohol, the Fourth Amendment has been 
modified with cases like Mapp v. Ohio, Terry v. Ohio, Kentucky v. King, and Rodriguez 
v. United States. These cases’ interpretations of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘search and 
seizure clause’ bring much clarification to the rights of cannabis users in the modern legal 
scene. The first of these cases, Mapp v. Ohio, was monumental in criminal procedure, in 
which the Supreme Court of the United States decided that evidence obtained in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment may not be used in state law criminal prosecutions in state 
courts as well as in federal criminal law prosecutions in federal courts. The Supreme 
Court accomplished the change criminal procedure by use of a principle known as 
selective incorporation or the exclusionary rule. Such principles allow the defendant in 
criminal cases to suppress evidence from being entered into discovery in relevant cases. 
The decision of Mapp v. Ohio in 1961 protects lawful users of cannabis from more 
stringent federal laws if law agencies chose to try defendants in a higher court where 
medical cannabis is in violation with the Schedule I classification of cannabis and its 
derivatives. This is only made possible if law officers usurp the ‘probable cause part of 
the search and seizure clause’ of the fourth amendment or obtaining a lawful warrant 
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obtained such evidence of cannabis. The ‘probable cause’ portion of the Fourth 
Amendment was redefined with the Supreme Court case of Terry v. Ohio in 1968.  
Before the ruling on Terry v. Ohio, states needed probable cause to administer a 
reasonable search, “the Warren Court lowered the standard [of reasonableness] police 
officers had to meet to conduct a certain type of search: the so-called ‘stop and frisk,’” 
(Starkey, Villanova University School of Law, 2012). A ‘stop and frisk’ search is 
precluded by an officer believing a suspect is armed with a weapon and in the 
‘commission’ of a crime. The investigating officer can conduct an interrogation and pat 
down for weapons. Veteran Cleveland Police Department Detective Martin McFadden 
witnessed two men, Terry and Chilton, circling a store in a ‘stick up’ fashion. McFadden, 
a 39-year police veteran, testified, “[Terry] did not look right to [me] at the time,” (Terry 
v. Ohio, 1968). After questioning the alleged suspects, McFadden patted down Terry and 
Chilton because he presumed the sketchiness of the demeanor of the two as them having 
the intent on robbing the store, and found both concealing weapons. The decision of such 
case, “Police are only permitted to frisk for weapons, not evidence of a crime. Thus, 
frisks are limited to a pat down of outer clothing,” (Starkey, 2012). The Supreme Court 
found that the patting down of Terry and Chilton fit perfectly within these bounds. The 
Warren Court fundamentally altered Fourth Amendment law without admitting its new 
paradigmatic shift of the scope of the fourth amendment rights. A criminal search and 
seizure, for the first time, was constitutional when law enforcement lacked probable 
cause, but had ‘reasonable suspicion’ of a suspect having the intent of committing a 
crime with a weapon. Reasonableness became king, while decaying the rights of citizens 
of the United States. Such ruling, if properly upheld, would lessen the effects of the 600 
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thousand plus ‘Terry frisks’ in New York City every year. If an officer conducts a ‘Terry 
frisk’ and the suspect is in possession of cannabis, then such suspect’s cannabis becomes 
in ‘public view.’ The impact of ‘Terry frisks’ is seen when in the state of New York in 
the highest of magnitude. New York has decriminalized the possession of cannabis of 
less than 25 grams. The punishment of such offense is a citation carrying a fine of less 
than $250 for the first three offenses. However, if the cannabis is discovered by a ‘Terry 
frisk’, then the cannabis becomes a, “Class B misdemeanor punishable by a fine of $250 
[alongside] a maximum sentence of 90 days,” (New York Laws, NORML, 2016). Terry 
frisks by the virtue of cannabis users are arguably more detrimental to the future of such 
suspects arrested for a small discrepancy in the law in the state of New York.  
Since the people of the State of California passed Proposition 215/ Compassionate 
Use Act of 1996 which legalized cannabis for medical use, many cases have since been 
heard by the Supreme Court of the United States to try certain aspects of the ongoing war 
on drugs. For example, in 2011 the court case Kentucky v. King went to the Supreme 
Court. This case is of extreme importance to the usurpation of the Fourth Amendment 
right of, “the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,” (US Constitution). 
This case originally involved a person, other than defendant King, who allegedly sold 
crack cocaine to an undercover officer in Lexington, Kentucky. After the deal was made 
between the crack cocaine dealer and the undercover officer, the dealer moved quickly to 
an apartment building. Uniformed officers followed with no avail, heard a door shut and, 
“detected a very strong odor of burnt marijuana,” (Kentucky v. King, 2011). Officer 
Steven Cobb banged on the apartment door notifying those inside that he was on officer 
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of the law, and he, “could hear people inside moving as [though] things were being 
moved inside the apartment, of which Cobb testified led the officers to believe that drug-
related evidence was about to be destroyed,” (Kentucky v. King, 2011). The fact that 
such ‘drug-related evidence’ was allegedly destroyed is an exigent circumstance to enter 
the residence without a warrant. Exigent circumstances occur when a law enforcement 
officer has reasonable suspicion of a crime being committed with no sufficient time to 
secure a warrant, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed and held that exigent 
circumstances, “justified the warrantless entry because the police reasonably believed 
that evidence would be destroyed and did not impermissibly evade the warrant 
requirement,” (Kentucky v. King, 2011). While the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed 
that exigent circumstances are enough of a cause to conduct a search without a warrant, 
the Supreme Court of Kentucky reversed such affirmation. So the case was taken to the 
Supreme Court of the United States who ultimately decided, “That an exigency existed 
but officers did not violate or threaten the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency, we 
hold that the exigency justified the warrantless search of the apartment. The decision of 
the Kentucky Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion,” (Kentucky v. King, 2011). The 
implications of Kentucky v. King include an environment where officers may ascertain 
noise as the proof of suspects destroying evidence. If an officer has such suspicion of 
evidence being destroyed, then this presumption assumes the suspect is guilty, destroying 
another ideal that is at the heart of American rule of law, presumption of innocence.  The 
exigency in this case could be the odor of burnt marijuana, which in the court of law is 
not indisputable evidence. While the smell of burnt marijuana is unique and noticeable, 
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the smell like the location of the crack cocaine dealer could not be identified by a factor 
beyond reasonable doubt. While the possession of cannabis in the state of Kentucky is 
illegal, it warrants a less serious charge than that of crack cocaine. The exigent 
circumstance that existed for the uniformed officers following the dealer was not the 
‘smell of burnt marijuana’ but the transfer of crack cocaine from the dealer to the 
undercover officer.  
The next case that is relevant to cannabis users concerning their Fourth 
Amendment right is the case of Rodriguez v. United States. This case analyzed whether 
police officers may extend the length of a traffic stop to conduct a search with a trained 
detection dog. The case involves Dennys Rodriguez being pulled over for swerving off 
the shoulder of the road. After being questioned, the officer reported, “an overwhelming 
scent of air-fresheners emanating from the car,” (Rodriguez v. United States, 2015). The 
overwhelming scent of air-fresheners acted as an exigent circumstance giving the officer 
reasonable suspicion that Rodriguez was involved in other criminal activity. The officer 
requested back up and conducted a records check on the vehicle and its passengers. The 
officer issued Rodriguez a warning ticket for swerving. After such issuance, a drug 
detection dog indicated the presence of drugs within the vehicle. The officer searched the 
car and discovered methamphetamine. Rodriguez filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
by arguing that an officer may not extend a completed traffic stop to conduct a K-9 sniff 
without reasonable suspicion. The Supreme Court ruled that, “the use of a K-9 unit after 
the conclusion of a traffic stop and without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
[similar to Terry v. Ohio] is a violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition of 
unreasonable search and seizures,” (Rodriguez v. United States, 2015).  
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Currently, evidence that is in ‘plain sight’ is suspect for a warrantless search and 
seizure and the Supreme Court of the United States has upheld that to satisfy the probable 
cause clause of the Fourth Amendment, but the court decision of Rodriguez v. United 
States eliminates any contention that would include that the plain smell of fresh or burnt 
cannabis to satisfy either the ‘reasonable suspicion’ as outlined by Terry v. Ohio case 
where stop and frisk searches are allowed when officers are have suspicion of a suspect 
being armed or as ‘probable cause’ because the 2015 case decided that the use of a K-9 
unit after the completion of a traffic stop is a violation of fourth amendment rights. If the 
use of a trained animal with sensory perception far exceeding that of his/her handler is a 
violation of the prohibition of unreasonable search and seizures, then such ‘plain smell’ 
cannot serve as an exigent circumstance to conduct a warrantless search as explained in 
Kentucky v. King. The smell of fresh or burnt cannabis should not be held as a qualifier 
for officers to conduct searches where cannabis can be used as legal medicine, for 
recreational purposes, or where simple possession is decriminalized because states 
reserve the right to amend laws or their own constitution by ballot initiatives or popular 
referendums. Such officers using the current Schedule I classification to distinguish the 
discrepancy between possible state laws and federal laws concerning possession and use 
of cannabis are violating the oath of upholding the constitution. While the Supreme Court 
of the United States has not officially declared if plain smell can satisfy as either a 
‘reasonable suspicion’ to conduct a stop and frisk search or as ‘probable cause’ to 
conduct a lawful, though warrantless search. States like Arizona and Massachusetts have 
found that the smell of cannabis made by a law enforcement agent, where canine or 
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human, is not enough grounds for either from state court decisions State v. Sisco and 
Commonwealth v. Cruz for the states respectively.  
While the modifying interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has occurred 
through several Supreme Court decisions, the Fifth Amendment rights have been seized 
through two main components: substantial assistance and asset forfeiture. Substantial 
assistance is assistance directed to the investigation and prosecution of criminal activities 
by persons other than the defendant. Defendants that want to lower the sentence of their 
convictions carry out such assistance. The practice of substantial assistance started after 
the implementation of the Sentence Reform Act of 1984. The intent of the Sentence 
Reform Act of 1984 includes: providing sentences that are close approximations of the 
actual time defendants would serve in prison, provide consistency between similar 
defendants convicted of similar offenses, and fostering sentence lengths that correlate 
with the severity of the offense committed. Substantial Assistance came to rise with the 
passing of the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act. The Act of 1986 made provisions to 
reintroduce mandatory minimums for drug offenders that were repealed in 1970, even 
though, “no hearings were held with no experts on the relevant issues, no judges, no one 
from the Bureau of Prisons, or from any other office in the government, provided advice 
on the idea before it was rushed through the committee and into law,” (Sterling, Public 
Broadcasting Service, 2014). The Act outlined 10 and 5 year sentences, the longer of 
which was issued to offenders who were seen as ‘major traffickers’, while those receiving 
the shorter sentences were defined as ‘serious traffickers’ were more than likely just 
consumers of the illicit substances. The only way defendants could receive a shorter 
sentence than the ones prescribed by the Act would be if he/she provided information 
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leading to the prosecution of another, substantial assistance. The prosecutor in the case 
would be the agent determining if the information provided qualified as substantial 
assistance, not the impartial arbiter. Before the decision of United States V. Wade, 
“neither defendants nor the district could inquire into the prosecutor’s reasons for 
refusing to move for departure [of sentencing guidelines outlined by the Sentencing 
Reform Act of 1984],” (Austin, Campbell Law Review, 1993). The partiality of the 
prosecutor is a direct violation of the procedural due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment. The procedural due process clause’s purpose is to protect individuals from 
the coercive powers of the government by ensuring that adjudication processes under 
valid laws like the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
are fair and impartial such as the right to an impartial arbiter. The 1986 Act, “shifts power 
away from judges- who are impartial- to prosecutors, who are not,” (Sterling, 2014). The 
case of Mistretta v. United States, petitioner John Mistretta argues that the United States 
Sentencing Commission created by Congress through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 
was in violation of the separation of powers. This argument is made because the powers 
of the Commission were given to the judicial branch, not carried out by the legislative 
branch. The Supreme Court held that the delegation of the power to create sentencing 
guidelines did not violate the separation of powers clause. While the Supreme Court 
disagreed with the claims of Mistretta, a key criticism, however, is one that the, 
“guidelines take too much discretion away from the judge wile placing much more 
discretion in the hands of the prosecutor, tipping so one-sidely in the prosecutor’s favor 
as to ‘disturb the due process balance essential to the fairness of criminal litigation,’” 
(Austin, 1993). The portion of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 establishing the U.S. 
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Sentencing Commission did not violate separation of powers, because although Congress 
cannot generally delegate its legislative power to another Branch, the non-delegation 
doctrine does not prevent Congress from obtaining assistance from coordinate Branches. 
Another portion of the Fifth Amendment that the War on Drugs violates is the 
double jeopardy clause. In 1937, the Marihuana Tax Stamp Act was passed. Before the 
passage of the Act of 1937, there was no federal piece of legislation to interpret the 
production, distribution, or consumption of cannabis leaving states to deal with the use of 
cannabis through individual legislation making the sale or use of the substance illegal. 
The Marihuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937 implemented a system of drug taxes on cannabis 
use. A drug tax allows governments to collect revenue from the ‘taxpayer,’ in a civil 
action, an amount in which calculates as a fraction of the street value of the substance in 
possession by the ‘taxpayer’ or a flat fee permit of the substance. Federal inspections of 
suspected drug dealers were continued by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and its 
progeny until 1969 when Timothy Leary challenged the Act of 1937, claiming it violated 
the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment which states, “no person shall…be 
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb, nor shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” The Fifth Amendment 
ensures that nobody can be tried for the same crime twice, nor be forced to testify against 
oneself. In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court heard the case, Timothy Francis Leary v. 
United States, the first federal challenge to the Marihuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937. After 
being denied entrance to Mexico by car, Timothy Leary was stopped at the border, 
searched, and found in possession of marijuana. While in the act of crossing the border, 
Leary was a 'transferee of marijuana'. As a transferee, the Act of 1937 would have made 
107	 	
Leary should have registered with the appropriate authorities and paid his transfer tax to 
the Internal Revenue Service. Leary had not done either, thereby placing him in violation 
of the Act. After conviction in a lower court, Leary held in the Supreme Court that 
compliance violated his privilege against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court held that 
the Act of 1937 placed Leary in a precarious legal limbo. The Act of 1937 allowed a 
particular group of people, medical suppliers of cannabis, legal access to dealing cannabis 
at a lower tax rate, and not subject to many state anti-cannabis laws. The Act of 1937 
inadvertently created a group of unsanctioned, untaxed dealers who had to release 
identifying information to federal authorities when they chose to pay the tax. The federal 
authorities could then pass it to local police who made such consumption and sale illegal. 
The group of “unsanctioned dealers,” whose activities fell outside of the medical field, 
had released information that compromised state law. Most state laws at the time made 
cannabis illegal, except for specified conditions, most of which were outlined in the Act 
of 1937. Thus, supplying one's name and address to federal authorities exposed the 
defendant to a “real and appreciable” risk of self-incrimination. The Supreme Court 
declared the Act unconstitutional. Such discrepancies between the sanctioned, medical 
suppliers and ‘unsanctioned’ suppliers forced Congress to pass the Controlled Substances 
Act of 1970, which regulated drugs in all states. This Act explicitly named and scheduled 
all illegal drugs and provided for a system of penalties and enforcement that still stands 
today. 
Finally, some aspects of asset/civil forfeiture remain of great importance when 
considering the violations of the Fifth Amendment’s ‘just compensation’ clause. Asset 
forfeiture is a form of confiscation of assets by the State and typically applies to the 
108	 	
alleged proceeds or instruments of crime. Asset forfeiture is applied to a host of different 
types of crimes but is typically associated to terrorist activities, drug related crimes, and 
other criminal and civil offenses. Asset forfeiture developed from English common law 
where statutory forfeitures of, “offending objects used in violation of the customs and 
revenue laws,” (Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company, 1974). The court 
case Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Company invoked the ‘guilty property’ 
fiction, which justifies the forfeiture of an innocent owner’s property against the ship. To 
justify the ‘guilty property’ fiction, the Supreme Court declared, “the thing is here 
primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the 
thing,” (Calero-Toledo, 1974). The ‘guilty property’ fiction prescribed the property is 
guilty of the crime, regardless of the intent of the owner, and for that point the property is 
justifiably forfeited to law enforcement agencies. In Dobbins’ Distillery V. United States, 
the Court, “upheld the forfeiture of the real and personal property of a distillery occupied 
and operated by a lessee who failed to maintain the distillery’s business records in 
accordance with United States revenue laws. The Court maintained that the forfeiture 
action attached to the distillery and did not require proof of the lessor-owner’s knowledge 
that the lessee committed fraud upon the government,” (Brodey, Journal of Criminal Law 
and Criminology, 1997). The ‘guilty property’ fiction rests on the notion that the owner 
who allows his property to become involved in an offense has been negligent,” (Brodey, 
1997), and such forfeitures still justified because of such negligence of the owner to the 
lessee of the property. While most cases dealing with asset forfeiture pertain to concerns 
of the Fifth Amendment, the court case Austin v. United States upholds that some types 
of asset forfeiture can apply to the Eighth Amendment’s ‘excessive fines’ clause. The 
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claim made by Austin was one that explained that the Eighth Amendment, unlike other 
constitutional provisions, did not limit its protection to the context of criminal 
proceedings. Additionally, the Court noted, “that the historical purpose of the provision 
was to ‘prevent the government from abusing its power,’” (Brodey, 1997). The Court 
decided that the ‘excessive fines’ clause did also pertain to civil proceedings, and since 
Austin had plead guilty to the crime of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, the 
forfeiture of his mobile home and his auto body shop were not contraband. Furthermore, 
the Court stated: 
The dramatic variations in the value of conveyances and real property forfeitable 
under  [21 USC] § 881 (a) (4) and (a) (7) undercut any argument that the forfeitures 
serve to compensate the government for the cost of law enforcement. Thus, the Court 
concluded that the forfeiture in Austin was subject to the limitation of the ‘excessive 
fines’ clause of the Eighth Amendment, (Brodey, 1997). 
While the Court decided unanimously in favor of Austin, the Court declined to 
declare a test for determining when a civil forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. Rather, 
the Court remanded the case to the trial court for such determination. State Supreme 
Court decisions with specific regards to the rulings of State v. Sisco and Commonwealth 
v. Cruz, rule that law enforcement agencies cannot use any iota of burnt or fresh cannabis 
as grounds for reasonable suspicion to conduct a warrantless search. However, no state 
court decisions have ruled on whether state law agencies can apply asset forfeiture to 
legal, medical cannabis businesses. State legislators must make laws to restrict law 
enforcement agencies from using federal civil forfeiture laws. These laws must equate to 
the intent of the cases of State v. Sisco and Commonwealth v. Cruz. Such court ruling 
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argues that the smell of cannabis does not constitute as reasonable suspicion of a crime 
being committed. Likewise, these rulings must align so law enforcement agents cannot 
use the Schedule I classification of cannabis from the Controlled Substances Act to seize 
assets from cannabis users and distributors even though these agents are not in violation 
of state laws.  
While civil forfeiture has been argued to be in violation of the ‘excessive fines 
and punishment’ clause of the Eighth Amendment, other provisions of the War on Drugs 
remain more dubious to the ‘cruel and unusual punishment clause’ of the Eighth 
Amendment. Such provisions like felony disenfranchisement for ‘victimless crimes’ such 
as medical use of cannabis in states that have prescribed such use as legal. In More 
Primitive Than Torture, Dietrich analyzes many facets of felon disenfranchisement like: 
the history of it in Europe and how its typified use translated to the United States after the 
Revolutionary War, several constitutional and statutory challenges of felon 
disenfranchisement, the transformation of the evolution and application of the Eighth 
Amendment, and, finally, whether felons disenfranchised while not under state 
supervision violates the ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ clause of the Eighth Amendment. 
He first notes, “James emerging from an Alabama penitentiary after three years of 
incarceration on felony drug charges. While his past is unfavorable, he expects now that 
he has served his time he will be able to enjoy all the rights and privileges [specifically 
the rights and privileges of life, liberty, and property] of being a free man [not under state 
supervision through parole or probation],” (Dietrich, University of Maryland, Baltimore 
County, 2007). Dietrich notes the origins of felon disenfranchisement are consistent with 
Greco-Roman culture by stating, “those who committed a crime would be labeled as 
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‘infamous’ and would be subject to a range of disabilities, including prohibitions on 
voting, making speeches, appearing in court, serving in the army, or appearing in the 
Greek [or Roman] assembly,” (Dietrich, 2007). These traditions continued with the 
Germanic tribes conquering the existing Roman Empire. The concept of ‘infamous’ 
crimes deserving of a ‘range of disabilities’ including the prohibition of voting rights 
became the, “concept of ‘outlawry’ being employed as a method of punishing those who 
committed serious crimes against the community,” (Dietrich, 2007). With the rise of 
colonial powers like England, individuals convicted of a felony or treason under the 
power of the crown could, “be declared ‘attained’ resulting in several dire consequences 
like: losing most civil and proprietary rights, forfeiting real and personal property to the 
crown, and prohibiting themselves from the transference of proper to family by grant or 
devise also known as ‘corruption of the blood,’” (Dietrich, 2007). Such ideals were 
typified in early colonial law rewarding ‘prescribed good moral behavior’ while, 
“disenfranchising those involved in perceived moral shortcomings,” (Dietrich, 2007). 
These religious ideals on disenfranchisement remained static until the Civil War and the 
inclusion of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments that placed, “a 
substantial limit on the states’ power, especially in the realm of race and voting,” 
(Dietrich, 2007). Several Southern states, in order to be readmitted in the Union while 
still denying black populations the franchise. The tool in which Southern states 
accomplish this goal is to, “include disenfranchisement of those convicted of crimes 
commonly thought to be committed more frequently by blanks, while appearing race-
neutral,” (Dietrich, 2007). The assumption being made was that blacks were more prone 
to disenfranchisement because of their previous condition of servitude and possessed 
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‘peculiar characteristics’ that caused them to, “commit certain ‘black crimes’ such as 
theft, arson, perjury, wife-beating, and vagrancy, yet not disenfranchising individuals 
convicted of ‘white’ crimes such as crimes of violence, including sometimes murder,” 
(Dietrich, 2007). Under the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Supreme Court 
decided that voting is a fundamental right, and could only be abridged if a law or 
constitutional provision survived strict scrutiny review. In the case of Carrington v. Rash, 
the majority opinion ruled that a jurisdiction could not simply, “‘fence out’ a certain 
segment of the voting population based on perceptions as to how that population would 
vote,” (Carrington v. Rash, 1965). While the Supreme Court ruled that legislators could 
not block a ‘certain segment of the voting population’, strict scrutiny review did not 
apply to felon disenfranchisement. The case of Carrington v. Nash implied certain 
jurisdictions could infringe on certain segments; several states began to reexamine the 
intent behind its disenfranchisement provisions. However, “in 1973, the picture of felon 
disenfranchisement in America was grim. While four states did not deprive criminals of 
the right to vote… nearly half of the states disenfranchised convicted criminals for the 
rest of their lives,” (Dietrich, 2007). The analysis of the intent behind States’ intent 
behind its disenfranchisement provisions lines up with the changing views of mandatory 
minimums. The shift in felon disenfranchisement is examined by a survey conducted by 
the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University, “the researchers found that 
81.7 percent of respondents ‘rejected the policy of permanent disenfranchisement for 
convicted felons,” (Pinaire, 2003). Even though public sentiment in the United States 
disagrees with ‘permanent disenfranchisement for convicted felons’, “an estimated 3.9 
million of the 4.25 million individuals denied the right to vote because of criminal history 
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are in the United States, and of the 3.9 million currently without the right to vote because 
of current incarceration or have been disenfranchised for life are 1.4 million black men, 
representing 13 percent of black men nationwide,” (Felony Disenfranchisement Laws, 
2003). In 1980, the total prison population of federal and state facilities was 218 thousand 
and of that 18.76 percent were drug offenders. In 2014, 488 thousand of the total 1.51 
million offenders incarcerated were drug offenders, (Carroll, PolitiFact, 2016). Of the 
increase in total federal and state prison, drug offenders make up 32.3 percent of such 
total increases. It can be extrapolated that 32.3 percent, 1.26 million, of the 3.9 million 
disenfranchised are drug offenders. Public sentiment on drug abuse is shifting from a 
moral problem to a health problem as noted by Bernie Sanders stated in the Presidential 
debate in Flint Michigan in 2016. If early colonial law disenfranchised on the basis on 
‘perceived moral shortcomings’, and, “a majority of Americans (2/3) think that the 
criminal possession of [cannabis] and harder drugs like cocaine and heroin shouldn’t be 
prosecuted,” (Nadelmann, Drug Policy Alliance, 2014), as well as the issue of drug abuse 
being seen as a health issue, not a moral issue, then current disenfranchisement laws 
should apply to the strict scrutiny review as insufficiently outlined by the 1965 case of 
Carrington v. Rash. 
While felony disenfranchisement and civil asset forfeiture serves as a violation of 
the ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ and the ‘excessive fines’ clauses respectively, the 
most blatant attack on the state appropriation of legal cannabis is the Tenth Amendment. 
Such amendment provides, “powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or 
to the people.” This effectively means that if the Constitution does not specifically grant 
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the power to the federal government over a specific issue, and if the State does not 
prohibit such issues, then the State or the collective persons of the State decide on such 
issue not outlined by the Constitution. Since the Constitution does not either prohibit the 
use of cannabis explicitly or does the standard definition of cannabis as outlined by the 
Marihuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937 apply to States anymore because of its ‘real and 
appreciable’ risk of self-incrimination as decided by Leary v. United States, States have 
the enumerated rights to decide if cannabis use can be regulated within its borders. If 
each state allowing for legal cannabis fails to keep the supply of such cannabis in its 
borders than Congress can regulate such commerce through the enumerated powers of the 
‘commerce clause.’ The court cases of Raich v. Ashcroft and Nebraska and Oklahoma v. 
Colorado are the most current and of most importance concerning States’ rights in the 
21st century cannabis scene. At the time of the case, 11 states had currently allowed the 
medical appropriation of cannabis with California being the largest state allowing its use 
for such purposes. California allowed the medical use of cannabis through Proposition 
215 while the federal government not recognizing medical cannabis because of the 
Schedule I classification through the CSA of 1970 implying that such a substance has ‘no 
current accepted medical use in the United States.’ The federal government felt strongly 
enough to divert resources, “that could have been used to fight terrorism or go after 
violent traffickers, in order to arrest sick people,” (Guither, Drug War Rant, 2016). The 
urge to divert such resources is motivated by the police-for-profit that civil asset 
forfeiture incentivizes. The case involves two medical cannabis patients, Raich of 
Oakland and Monson of Oroville, along with two anonymous caregivers with the support 
and backing of the Oakland Cannabis Buyers Cooperative suing the federal government 
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on October 9, 2002, “to prevent the feds from interfering with their [State] right to use 
medical cannabis,” (Guither, 2016). The cooperative argued three points to defend such 
access to medical cannabis. Firstly, the action of the respondents was completely legal 
under state and local laws through Proposition 215 on the state level and the Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative on the local level. Additionally, it is exclaimed that the 
use of cannabis by the respondents is of medical necessity and, “the evil sought to be 
averted was less heinous than that performed to avoid it,” (United States v. Aguilar, 883 
F.2d 662, 693 (9th Cir. 1989). The second factor upheld the decision held by Judge 
Washington, who ruled in favor of Robert Randall and opened up the Compassionate 
IND Program to allow patients with ‘marijuana-responsive disorders’ access to such 
medicine. Finally, the cannabis, “grown as part of a cooperative of patients and no money 
changing hands,” (Guither, 2016), is exempt from the interstate commerce clause. As a 
result of such aspects of the case, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a 
preliminary injunction to stop the federal government in part on this ruling: 
We find that the appellants have demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on 
their claim that, as applied to them, the CSA is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ 
Commerce Clause authority, (Raich v. Ashcroft, 2005). 
The Commerce Clause and its intent is best described by, the father of the 
Constitution, James Madison when he states: 
The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government are 
few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and 
infinite…The powers reserved to the several States will extend to  all the objects which, 
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in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, 
and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity  of the State, (Madison, The 
Federalist, 1888). 
The ‘preliminary injunction’ granted by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the 
behalf of the respondents alleged that the CSA of 1970 is an unconstitutional exercise of 
the Commerce Clause on the basis of the court case of United States v. Lopez. The case 
of United States v. Lopez and further clarified by United States v. Morrison ruled, 
“Congress only had the power to regulate the channels of commerce, the instrumentalities 
of commerce, and the action that substantially affects interstate commerce, but not the 
power to regulate relatively unrelated things,” (United States v. Morrison, 2000). 
Ultimately, the Supreme Court argued that, “federal control of the intrastate incidents of 
the traffic in controlled substances is essential to the effective control of the interstate 
incidents of such traffic,” (Raich v. Ashcroft). In Raich v. Ashcroft, the federal 
government ensures that the Commerce Clause is relevant, “as long as the activity is 
related in some way to other activities that are part of interstate commerce, then Congress 
has the power to determine the bounds of any [intrastate] subclasses at its own whim,” 
(Trudeau, Cannabis Culture, 2005). 
The merit of the ‘federal control of intrastate incidents’ being essential to the 
control to the control of the ‘interstate incidents of such traffic’ is examined in the court 
case of Nebraska and Oklahoma v. Colorado. The court case examines how the legality 
of medical and recreational cannabis in Colorado, “caused [cannabis] to flow into their 
states, thereby undermining [Nebraska’s and Oklahoma’s] strict laws prohibiting 
[cannabis]. The states’ claim ‘irreparable injury’ by draining their treasuries, placing 
117	 	
stress on criminal justice systems, and endangering the health of their residents,” 
(Watson, Huffington Post, 2016). An irony of this case that caused the Supreme Court of 
the United States to move for a motion to leave to file a bill of complaint denied on 
March 21, 2016 is the fact Oklahoma along with 15 other states recently enacted medical 
cannabis bills for the use of CBD oil for epileptic seizures in children, and such bills 
hardly ever provide how possible patients safe, in-state access. If in-state access is not 
secured for the state of Oklahoma, then patients who could legally use CBD for epilepsy 
would indeed have to travel to states like Colorado that could provide just that. 
Additionally, the assertion that Colorado having a legal, regulated marketplace, 
“naturally resulted in more people entering these states with cannabis, while not alleging 
that the flow of cannabis into the states was due to Colorado’s engaging in conduct that 
would promote interstate commerce,” (Watson, 2016), grounds that would allow 
Congress to intervene via the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court would not have 
denied the motion if the legality of cannabis in Colorado was related in some way to 
illegal activities in Nebraska and Oklahoma, which would then be part of interstate 
commerce. Since this argument is invalid, Congress does not have the power to 
determine the bounds of any [intrastate] subclasses on its own whim, and the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals preliminary injunction would have ‘demonstrated that the CSA 
of 1970 is an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce Clause authority.  
The ‘motion to leave to file a bill of complaint’ being denied to the states of 
Nebraska and Oklahoma, the Ninth District Court of Appeals’ ‘preliminary injunction’ 
for respondent Raich, and the Obama’s continually lessened priority of enforcing federal 
cannabis laws in states where medical cannabis is legal proves how federal agents and 
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departments are protecting the privileges and immunities of some citizens in some states 
while not providing blanket coverage legislation to protect all citizens in all states is in 
violation of the ‘Privileges and Immunities’ clause which states, “No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States,” (US Constitution, 1789). This clause is located in both the Preamble; Article IV, 
Section 2, Clause 1; and the Fourteenth Amendment. Since this clause is located in the 
Preamble, its gravity then becomes attached to the federal government as well as state 
governments. Since the people of various states enjoy the ‘privilege’ to grow medical 
cannabis while having the ‘immunity’ from the law to use such cannabis, this privilege 
and immunity by and for the law for medical cannabis users in some states must not be 
‘abridged’ in states that ‘make and enforce such laws [that undoubtedly curtail various] 
privileges and immunities’ of other potentially-legal medical cannabis users in all other 
states.  
The ongoing war on cannabis violates all ‘four relations’ as defined in The Social 
Contract written by Rousseau. The prohibition of cannabis ignores, “laws that govern the 
Sovereign to the State,” (Rousseau), wherein Congress has made legislation to 
criminalize a substance while enforcing such criminalization with tooth and nail even 
though as argued earlier the Constitution gives it no footing. Secondly, civil asset 
forfeiture oversteps the ‘second relation’ of the social contract by treating governmental 
agencies as private citizens. Such cases between agencies and citizens are treated as a 
tort, not a criminal proceeding. The agencies accuse citizens of crimes by ‘preponderance 
of evidence’ while hindering innocent people from obtaining such assets that without 
contest are theirs as well as profiting off of seized assets. Finally, morals and manners, 
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customs, and public opinion should dictate and motivate the laws of a society, and 
sentiment on cannabis, drug abuse, and other drug crimes is being ignored. Ignoring such 
public sentiments has caused the discrepancy between states with medical cannabis 
legislated through ballot initiatives and the federal Schedule I classification of cannabis. 
For these reasons identified above, it is sensible to then assume that failure to observe 
these four relations will cause for, “the best possible form to public affairs,” (Rousseau), 
to not occur. Such disregards of these relations should be considered to have greater 
accord and harmony between governing agents, legislators, courts, law enforcement 
agents and their constituents. 
In this chapter, I have analyzed how the lack of settling of the dispute with 
regards to the Schedule I classification of cannabis has created an environment that 
violates the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth amendments of the 
United States Constitution. In this chapter, I answered relevant, historic legal precedent 
questions from the Supreme Court on how common defenses used to perpetuate the “War 
on Drugs”, and how such legal precedent legitimizes the movement of cannabis law 
reform. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
120	 	
Chapter IV 
The Costs of Prohibition and Benefits of 
Legalization of Cannabis sativa  
In this chapter, I will approximate a ‘low and high’ estimate of the total economic 
deadweight loss attributable to the Schedule I classification of Cannabis sativa based on 
the rejection of the ‘recommendation’ made by the Shafer Commission. The 
approximations will include the difference in costs of enforcement as estimated by The 
War on Marijuana which serves as a baseline evaluation for 2010, then extrapolated for 
all relevant years as outlined by A-1; a report on the relative fine difference in accordance 
to the Shafer Commission as outlined by A-2; 3 ‘low’ aggregate estimate models from 
NORML and Gettman in A-5 and A-6, which are extrapolated as a base evaluation in A-7 
and A-8, respectively, and Colorado in A-9; and 3 ‘high’ aggregate estimate models by 
Gettman and NORML in A-12 and A-14, which are extrapolated as base evaluations in 
A-15 and A-16, respectively, and Colorado in A-17. 
The overwhelming discrepancy between public sentiment on the legalization, 
regulation, and taxation of cannabis and its derivatives and the long-standing, immovable 
Schedule I classification of cannabis through the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) of 
1970 has plagued the states of the nation in economic terms, directly and indirectly. The 
direct economic costs of prohibition can be divided into one of three main categories: 
policing, judicial and legal, and corrections’ expenditures. Evidence has been provided 
121	 	
that enforcing the criminalization of cannabis possession is not well-founded while 
costing millions’ freedoms in every facet of American life. While the impact of such 
prohibition is widespread, calculating merely the cost in dollars is difficult, and while 
attempting to calculate this number one will be left making trite assumptions to seek the 
totality of its destruction economically. This calculation alone merely covers how the 
‘War on Drugs’ has removed the humanity of those afflicted by it.  
 The War on Marijuana: In Black and White published by the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) with specifics gathered from The Budgetary Implications of 
Marijuana Prohibition written by Jeffrey Miron Visiting Professor of Economics at 
Harvard University outlines and defines a ‘high, medium, and low’ estimate for each type 
of expenditures for each state and an aggregate summation for the United States. Where 
the indirect expenditures are the ‘ripple effects’ of the enforcement of cannabis 
prohibition laws throughout the United States. In The War on Marijuana, Miron uses 
different strategies to approximate these costs further into three different estimates: high, 
medium, and low, where the medium estimate is the mean between the high and low 
estimates.  
 Miron defines ‘policing’ expenditures to include all money spent on police 
equipment and salaries to arresting officers. Later, policing expenditures will include the 
opportunity costs, externalities, and other potential tradeoffs enforcing cannabis 
prohibition instead of pursuing possible offenders of traffic violations alongside other 
possible drug, violent, and/ or property crimes. Miron’s basic approach to calculate the 
‘high’ estimate of policing expenditures, “consists of prorating historical criminal justice 
system expenditures [analyzing] the fiscal cost of police expenditures on marijuana 
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possession arrests is estimated as the total budget for such services multiplied by the 
percent share of total arrests accounted for marijuana possession,” (The War on 
Marijuana, ACLU, 2013). Miron estimates that only one-third of enforcement 
expenditures is allocated to arrests because while arrests are ‘expensive,’ police officers 
do much more than make arrests. This concern is mitigated to some extent because, “the 
costs of other non-enforcement activities are relatively low compared to arrests,” (The 
War on Marijuana, 2013). Miron’s calculations found 48 percent of costs enforcing 
marijuana prohibition are policing expenditures. Using this percentage helps with the 
inference of the ‘high’ policing expenditures estimate. The ‘high’ estimate of enforcing 
marijuana prohibition, according to Miron, amounts to $6.032 billion of which $2.916 
billion, 48 percent, would be attributable to policing expenditures. Using the 
methodologies listed previously, the ‘high’ estimate for policing expenditures for the 
United States would be $2.916 billion costing each of the, “750,592 persons arrested for 
marijuana possession in 2010,” (NORML, 2010), roughly $3,885 and each of the, “309.3 
million American citizens in 2010,” (Ewert, United States Census Bureau, 2015), $9.43 
to fund for such policing. Likewise, the ‘high’ policing expenditures estimate for the state 
of Mississippi equals $14.59 million costing each of the, “8,281 persons arrested for 
marijuana possession 2010,” (Mississippi Marijuana Arrests, 2010), $1762 and each of 
the “2.97 million Mississippi residents,” (Ewert, United States Census Bureau, 2015), 
$4.91. Mississippi will be used as a baseline in estimating the approximate reduction/ 
savings due to the decriminalization of marijuana possession compared to the United 
States collectively because a majority, 39 of the 50 states, still criminalize such 
possession. The cost reduction between decriminalization in Mississippi results in a 
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reduction of 54.6 percent in costs attributed to each offender, and a 47.9 percent 
reduction percent reduction in costs to residents, averaging 51.25 percent.  If all states in 
America were to decriminalize marijuana possession, policing expenditures would be 
reduced by $1.494 billion. 
Miron’s approach to calculate the ‘low’ estimate of policing expenditures uses the 
2001 Washington State Institute for Public Policy (WSIPP) to serve as benchmark to 
measure the average cost of marijuana possession arrest comparted to the average annual 
cost of arrest for the rest of the country.  This report serves as the only source for either 
the state or national level to have such information. The WSIPP report estimates, “the 
operating per unit cost of policing a marijuana possession arrest is $750 per arrest, which 
is 15 percent of the average cost per arrest,” (The War on Marijuana, 2013). This average 
of $750 cost of policing a marijuana possession arrest or the 15 percent figure serves as a 
control where other states’ data was not available. 
 Miron’s calculations found that the total ‘low’ policing expenditures estimate 
cost Americans $578 million and Mississippi spending $2.89 million. The ‘low’ estimate 
for policing expenditures for the United States would be $578 million costing each of the, 
“750,592 persons arrested for marijuana possession in 2010,” (NORML, 2010), $770 and 
each of the, “309.3 million American citizens in 2010,” (Ewert, United States Census 
Bureau, 2015), $1.87 to fund for such policing. Likewise, using the same calculations on 
approximating the ‘low’ estimate for such costs, the state of Mississippi spent $2.89 
million costing each of the, “8,281 persons arrested for marijuana possession 2010,” 
(Mississippi Marijuana Arrests, 2010), $349 and each of the “2.97 million Mississippi 
residents,” (Ewert, United States Census Bureau, 2015), $.97. The cost reduction 
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between decriminalization in Mississippi results in a reduction of 54.6 percent in costs 
attributed to each offender, and a 48.1 percent reduction percent reduction in costs to 
residents, averaging 51.35 percent.  If all states in America were to decriminalize 
marijuana possession, policing expenditures would be reduced by $297 million using the 
‘low’ estimate. With the ‘middle’ estimates for the reduction in policing expenditures 
being the average of the savings of the high and low profiles of $1.495 billion and $297 
million from the respective profiles equaling $896 million in savings if decriminalization 
of marijuana possession was recognized in all 50 states. 
The second category outlined by The War on Marijuana that Miron analyzes is 
‘judicial and legal’ expenditures. Miron defines ‘judicial and legal’ expenditures are the 
dollars associated with the salaries of judges and district attorneys, court costs as well as 
fiscal costs of both defense and prosecution. Later, judicial and legal expenditures will 
include the opportunity costs, externalities, and other potential tradeoffs undergone 
pursuing misdemeanor marijuana possession convictions instead of convictions of traffic 
violations alongside other possible drug, violent, and/ or property crimes. 
Miron’s calculations found 38 percent of costs enforcing marijuana prohibition 
are judicial and legal expenditures. Using this percentage helps with the inference of the 
‘high’ expenditures estimate in this category. The ‘high’ estimate of enforcing marijuana 
prohibition, according to Miron, amounts to $6.032 billion of which $2.228 billion, 38 
percent, would be attributable to judicial and legal expenditures. Miron’s approach to 
calculate the ‘high’ estimate of judicial and legal expenditures is made by, “multiplies the 
total judicial and legal expenditures by the percentage of marijuana-related proceedings 
in state courts resulting in felony convictions, using, in particular, a national fraction of 
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10.9% because state-level data are not available,” (The War on Marijuana, 2013). This 
report estimates adjudication costs slightly differently.,” (The War on Marijuana, 2013). 
Of the 13.12 million arrests made in 2010 (Persons Arrested, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, 2011), 750,592 arrests were made for marijuana possession alone, making 
marijuana possession related arrests amounting to 5.7 percent of all arrests made in 2010. 
Available state data suggests that marijuana possession percentage share of total state 
cases is approximately twice as large as the share of total arrests accounted for by 
marijuana possession cases.  
Miron states, “only 50 percent of all marijuana possession offenses are stand-
alone arrests,” (The War on Marijuana, 2013), making the upper-bound of the ratio of 
marijuana possession related arrests to total arrests to be 11.4 percent of all arrests.  
Miron’s calculations found that the ‘high’ estimate of judicial and legal 
expenditures to be $2.228 billion. Additionally, the ‘high’ judicial and legal expenditures 
estimate for the state of Mississippi amounts $9.28 million. Using the methodologies 
listed previously, if the ‘high’ estimate for such expenditures for the United States would 
be $2.228 billion costing each of the, “750,592 persons arrested for marijuana possession 
in 2010,” (NORML, 2010), $2,968 and each of the, “309.3 million American citizens in 
2010,” (Ewert, United States Census Bureau, 2015), $7.20 to fund for such expenditures. 
Likewise, Mississippi spent $9.28 million costing each of the, “8,281 persons arrested for 
marijuana possession 2010,” (Mississippi Marijuana Arrests, 2010), $1121 and each of 
the “2.97 million Mississippi residents,” (Ewert, United States Census Bureau, 2015), 
$3.12. The cost reduction between decriminalization in Mississippi results in a reduction 
of 62.23 percent in costs attributed to each offender, and a 56.67 percent reduction 
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percent reduction in costs to residents, averaging 59.45 percent.  If all states in America 
were to decriminalize marijuana possession, judicial and legal expenditures would be 
reduced by $1.325 billion.  
Miron’s approach in calculating the ‘low’ estimate in judicial and legal 
expenditures is also derived from the WSIPP report. The report found these expenditures 
to include, “the annual costs of adjudicating marijuana possession arrests, which is 
assumed to include court costs, as well as the fiscal costs of both defense and 
prosecution, as $400 per disposition sought on a marijuana possession arrest,” (The War 
on Marijuana, 2013). This ‘low’ estimate that is derived from the WSIPP report should 
not be used as a benchmark for the totality of marijuana possession arrests because 
Washington state in 2001 became the fourth state to legalize medical cannabis in 1998, 
three years before the study was done. Also, Washington’s acceptance towards cannabis 
reform was atypical of most states in 2001. This fact makes it likely that the WSIPP’s 
estimate to much lower than the costs attributed to states with a less progressive stance on 
cannabis possession. Since it is estimated that only roughly one half of all marijuana 
possession offenses are ‘stand-alone’ arrests, Miron concludes that the, “per unit 
adjudication cost of a disposition sought for marijuana possession should lie somewhere 
between the lower-bound cost of marijuana possession adjudication amounting, “to 5.7 
percent of the average cost per court case (400 of the 6,985, the average annual cost per 
court case) and the upper-bound cost amounting to 11.4 percent of the average court case 
(800/6,985). The cost Miron found the cost of $600 per unit adjudication cost per 
marijuana possession arrest to be most reasonable to calculate the ‘low’ estimate of 
judicial and legal expenditures.  
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The ‘low’ estimate equals $454 million for the United States; while the ‘low’ 
estimate of such expenditures for Mississippi amounts to $1.84 million. Using the 
methodologies listed previously, the ‘low’ judicial and legal expenditures estimate for the 
United States would be $454 million costing each of the, “750,592 persons arrested for 
marijuana possession in 2010,” (NORML, 2010), $604 and each of the, “309.3 million 
American citizens in 2010,” (Ewert, United States Census Bureau, 2015), $1.47 to fund 
for such expenditures. Likewise, the state of Mississippi spent $1.84 million costing each 
of the, “8,281 persons arrested for marijuana possession 2010,” (Mississippi Marijuana 
Arrests, 2010), $222 and each of the “2.97 million Mississippi residents,” (US Census 
Bureau, 2010), $.62. The cost reduction between decriminalization in Mississippi results 
in a reduction of 63.25 percent in costs attributed to each offender, and a 57.82 percent 
reduction percent reduction in costs to residents, averaging 60.54 percent.  If all states in 
America were to decriminalize marijuana possession, policing expenditures would be 
reduced by $275 million using the ‘low’ estimate. With the ‘middle’ estimates for the 
reduction in policing expenditures being the average of the savings of the high and low 
profiles of $1.325 billion and $275 million from the respective profiles equaling $800 
million in savings if decriminalization of marijuana possession was recognized in all 50 
states. 
The final group Miron examines is ‘corrections’ expenditures. Miron defines 
‘corrections’ expenditures as the dollars spent on the construction of new state prisons; 
county correctional facilities; and local jails, alongside the cost of housing inmates, the 
cost of employing guards, officers, and other staff to supervise such facilities, and the 
costs associated with supervisory/ probationary mediation used as punishment to 
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marijuana possession offenders. Later, corrections expenditures will include the 
opportunity costs, externalities, and other potential tradeoffs undergone incarcerating 
misdemeanor and/ or felony marijuana possession offenders instead of convictions of 
traffic violations alongside other offenders of possible drug, violent, and/ or property 
crimes.  
Miron’s approach to calculate the ‘high’ estimate of corrections expenditures is 
made by, “multiplying the fiscal expenditures on local and county correctional facilities 
[without calculating the costs of state, federal, or privatized facilities] by the ratio of 
stand-alone marijuana possession arrests to all total arrests,” (The War on Marijuana, 
2013). As stated before, the ratio of ‘stand-alone’ marijuana possession arrests to total 
arrests is somewhere between nearly 6 to 12 percent of all total arrests in 2010. Miron 
estimates correction costs to, “equal nearly 1 percent of total corrections expenditures 
including state prison facilities, where 1 percent corresponds to the weighted average of 
the proportion of prisoners incarcerated on marijuana charges in five states [California, 
Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Hampshire],” (The War on Marijuana, 
2013). While the ‘high’ estimate is just an approximation of the ‘weighted average’ of the 
proportion of prisoners incarcerated on marijuana charges, all of the states except for 
Georgia, by 2010, had legalized the medical use of cannabis. Likewise, in 2010, the four 
states used in the ‘weighted average’ to have legalized medical marijuana, California, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, and Massachusetts respectively had, “the ninth, the 
fourteenth, the nineteenth, and the lowest incarceration rates of marijuana possession, 
while Georgia had the eighth largest,” (The War on Marijuana, p. 131, ACLU, 2013). 
Additionally, this approximation in the ‘high’ estimate of corrections expenditures is 
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foolish because this ‘weighted average of the proportion’ of prisoners incarcerated on 
marijuana charges doesn’t account for privatized, supervisory/ probationary mediation on 
offenders. The ‘high’ estimate is undermined further when Carrie Teegardin of the 
Atlanta Journal Constitution wrote, “Georgia’s probation rate is 6,161 per 100 thousand 
residents, the highest in the nation, nearly 4 times greater than the national average of 
1,568 per 100 thousand residents,” (Teegardin, Atlanta Journal Constitution, 2015).  
Teegardin explains the reasoning behind such grossly inflated numbers by stating, 
“Nearly 80 percent of people on misdemeanor probation in Georgia are supervised by 
private companies, [that have a perverse,] profit motive to have as many people on 
probation for as long as possible,” (Teegardin, 2015). corrections expenditures by the 
percentage of marijuana-related proceedings in state courts resulting in felony 
convictions, using, in particular, a national fraction of 10.9% because state-level data are 
not available,” (The War on Marijuana, 2013). Additionally, the legalized medical 
appropriation of cannabis’ main goal is to ensure patients have safe access to cannabis 
and are removed from the ‘black market’ that is typified by use of other drugs. The four 
states other than Georgia used in this ‘weighted average’ generally would not have many 
‘potential’ offenders convicted of marijuana possession and because of that fact alone 
would increase the ‘proportion of prisoners incarcerated on marijuana charges.’ Likewise, 
those in those four states incarcerated on marijuana charges have a higher propensity to 
be felony offenders than compared with states who do not recognized the medical use of 
marijuana and still criminalize it.  
Miron’s calculations found 14 percent of costs enforcing marijuana prohibition 
are corrections expenditures. Using this percentage helps with the inference of the ‘high’ 
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corrections expenditures estimate. The ‘high’ estimate of enforcing marijuana 
prohibition, according to Miron, amounts to $6.032 billion of which $827 million, 14 
percent, would be attributable to corrections expenditures. Miron’s calculations infer the 
‘high’ corrections expenditures estimate to be $827 million for the United States and 
$4.07 million for Mississippi. Using the methodologies listed previously, the ‘high’ 
estimate for corrections expenditures for the United States would be $827 million costing 
each of the, “750,592 persons arrested for marijuana possession in 2010,” (NORML, 
2010), $1102 and each of the, “309.3 million American citizens in 2010,” (Ewert, United 
States Census Bureau, 2015), $2.67 to fund for such expenditures. Likewise, using the 
same calculations on approximating the ‘high’ estimate for such costs, the state of 
Mississippi spent $4.07 million costing each of the, “8,281 persons arrested for marijuana 
possession 2010,” (Mississippi Marijuana Arrests, 2010), $491 and each of the “2.97 
million Mississippi residents,” (Ewert, United States Census Bureau, 2015), $1.37. The 
cost reduction between decriminalization in Mississippi results in a reduction of 55.4 
percent in costs attributed to each offender, and a 48.69 percent reduction percent 
reduction in costs to residents, averaging 52.05 percent.  If all states in America were to 
decriminalize marijuana possession, corrections expenditures would be reduced by $430 
million. 
The low estimate in calculating the corrections expenditures are estimated as, “the 
number of individuals in a local or county correctional facility for a marijuana possession 
offense multiplied by the average state-level per diem cost of such facilities, plus the 
number of individuals on local or community supervision,” (The War on Marijuana, 
2013). The average marijuana possession offender will spend, “5.5 days in jail where the 
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national average per diem jail costs $95 per day,” (The War on Marijuana), making the 
incarceration of such offender cost $523, with an additional, “74.5 days spent in local 
supervision, costing on average $2 per day,” (The War on Marijuana), equaling $149 for 
the extended supervision of a non-violent drug offender. If each of the 750,592 marijuana 
arrests made in 2010 cost an estimated $672 for each arrests, then the ‘low’ estimate of 
corrections expenditures would equal $504.4 million, not the $164 million inferred by the 
report. Likewise, using the average cost of $672 per marijuana possession arrest, the state 
of Mississippi spent $5.6 million, where the Miron Report estimates it only to be, “$807 
thousand,” (The War on Marijuana). This ‘low’ estimate contradicts even the simplest 
form of calculations where the more realistic estimate is almost 700 percent higher than 
given on such report. 
Using the methodologies listed previously, the ‘low’ estimate for corrections 
expenditures for the United States would be $164 million costing each of the, “750,592 
persons arrested for marijuana possession in 2010,” (NORML, 2010), $218 and each of 
the each of the, “309.3 million American citizens in 2010,” (Ewert, United States Census 
Bureau, 2015), $.53 to fund for such expenditures. Likewise, using the same calculations 
on approximating the ‘low’ estimate for such costs, the state of Mississippi spent $807 
thousand costing each of the, “8,281 persons arrested for marijuana possession 2010,” 
(Mississippi Marijuana Arrests, 2010), $97 and each of the “2.97 million Mississippi 
residents,” (Ewert, United States Census Bureau, 2015), $.27. If the ‘low’ estimate of the 
report were taken, then it would be calculated by dividing the ‘medium’ estimate of 
policing expenditures of $2.4 million divided by 3.022 equaling $807 thousand and 
would cost each of the 2.97 million citizens just $.27. The cost reduction between 
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decriminalization in Mississippi results in a reduction of 55.5 percent in costs attributed 
to each offender, and a 49.05 percent reduction percent reduction in costs to residents, 
averaging 52.28 percent.  If all states in America were to decriminalize marijuana 
possession, policing expenditures would be reduced by $86 million using the ‘low’ 
estimate. With the ‘middle’ estimates for the reduction in policing expenditures being the 
average of the savings of the high and low profiles of $430 million and $86 million from 
the respective profiles equaling $258 million in savings if decriminalization of marijuana 
possession was recognized in all 50 states. 
While Miron’s report may not necessarily represent the most accurate costs in 
enforcing marijuana possession laws, it does, however, illustrates how expensive such 
enforcement is. For example, the total cost for each of the over 700 thousand offenders 
arrested for marijuana possession in 2010 using the ‘high’ estimate would cost each 
offender $7,955. While the average offender $3,374 for Mississippi, a state with 
decriminalized possession with the incarceration rate for marijuana possession in 2010 
still in the upper 20th percentile for all states. Additionally, the total savings amount the 
collective fifty states in the union amounts to $3.249 billion using the ‘high’ estimate. 
Likewise, using the ‘low’ estimate, each offender arrested for marijuana possession for 
the collective United States amounts to $1,592 and $668 for each offender in Mississippi. 
Additionally, nationwide decriminalization would save $658 million for state corrections 
and judicial agencies. The direct costs of marijuana possession enforcement amount to 
huge numbers where, in 2018, 30 states and the District of Columbia have approved 
medical use of marijuana, thereby, legalizing possession for those card-carrying 
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members. Miron’s report represents a ‘best’ estimate to the total enforcement costs, 
where the number was previously incalculable.  
While the report made offers an approximation of enforcement, but the report 
does have several instances where it becomes less accurate. First, Miron uses estimates, 
and estimates are just that, estimates, instead of direct numbers from each state and the 
United States as a whole. The policing expenditures in the ‘high’ estimate is calculated 
by using an overtly simple equation, derived by the total police budget for each state 
multiplied by the percentage share of total arrests accounted for marijuana possession. 
The approximation using this ‘formula’ would lead one to assume that each arrest would 
cost the same to pursue, regardless of the severity of the crime. The approximation used 
by Miron when calculating the ‘high’ estimate to relevant policing expenditures should 
be much higher than what is calculated on the basis that while marijuana possession 
arrests account for a much higher percentage of arrests than say the trafficking controlled 
substances other than marijuana, arresting offenders of trafficking of other controlled 
substances often entails investigative, undercover work by police officers alongside the 
use of informants. Where, “50 percent of all marijuana possession offenses are not 
‘stand-alone’ offenses,” (The War on Marijuana), meaning the other half of all other 
marijuana possession arrests are made when another offense is committed. The 
occurrence of when the other offense was committed, often leads led officers to question 
the possession of marijuana when such possession would not be questioned or the contact 
with police would be less likely without the other offense. In 2010, the 750,592 
marijuana possession arrests did account for 5.72 percent of the over 13 million total 
arrests made that year, the costs associated with each arrest is likely to much less than the 
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other 785 thousand drug arrests made in the same year. Furthermore, Miron estimates 
that the costs of adjudicating marijuana possession arrests are derived using the 
Washington State Institute for Public Policy 2001 Report, a state that did not utilize the 
policy of decriminalization for marijuana possession. Miron states, “our [WSIPP’s] report 
conservatively estimates the operating per unit cost of adjudicating a marijuana 
possession offense, which is assumed to include court costs, as well as the fiscal costs of 
both defense and prosecution, as: $400 per disposition sought on a marijuana possession 
arrest,” (The War on Marijuana). To understand this statement made by Miron, the 
adjudicate[on] according to Black’s Law Dictionary means to pass upon judicially; to 
settle, or decree; to sentence or condemn, or to settle in the exercise of judicial authority, 
to determine finally. In essence, in order for an offense to be adjudicated, it must carry a 
criminal offense, either a misdemeanor or a felony. The only states where the fines are 
less than the $400 per disposition are the fourteen states that have decriminalized 
marijuana possession, where the average fine is $202.36, where every other states treats 
marijuana possession as a misdemeanor where the maximum fine for such offense is 
$1000 per disposition. Additionally, the statement made by Miron includes the verbiage 
of ‘arrest’ meaning the offense of marijuana possession made in his statement did not 
include the fourteen states with decriminalization. Negating these facts, assumed to be 
true, allow for the upper-bound of the ‘low’ estimate of the judicial and legal expenses to 
be much higher than he puts forth in his paper. Further, the estimate to adjudicate each 
marijuana possession offense/ arrest doesn’t include any expenses that could be related to 
the result of a conviction which would limit access to economic gains through 
employment as well as to post-secondary educational opportunities.  
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Another major issue with the Miron Report is the statistic estimating the ‘high’ 
end of corrections expenditures. Miron estimates, “corrections costs as equal to 1 percent 
of total corrections expenditures, including state prison facilities, where 1 percent 
corresponds to the weighted average of the proportion of prisoners incarcerated in five 
states, California, Georgia, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Hampshire,” (The War on 
Marijuana). While the facts of his statement are not in question, the fact of the matter is 
that every state except for Georgia allows for the medical use of marijuana. If a state 
allows for the use of medical marijuana, then that state’s enforcement of marijuana 
allows would be more likely than non-medical states to arrest felony possession/ 
trafficking of marijuana. This presumption is supported with data extrapolated from 
Miron’s report. For example, the states with medical marijuana, California, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Hampshire, represented a 26.831 weighted-average 
percent of marijuana offenders as a proportion of all drug offenders, where Georgia had a 
65.1 percent of drug offenders that were represented by marijuana possession arrests and 
the average amongst other states with non-medical legalization of marijuana equaled to 
52.62 percent. Additionally, the states from the example provided in the Miron report had 
a 24.135 weighted-average percent of marijuana arrests that were felonious with Georgia 
only have a 9.5 percent and the average of non-medical states equaling 11.37 percent. 
Finally, these states’ incarceration rates for marijuana possession decreased by 4.381 
percent from 2001 to 2010 while the state of Georgia increased such rate by 19.9 percent 
along the same time frame and the average change in the incarceration rate of marijuana 
possession offenders among non-medical states is a decrease of .022 percent. While 
California, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Hampshire only represent 28.414 percent 
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of the total population of states legalizing medical marijuana at the time, these facts 
exemplify the flaw in using the weighted-average in correction costs of the five states as 
a representative sample in estimating the aggregate costs in corrections in regards to 
enforcing marijuana possession. 
The logical flaws listed previously illustrates how Miron’s analysis of each kind 
of expenditure relevant to the enforcement of marijuana possession is likely too 
conservative on both the ‘high and low’ estimates for policing, judicial and legal, and 
corrections expenditures. However, his report does show the effectiveness in concerns of 
cost savings that would be attributed to decriminalization if all fifty states enacted such 
policy towards marijuana possession without legalizing the medical or recreational use of 
such. Mississippi is an ideal state to compare the percentage decrease in cost when 
comparing the savings of decriminalization to the criminalization of marijuana possession 
because, while, Mississippi does have the tenth highest incarceration rate for marijuana 
possession among the fifty states and the District of Columbia, it ranks fifth highest 
among the fourteen states with decriminalization of marijuana possession. The 
incarceration rate of marijuana possession for the state of Mississippi in 2010 was 317 
per 100 thousand citizens and the population weighted average incarceration rate of all 
the states with decriminalization was 337 per 100 thousand citizens. At face value, it 
would seem that Mississippi is slightly less likely to pursue an arrest for a decriminalized 
charge than the other states, but upon further analysis Mississippi becomes closer to the 
mean in incarceration rates. The total population of the fourteen states with 
decriminalization equaled to 81.957 million in 2010, with Mississippi have only 3.62 
percent of that total. Additionally, Mississippi contributed 3.402 percent of the weighted 
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average incarceration rate, meaning the population of Mississippi compared to its 
contribution to the weighted average incarceration rate was 93.983 percent in line. 
Compared to states like New York whose population represented 23.64 percent of the 
population, its contribution to the weighted average incarceration rate was 37.529 
percent, meaning New York officials were 1.588 times more likely to pursue an arrest 
than the aggregate of the fourteen states. Another reason why Mississippi should serve as 
the ‘model’ to approximate the percentage savings for decriminalization versus the 
misdemeanor approach to enforcing marijuana laws is that among the states with 
decriminalization Mississippi has the lowest cost per citizen to enforce marijuana laws at 
$5.62, where the average among these states is $12.87, as of 2010. Furthermore, 
Mississippi’s marijuana possession arrests as a percentage of total drug arrests is 42.8 
percent while the United States as a whole is 49.75 percent, showing that an arrest for 
marijuana possession is less likely to be pursued in Mississippi compared to the nation as 
a whole. While the sentiment towards marijuana reform has changed drastically since 
2010, the facts concerning the cost efficiency around decriminalization are still accurate. 
Prior to 2011, only (Ohio, Minnesota, Mississippi, North Carolina, New York, and 
Nebraska) six states decriminalized the possession of marijuana representing 18.98 
percent of the population in 1978, the last year in this era when a state changed its stance 
on marijuana possession. As of 2017, (Connecticut, Rhode Island, Vermont, Missouri, 
Maryland, Delaware, Illinois, and New Hampshire) eight more states decriminalized 
marijuana possession. Even after a 33-year gap between the sixth and seventh state 
decriminalizing such possession, the growth in acceptance in decriminalization between 
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2011 and 2017 grew on average 9.48 percent in relation to the population of the United 
States and grew 12.81 times faster than the population of the United States grew.  
While decriminalization would dramatically lower the incarceration rate; 
expenditures concerning policing, judicial and legal, and corrections as outlined by 
Miron; and help alleviate some of the burden the War on Drugs has placed on the 
criminal justice system throughout the United States, outright legalization for the state of 
Mississippi would emblazon the agrarian economy of the state. Despite the fact, 
Mississippi has decriminalized the possession of marijuana, arrests for marijuana 
possession still occur.  For example, while decriminalization, on paper would hereby 
eliminate all arrests for such violation, Mississippi, as of 2010, has an incarceration rate 
of, “520 marijuana arrests per 100 thousand residents,” (Lopez, Vox Magazine, 2014), 
and an annual incarceration rate of, “12,016 per 100 thousand marijuana users,” (Lopez, 
2014). Furthermore, while the direct costs of marijuana enforcement are difficult to 
approximate, the magnitude of such expenses can be felt. Currently, marijuana offenses 
represent over 40 percent of all drug arrests in the state of Mississippi, even though 
support within the state is growing with regards to outright legalization.  
The growing support can be exemplified with Ballot Initiatives 48 of 2016 and 
Ballot Initiative 60 of 2017, which would, “declare an end to the prohibition on cannabis, 
and fully legalize the use, taxation (if applicable), medical use, cultivation and sale of 
both industrial hemp, and cannabis, only for adults who are 21 years or older…[and] the 
legislature shall add a process for expunging the criminal record of any person convicted 
on non-violent cannabis possession, sales, and manufacture against the State of 
Mississippi,” (Jacobs, Ballot Initiative 48, 2016). While neither Ballot Initiative 48 nor 60 
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garnered enough certified signatures to place the initiatives on the ballot for the following 
year, Mississippi’s legislators, Bomgar, Sykes, Smith, Blackmon, and Scott, introduced 
House Bills that would extend the hopes of marijuana legalization similar to those 
outlined by ballot initiatives. House Bill 179 introduced by Representatives Bomgar, 
Sykes, and Smith, goal was to, “allow the therapeutic use of marijuana for certain 
patients who have debilitating medical conditions by establishing Mississippi Medical 
Marijuana Pilot Program Act,” (Bomgar, HB 179, 2017).  House Bill 179 was referred to 
House Committees on Drug Policy and Public Health and Human Services on January 3, 
2017, but died just four weeks later in committee on January 31, 2017. Furthermore, 
House bills 1443 and 1444, introduced representatives Blackmon and Scott, respectively; 
goal was to, “make certain declarations regarding the powers of the state and retail 
marijuana and retail marijuana products [by creating a bill to be known as] the 
Mississippi Retail Marijuana Code,” (HB 1443 and 1444, 2017). Both of these bills were 
referred to the House Committee on Drug Policy on January 16, 2017 and died in 
committee on January 31, 2017. Additional internal support regarding the extension of 
drug law reform came with House Bills 459 and 1441. These bills’ purpose was to, 
“extend the date of the repealer on Harper Grace’s Law from July 1, 2017 to July 1, 
2020,” (White, House Bill 459, 2017), and to, “authorize CBD oil to be obtained [by all 
entities expressed in the portion of HB 1231 outlining the permissive use of CBD oil] and 
further, the State Department of Health,” (Bomgar, House Bill 1441, 2017). House Bill 
459 was introduced to the House Committee on Public Health and Human Services by 
Representatives White and Sykes on January 9, 2017, and further died in committee on 
January 31, 2017. House Bill 1441 was introduced to the House Committee on Public 
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Health and Human Services by Representative Bomgar on January 16, 2017, and further 
died in committee on January 31, 2017.  
The attempts of modifying the legality of the medical appropriation ‘allowing the 
therapeutic use of marijuana for certain patients who have debilitating medical 
conditions’ by internal governmental agents through the introduction of House Bills or 
the external governmental processes like that of Ballot Initiatives 48 and 60 have been 
thwarted by arcane governmental bureaucratic means leaving all attempts to change the 
legality of marijuana in the states futile in attempting to relieve the pain of the state 
having, “the fourth highest arrest rate per 100 thousand users while having the lowest 
yearly users as a percent of the state’s population,” (Gettman, Marijuana in Mississippi: 
Arrests, Usage, and Related Data, 2009). Gettman of Drug Science goes on to explain in 
Marijuana in Mississippi the opportunity costs associated with the enforcement of 
marijuana laws as, “the consequences of making specific budgetary decisions where 
providing funds for one program often means accepting less or no funds for some other 
government activity,” (Gettman, 2009). For example, enforcing laws regarding to 
marijuana possession deprives law enforcement of funds to apply to other investigations 
and activities. With estimates derived by Miron’s Report and by the 2001 Washington 
State Institute for Public Policy Report, somewhere between 5 and 10 percent of all 
arrests are made for marijuana possession alone. If arresting officers were free to pursue 
crimes against another person like murder, rape, robbery, assault, larceny, and motor 
vehicle theft, then such clearance rates would improve. A clearance rate can be defined/ 
calculated, “by dividing the number of crimes ‘cleared’ by the total number of crimes 
being reported,” (Clearances, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2014), where a crime 
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being cleared leads to a person being, “Arrested, charged with the commission of the 
offense, or turned over to the court for prosecution,” (Clearances, 2014). Jon Gettman 
exclaims that the clearance rates/ percentages for the crimes in the state of Mississippi in 
2007 listed above are, “54.8, 28.4, 19.2, 34.9, 18.6, and 16.4, for murder, rape, robbery, 
assault, larceny, and motor vehicle theft respectively,” (Gettman, 2009). Meaning that 
45.2 percent of all murders, 71.6 percent of all rapes, 80.8 percent of all robberies, 65.1 
percent off assaults, 81.4 percent of all crimes of larceny, and 83.6 percent of all motor 
vehicle thefts weren’t cleared. If the clearance rates could be heightened because of 
arresting agents not pursuing marijuana offenses, shouldn’t the pursuing of more heinous 
crimes be done especially when the public at large is grossly more offended by such 
crimes when compared to marijuana possession?  
In order to extend the estimation of the direct/ indirect costs of prohibition and 
benefits of legalization of cannabis, I will follow the approach used by Miron as 
explained in The War on Marijuana namely on giving and continuing the ‘high, low, and 
middle’ estimate approach to each form of expenditure/ benefit attributable to each cost 
of prohibition and benefit of legalization of cannabis. The first of the four categories 
associated with the costs/ benefits of cannabis law reform is the aggregate expenditures 
associated with marijuana enforcement with regards to the policing, judicial and legal, 
and corrections expenditures as outlined by the ACLU report from 1972 to the most 
recent year where the relative data is available.  
While the ACLU report approximates a ‘high, low, and middle’ estimate in 
enforcement costs attributable to all fifty states for 2010, these estimates only consists of 
one of the forty-five years in costs since the Shafer Commission. While Miron equated 
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the ‘total’ costs for ‘policing, judicial and legal, and corrections’ expenditures for this 
year, 2010, his report analyzes just that. To extrapolate the aggregate expenditures from 
1972 to 2017 and for each year individually, the model in approximating these costs for 
the totality of each of the costs/benefits of each segment of marijuana legalization will be 
as follows: for the year immediately after the model estimates or values, the benchmark 
will be ‘inflated’ by the relationship of Yt+1 divided by Yt, then multiplied by the base 
year’s valuation, then extended to the future, 2017. Likewise, for the year immediately 
before the model estimates or values, the benchmark will be ‘deflated’ by the relationship 
of Yt-1 divided by Yt then multiplied by the benchmark, then retrograded back to 1972. 
As A-1 shows, the total ‘high estimate’ costs in enforcement, using 2010 as the 
benchmark from the ACLU report, equal $202,317 million, the ‘low estimate’ for 
enforcement costs equaling $40,106 million, and the ‘middle estimate’ costs in 
enforcement equaling $121,199 million.  
Another expenditure component when discussing the costs of marijuana 
enforcement is the expenditures associated to each offender caught with possession of 
marijuana. Per the ACLU report, the ‘low, middle, and high’ estimates in enforcements 
are $1.196 billion, $3.614 billion, and $6.032 billion for each estimate respectively. In 
2010, “750,591 people were arrested for marijuana possession,” (Stroup, NORML, 2011), 
meaning per each offender enforcements costs are as follows: $1,593 for the ‘low’ 
estimate, $4,815 for the ‘middle’ estimate, and $8,036 for the high estimate in 2010. 
Additionally, the totality of expenditures associated to each offender will be estimated 
with the same methodology as mentioned before. Where the respective fine amounts for 
each offender will be either deflated or inflated from 2010, in a range from 1972 to 2016, 
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the most recent year where the total number of marijuana possession arrests is available, 
as well as the suggested fine amount as supposed by the Shafer Commission where it 
states in the “Discussion of State Recommendations” from Marihuana: A Signal of 
Understanding, “where marihuana is concerned, continuing societal disapproval requires 
that the behavior occur only in private if at all. Public use, under the proposed scheme, 
would therefore be punishable by a fine of $100,” (Marihuana: A Signal of 
Understanding, 1972). Additionally, the states that have since decriminalized the 
possession of marijuana as the Shafer Commission suggested, the fine has ranged 
between $100 to $250, so there will be two estimates for each the ‘low, middle, and high’ 
estimates the total difference in the relevant fine amounts, where one will have the Shafer 
Commission’s ‘suggestion’ inflated in accordance to GDP growth rates between 1972 
and the relevant year, after 1972, and the second will remain at $100. Each estimate for 
every year from 1972 to 2016, will be calculated as the difference between the estimated 
cost for each offender, where one estimate will include the ‘recommendation’ of the 
Shafer Commission as a $100 fine for each offender for all years; while the other will be 
estimated with the ‘inflated’ fine recommendation as shown as the ‘high, low, and middle 
adjusted estimates’ in A-2. Furthermore, this amount will be subtracted from the product 
of the number of marijuana offenders for each year multiplied by the respective ‘deflated’ 
amount for each ‘high, low, and middle’ expenditures associated to each offender as 
approximated by the ACLU report. The average between the two ‘high’ estimates in the 
difference of such enforcement costs from 1972 to 2016 equals: $104,748 million. The 
average between the two ‘low’ estimates in the difference of such enforcement costs from 
1972 to 2016 equals: $13,562 million. Finally, the average of the ‘middle’ estimates on 
144	 	
such expenditures equals: $60,498 million. The distinction between the two estimates 
within each level is one where the first of the two has kept the Shafer Commission 
‘recommendation’ and the second has adjusted the ‘suggested’ fine amount in line with 
GDP growth. The calculations as listed above are included in detail in Appendix B.   
The largest and most complex portion in calculating the total costs of prohibition 
and the potential benefits of marijuana legalization (a combination of legalization for 
medical and recreational use for adults over the age of twenty-one will be used in some 
extent) for both the ‘low and high’ estimate valuations going forward. These valuations 
will examine how the Schedule I classification of marijuana and all its derivatives has 
acted as a ‘deadweight loss’ and thwarted the legal industry since the ‘recommendation’ 
of the Shafer Commission as outlined in Marihuana: a Signal for Understanding (1972). 
If such ‘recommendation’ were followed and guided by the Nixon presidency, then it is 
likely that states and people of such states would follow the path towards legalization for 
either medical or recreational use or some combination of the two in a timeline very 
similar as the current paradigm has shown, but having started in 1972, instead of 1996, 
with the passing of Proposition 215 in California. Once again, several models will be 
used to approximate a relevant baseline valuation for an individual year, which will then 
be inflated/ deflated for all years from 1972 to 2016(7) for each a ‘low and high’ 
estimate. 
The first ‘low’ estimate’s baseline is derived from a compilation of NORML’s 
1997 United States Median Farm and Retail Valuation Estimates as outlined in A-3. The 
average of the median farm value and the median retail value equals $27.013 billion in 
1997. This year’s valuation is of extreme importance because it can serve as the ‘black 
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market’ valuation. Describing it as such is appropriate because 1997 is a year after 
medical marijuana was legalized and was a gap year for any other state following the suit 
of California. The 1997 valuation will be inflated by the ‘marginal’ increase in the 
population of states that followed the pattern of medical legalization started by 1996 until 
2016(7), when compared to the annual change in the United States total population. 
Additionally, in years where no states extend medical appropriation of marijuana the total 
percent in support will decrease while the support ‘remains’ constant the United States’ 
total population will increase. To extend NORML’s 1997 median valuation, it will be 
compounded by the ‘marginal’ percentage change in support from 1997 to 2013, the last 
year before the legalization of the recreational use of marijuana for adults over the age of 
21 came to fruition in the states of Colorado and Washington. This valuation model 
traces the ‘aggregate’ from 1997 to 2013, where the average of these valuations: $80.659 
billion, in A-5, will serve as the 2005 base estimate in calculating the total economic 
‘deadweight loss’ from 1972 to 2016, as outlined by A-6.  
The second ‘low’ estimate’s baseline is derived from a compilation of Jon 
Gettman’s Marijuana Production in the United States (2006). In his report, it is estimated 
that the, “total marijuana cultivation in the [United States] is valued at $35,804 million,” 
(Gettman, Marijuana Production, 2006). This valuation is extended in a similar manner 
as the first ‘low’ estimate by NORML, where this valuation is inflated by the yearly 
‘marginal’ increase of medical marijuana from A-4, from the years of 2006 to 2014. This 
valuation model is extended one year beyond NORML’s valuation because it accounts 
for 75 percent of that of Gettman’s while being made nearly ten years earlier. It would be 
irrational to think that the value of this industry would only increase at a 2.86 percent 
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annualized rate over that decade while the states legalizing marijuana for medical use 
increased at a 5.21 percent over that same time period, or from 32.02 million in 1996(7) 
to 53.20 million in 2006, nearly a 70 percent increase in support. To mitigate the 
concerns that while the states whose support for legalization of this sort does not 
necessarily mean the number of patients using such legalization would increase by such 
amounts either. Even after allowing Gettman’s valuation to be compounded one year 
after the expansion of legalization made by Colorado and Washington, the total valuation 
in 2014, using such ‘marginal’ increase in support of medical marijuana, amounts to 
$87.393 billion, as outlined in A-6, will serve as the 2014 base estimate in A-8.  
The final ‘low’ estimate’s baseline is derived from the 2014 annual sales of 
Colorado’s legalized market amounting to, “$699.20 million,” (Baca, Colorado 
Marijuana Sales, 2015), raising an estimated, “$67.6 million in tax revenue,” (Colorado: 
Marijuana Tax Data, 2018). In 2015, when all the tax revenue was collected, Colorado’s 
population of 5.4 million and representing 1.7 percent of the total population of the 
United States, it can be interpreted that the total valuation of legal marijuana in the 
United States would be around $41,129 million, but this approximation is not accurate 
because marijuana taxes are collected only by people who use it through its now legal 
channels. Likewise, the population model is ineffective because marijuana taxes are not 
equally spread by the totality of the state’s population. Thereby, using the state’s 
‘marijuana market share’ when compared to the United States total estimated marijuana 
users would more appropriately estimate both the total of tax revenue generated if all fifty 
pushed for the legalization as seen in Colorado and the total valuation estimate of legal 
marijuana in the United States. NORML’s Colorado Crop Estimates again uses statistics 
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from 1997, where it is likely that reports of marijuana usage are too conservative because 
of people’s natural apprehension to the admittance of breaking a law. Regardless of this 
conservative estimate, NORML estimates Colorado’s, “marijuana market share equals 
ninety-three hundredths of one percent, while making up 1.43 percent of the total US 
population,” (Colorado Crop Estimates, NORML, 2015). It can be derived that using 
Colorado as a baseline, the total valuation of legal marijuana could amount to $75,183 
million if using NORML’s ‘marijuana market share’ or $48,895 million if using its 
‘population share’, with the average of these two estimates equaling $62,039 million. 
Additionally, in order to mitigate for the next year of legalization, the Colorado Low 
Estimate should be inflated by the ‘marginal’ increase in acceptance of medical 
marijuana for 2014, or an increase of 28.28 percent, bringing its 2015 valuation estimate 
to $79.583 billion.  
The three ‘low’ estimate models will be known as: NORML Low Estimate, 
Gettman Low Estimate, and 2015 Colorado Valuation Estimate with values of $80.659; 
$87.393; and $79.583 billion will serve as the baseline values for the years of 2013, 2014, 
and 2015 respectively. These estimates will then be inflated/deflated from the baseline 
year, to include all years from 1972 to 2016(7), to estimate the total economic 
‘deadweight loss’ of cannabis prohibition from 1972 to 2017. The totals in economic 
‘deadweight loss’, according to the valuation methods, inflated/deflated with GDP 
‘growth’ rates, are as follows: $1,913.5; $1,987.2; and $1,755.0 billion for the NORML 
Low Valuation Estimate, Gettman Low Valuation Estimate, and 2015 Colorado 
Valuation Estimate, as outlined in Appendices G, H, and I respectively. 
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The first types of expenditures in the ‘low’ estimate, the ‘low’ aggregate total as 
estimated by Miron from 1972 to 2016, as outlined in A-1, and the fine expenditures, 
consisting of the averages of the ‘recommendation’ of the Shafer Commission being at 
the same level of $100 per marijuana possession offense from 1972 to the current fiscal 
year and the ‘recommendation’ being inflated by the growth in GDP, as outlined in A-2. 
The ‘low’ estimate in fine expenditures would be the total amount of dollars offenders 
would have spent if all fifty states would have followed the ‘recommendation’ of the 
Shafer Commission, instead, in the time period since the Shafer Commission, 25 million 
Americans have been arrested for the possession of a plant, instead of treating such 
possession as much of an inconvenience as a noise complaint. Additionally, the aggregate 
‘low’ estimate sum of the policing, judicial and legal expenditures from Miron would 
cost each marijuana possession offender $2122 as a national average, but in the state of 
Mississippi, the same offense would cost $668. Miron reports that the lowest estimate of 
enforcement costs are nearly three times too high when compared to a state with 
decriminalization, and if the Schafer Commission’s recommended fine amount were 
inflated by GDP growth amounts the fine would amount to $1143, still nearly 46 percent 
lower than the ‘low’ estimate in Miron’s report. If each of the marijuana possession 
offenders made such fine amounts instead of the expenditures taken from Miron’s report, 
then the total cost of enforcement would be attributable only to those guilty of such 
offense, and not to all citizens like the current model of enforcement demands. Despite 
the misappropriation in law enforcement resources pursuing marijuana possession 
offenders, the total spent in law enforcement as well as the fine amounts estimated by 
Appendices 1 and 2, equals $53.67 billion. Likewise, these resources amount to roughly 
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80 percent of the DEA’s total budget for the same time period, as outlined by A-10. The 
data in A-10 was gathered from the Department of Justice: Budget Trend Data Report 
made available in 2004. The report gives the total budget for the DEA from 1975 to 2003, 
where the budget for the years 1972 to 1974, and 2004 to 2016 were approximated based 
on the average annual increase in budget, then inflated and deflated for the respective 
years. The decriminalization of marijuana possession from the year of 1972 would have 
nearly doubled the capacity in more pervasive drug issues facing the United States like 
the opioid epidemic that is currently taking the lives of, “53,332 in 2016, with 20,145 
coming from synthetic opioids; 15,446 coming from heroin; 14,427 coming from natural 
and semi-synthetic opioids; and another 3,314 stemming from methadone,” (Overdose 
Death Rates, National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2017). The resources that have been used 
to assuage the ‘nuisance’ on marijuana possession offenders could have more 
appropriately used to discourage the illegal distribution and use of such opioids.  
The amount of money spent to pursue and enforce marijuana possession and the 
money spent on fines relevant to being guilty of violation such laws pales in comparison 
to the amount of economic ‘deadweight loss’ attributable to the inability of legal 
marijuana to be a reality. While the NORML and Gettman Low Estimate are purely 
hypothetical, the 2015 Colorado Valuation Estimate Model extrapolates actual data to the 
United States as a whole, and has been mitigated on the estimated ‘marijuana market 
share’ and the ‘US population share’ as estimated by the National Organization for the 
Reform of Marijuana Laws along with the increased acceptance of medical marijuana for 
that year. This model should be used as an ideal benchmark for the rest of the United 
States because Colorado has the first and longest running legal infrastructure for the 
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regulation of the use of marijuana for adults over the age of 21, its population is ranked 
25th, its ‘marijuana market share’ is also near the median ranked 24th, and its median farm 
and retail value of harvest is ranked 24th as well. Additionally, the 2014 Colorado 
Valuation Estimate is only extrapolated using the first year of retail sales in the state.  
The ‘high’ valuation models are an extension of the ‘low’ valuation estimates, 
namely, a Gettman, NORML, and a Colorado estimate. Additionally, each one will be 
generated from a ‘baseline’ valuation for a given year, then inflated/ deflated for all years 
from 1972 to 2017 for both the Gettman and NORML High Valuation Estimate, as 
outlined in Appendices L and N. The first ‘high’ valuation method includes the Gettman 
High Valuation Estimate Model, where as before, the valuation $35.804 billion, as 
outlined in Marijuana Production in the United States (2006), is inflated by the increased 
acceptance in medical marijuana from its base year of 2006 to 2012, the year that 
recreational use of marijuana was legalized in both Colorado and Washington, from 
2012, the growth in valuation percentages will not be the annual change in acceptance of 
medical marijuana, but rather the annual increase of acceptance of recreational use of 
marijuana, as outlined in A-11. A-11 shows how the inclusion of Colorado and 
Washington added 12.006 to the total percentage of states with acceptance of recreational 
marijuana of the 314.1 million people in America as of 2012. The next series of 
jurisdictions that legalized cannabis for recreational use were Alaska and the District of 
Columbia, adding 1.397 to the 12.006 million attributed by the states legalizing in 2012, 
this added 1.397 is a 11.64 percent increase but will be divided by two because of the 
two-year interval between 2012 and 2014. The next series of states legalizing the 
recreational use of marijuana includes California, Nevada, Oregon, Massachusetts, and 
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Maine in 2016, adding 54.48 million people to the states supporting recreational 
marijuana for adults 21 or older. This increase in the support of recreational marijuana 
makes the annual percentage change between 2014 and 2016 at 203.23 percent. Using the 
baseline amount of $35.804 for 2006, and the ‘marginal’ change in acceptance of medical 
marijuana from 2006 to 2012, and the ‘marginal’ change in recreational marijuana for 
2014 and 2016, the end valuation for the Gettman High Valuation Estimation Model 
equals to $127.868 billion in 2017, as outlined in A-12. This valuation estimate will serve 
as the baseline for 2017 for the aggregate total valuation of economic deadweight loss 
from 1972 to 2017, as outlined in A-15.  
The second ‘high’ valuation model consists of an extension of NORML’s 1997 
Median Farm and Retail Value Estimates and ‘a weighted-average eradication rate.’ To 
find out the ‘weighted-average eradication rate’, each state’s population as well as the 
estimated eradication rate for each. The estimated eradication rate is the rate of law 
enforcement agencies removing illegally grown marijuana compared to the generally 
estimated whole of the illegal market grown in the entire state. The aggregate of the 
states’ population was found and the relative contribution to the total was used as well. 
Each state’s population relative to the whole was then multiplied by the estimated 
eradication rate, giving a relative contribution to the ‘weighted-average eradication rate.’ 
Each state’s contribution to the ‘weighted-average eradication rate’ was then added 
together to the national average of the estimated eradication. These calculations as 
previously described are outlined in A-13. The average of the Median Farm and Retail 
Values was divided by the ‘weighted-average eradication rate,’ to give the estimated 
valuation for 2017 equaling $122.395 billion, the average of the farm and retail estimates 
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along with the 2017 estimated valuation would serve as the 2017 base amount in the total 
valuation model as outlined in A-14. This valuation estimate will serve as the baseline for 
2017 for the aggregate total valuation of economic deadweight loss from 1972 to 2017, as 
outlined in A-16. 
The final high valuation estimate will include Colorado’s total sales of legal 
marijuana for the year of 2017, then divide by the average of ‘marijuana market share’ 
and the ‘US population share.’ This estimate will then be deflated from 2017, to include 
all years from 1972 to 2017. Alicia Wallace from The Cannabist wrote, “[Colorado’s] 
marijuana shops raked in $1.51 billion in sales of medical and recreational flower, 
edibles, and concentrate products during 2017, according to the Colorado Department of 
Revenue data released [earlier in 2018], collecting upward of $247 million in taxes and 
fess revenue from marijuana sales, according to state finance data,” (Wallace, The 
Cannabist, 2018). Extrapolating from the data from Colorado’s Department of Revenue, 
the $1.51 billion in sales from ‘marijuana shops’ from ninety-hundredths of a percent 
would amount to $162.37 billion dollars using NORML’s ‘marijuana market share’ and 
its ‘population share’ accounting for 1.73 percent of the total population of the United 
States in 2017 would amount to $87.283 billion, averaging $124.827 billion dollars for 
the 2017 Colorado High Valuation Estimate, this estimate will serve as the base estimate 
for 2017 and will be deflated from 1972 to the most current year, as outlined in A-17. 
The totals in economic ‘deadweight loss’, according to the valuation methods, 
inflated/deflated with GDP ‘growth’ rates, are as follows: $2,602.3; $2,490.8; and 
$2,540.3 billion for the Gettman High Valuation Estimate, NORML High Valuation 
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Estimate, and 2017 Colorado Valuation Estimate, as outlined in Appendices15, 16, and 
17 respectively. 
The last portion of the costs associated with the enforcement of marijuana 
prohibition is the benefit of tax revenue gained from the legalization of recreational 
marijuana. Finding an approximate in the dollar value associated with the tax revenue 
will be generated in two scenarios, namely a ‘high and low’ estimate from states that 
currently have gained positive tax revenues from such legalization. For these models, the 
states of Colorado, Washington, and Oregon will be used to find such approximates. 
Using the total valuation models generated previously in this report, an average for each 
the high and low estimates will be used and then multiplied by each the expected or 
realized annual tax rate for each state. This will give three approximates for each kind of 
estimate in generating tax revenues. Amendment 64, Initiative 502, and Measure 91 for 
the states of Colorado, Washington, and Oregon legalized the recreational use of 
marijuana for adults over the age of 21 while appropriating funds to several public 
expenditures. Since 2014, Colorado and Washington have sold more than $7.612 billion 
dollars in legal marijuana generating $1.38 billion in tax revenue. While Oregon has 
followed suit for the legalization of recreational marijuana in 2016, Colorado and 
Washington have had four years of lining state coffers with a new source of tax revenue. 
According to the Colorado Department of Revenue, this excise tax has grown from, 
“$67.6 million in 2014 to $247.4 million in 2017, [amounting to a 266 percent increase; 
while] sales increased from $699.2 million to $1.51 billion, [a 116 percent increase in 
sales,” (Colorado Department of Revenue, 2018). From 2014 to 2017, Colorado alone has 
sold $4.494 billion in legal marijuana generating $638.994 million in tax revenue, 
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making the effective tax rate attributable to all parties 14.219 percent for the state. For the 
state of Washington, the story is almost identical. Tax revenues for Washington have 
grown from, “$16 million in 2014 to $319 million in 2017, with sales expanding from 
$49 million in 2014 to $1.486 billion in 2017,” (502Data.com, 2018). During this time 
period, tax revenues have increased 163 percent in three years and sales increasing 204 
percent. For the state of Washington, total tax revenues have amounted to $740.7 million 
and sales amounting to $3.118 billion, giving the state of Washington an effective tax rate 
of 23.756 percent.  
The reports on Oregon have been slow to come to fruition, with 2016 being the 
first year of recreational marijuana sales in this state. Chris Roberts of High Times 
Magazine wrote, “despite the slow start, total sales for the year were on pace to hit $200 
million, or more than 60 thousand pounds worth…but only a tiny percentage of Oregon’s 
total cannabis-growing capacity,” (Roberts, High Times Magazine, 2017).  A leaked and 
published post in the Oregonian estimates that, “the state’s marijuana growers may be 
able to produce at least 265 thousand surplus pounds, above and beyond what is legally 
[allowed] to be sold in stores, with a street value of more than $5 billion,” (Roberts, 
2017). Oregon’s Economic and Revenue Forecast published on May 16, 2017 lays out 
the revenue estimates pertaining to marijuana excise taxes in two year increments as 
follows, “In the years of 2015 to 2017, it is estimated that marijuana earnings will amount 
to $67.278 million dollars a year, $156.216 in 2017 to 2019, $212.238 in 2019 to 2021, 
$238.977 in 2021 to 2023, and $262.576 from 2023 to 2025,” (Oregon Economic and 
Revenue Forecast, 2017). The report also expects the excise tax to amount to, “17 percent 
from Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC), with the local option of adding up to 
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three additional percent,” (Oregon, 2017). Anticipating for the increase in the excise tax 
and the expected ‘marijuana earnings’ given from the report, the annual sales for 2017 
are assumed to be $395.75 million; $870.53 million in 2018; $1,130.8 million in 2019; 
and plateauing slightly in 2021 with annual sales expected to reach $1,241.7 million. 
Oregon’s fate after four years of legalizing the recreational use of marijuana for adults 
over the age of 21 follows the precedent seen by both Colorado and Washington from 
2014 to 2017. Oregon’s sales are projected to grow by 213 percent in that timeframe with 
tax revenues expected to grow by 251 percent as well. The more expedient growth 
compared to Washington could be revealed in the report’s statement where it exclaims, 
“[Oregon] had a significantly lower tax rate than Washington, which helps keep final 
consumer prices lower. Furthermore, the first set of quarterly tax returns…, indicates that 
[Oregon’s] prices were very competitive with Washington’s, even though Washington 
had two additional years to get accustomed to the newly legal market, license growers, 
and the like. A lower retail price… should bring more consumers and more black market 
conversions [into the legal market despite the excise tax put on the purchase of 
recreational marijuana],” (Oregon, 2017). The effective tax rate for the state of Oregon 
equals 18.389 percent assuming that from 2017 to 2021 the additional ‘local option’ of an 
added three percent tax would be gradually introduced throughout that time period 
evenly. From 2017 to 2021, the total tax revenue gained from Measure 91 would add 
$669.1 million from the sale of $3,638.8 million in recreational marijuana for adults over 
the age of 21. 
While the effective tax rates for the purchase of recreational marijuana varies 
from 14.2 percent in Colorado, 18.4 percent in Oregon, and 23.8 percent in Washington, 
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these states have followed almost identically what this tax revenue will be allocated to 
fund. For example, both Colorado and Washington give 40 percent of marijuana tax 
revenue to the Common/ General School Fund, 20 percent to Mental Health, Alcoholism, 
and Drug Services, 15 percent to State Police, 10 percent to both City and County budget 
offices, and the remaining 5 percent to Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention, Intervention, 
and Treatment Programs. While Washington gives 32 percent to the ‘General Fund’, 49 
percent to ‘Basic Health’ fund, 2 percent to cities and counties, 12 percent to ‘Education 
and Prevention’ funds, and the rest to another fund, “grants to support building bridge 
programs, and for Health Care Authority funding for community health centers,” (Annual 
Report: Fiscal Year 2017, 2017). Four years after the legalization of recreational use of 
marijuana, Colorado, Washington, and Oregon have/ will have generated $760.22 million 
to education; $624.56 million to basic health funds; $276.4 million to city and county 
budgets; $196.2 million to state police funds; and $65 million to Alcohol and Drug 
Treatment programs. At a time when the Trump administration is, “proposing a 13 
percent decline in funding to the U.S. Department of Education, with higher education 
programs [like the Pell Grant] comprising most of what will be sliced,” (Boland, The 
Hill, 2017). He has also been quoted to 60 Minutes to Scott Pelley, “There’s many 
different ways [to appropriately insure e]verybody’s got to be covered. This is an un-
Republican thing for me to say because a lot of times they say, ‘no, the lower 25 percent 
that can’t afford private’…I am going to take care of everybody,” (Rechtoris, Becker’s 
Hospital Review, 2016). Those comments have been rescinded with his budget cuts 
including, “[The] first budget blueprint envisions a major retrenchment for the 
Department of Health and Human Services, calling for a nearly 18 percent cut, or $15.1 
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billion…[and] among the biggest targets are the National Institutes of Health, which 
would see their budgets cut by $5.8 to $25.9 billion,” (Levey, Los Angeles Times, 2017). 
While maintaining the normalcy in the divergence of Presidential candidate and President 
is understandable, the time for state revenue to fund these programs could not be more 
imperative than now. In addition to the proposed budget cuts the Trump administration 
would like to be done, the Justice Department and Attorney General Jefferson Sessions’ 
view on the legality of both medical and recreational marijuana could not be in more 
turmoil.  
In order to find out the approximate tax revenue that could be generated for the 
United States as a whole, three tax rates will be used, the ‘effective tax rate’ as mentioned 
previously for each Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, multiplied both the ‘low and 
high’ aggregate valuation estimates derived from NORML, Gettman, and Colorado’s 
extrapolation for the United States as whole. Then, for each ‘effective tax rate’ will be 
averaged together to generate a concise estimate to the tax benefit for the United States as 
a whole from 1972 to 2017.  
The ‘effective tax rates’ for each Colorado, Oregon, and Washington are as 
follow, 14.219, 18.389, and 23.756 percent respectively. For the Low Colorado estimate, 
tax revenue associated with the NORML, Gettman, and the 2014 Colorado aggregate 
estimates are as follows $272.08 billion, $282.56 billion, $249.55 billion, averaging 
$268.06 billion dollars in tax dollars from 1972 to 2017. For the Low Oregon estimate, 
tax revenue associated with the NORML, Gettman, and the 2014 Colorado aggregate 
estimates are as follows $351.87 billion, $365.43 billion, $322.73 billion, averaging 
$346.68 billion dollars in tax dollars from 1972 to 2017. For the Low Washington 
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estimate, tax revenue associated with the NORML, Gettman, and the 2014 Colorado 
aggregate estimates are as follows $454.57 billion, $472.08 billion, $416.92 billion, 
averaging $447.86 billion dollars in tax dollars from 1972 to 2017. The average of the 
three average estimates for the low end of tax revenue associated with the legalization of 
the recreational use of marijuana equals $354.2 billion. 
For the High Colorado estimate, tax revenue associated with the NORML, 
Gettman, and the 2017 Colorado aggregate estimates are as follows $354.16 billion, 
$370.03 billion, $361.20 billion, averaging $361.80 billion dollars in tax dollars from 
1972 to 2017. For the High Oregon estimate, tax revenue associated with the NORML, 
Gettman, and the 2017 Colorado aggregate estimates are as follows $458.03 billion, 
$478.55 billion, $467.13 billion, averaging $467.90 billion dollars in tax dollars from 
1972 to 2017. For the High Washington estimate, tax revenue associated with the 
NORML, Gettman, and the 2017 Colorado aggregate estimates are as follows $591.71 
billion, $618.21 billion, $603.47 billion, averaging $604.46 billion dollars in tax dollars 
from 1972 to 2017. The average of the three average estimates for the high end of tax 
revenue associated with the legalization of the recreational use of marijuana equals 
$478.05 billion. 
In total, the illegality has cost the United States of America and its citizens $40.11 
billion associated with enforcement costs, $13.56 billion associated with the difference in 
fine expenditures derived from GDP growth and the Shafer Commission’s 
‘recommendation’, $1,885.24 billion derived from the average of the NORML, Gettman, 
and 2014 Colorado aggregate valuation models in ‘economic deadweight loss’, and an 
average of $354.20 billion in lost tax revenue. The total amount associated with the cost 
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of enforcing marijuana laws and not pursuing/ recommending marijuana legalization for 
recreational use equals $2,293.11 billion from 1972 to 2016(7) for the low estimate. For 
the high end estimate, the illegality has cost the United States of America and its citizens 
$202.32 billion associated with enforcement costs, $104.75 billion associated with the 
difference in fine expenditures derived from GDP growth and the Shafer Commission’s 
‘recommendation’, $2,544.47 billion derived from the average of the NORML, Gettman, 
and 2014 Colorado aggregate valuation models in ‘economic deadweight loss’, and an 
average of $478.05 billion in lost tax revenue. The total amount associated with the cost 
of enforcing marijuana laws and not pursuing/ recommending marijuana legalization for 
recreational use equals $3,329.59 billion from 1972 to 2016(7) for the high estimate. To 
put these figures in perspective, Popular Mechanics Magazine estimated that the hemp 
and marijuana, “industry amounts to over $1 billion a year, and of that, 80 percent is 
imported,” (Popular Mechanics, February 1938), at a time when the United States Gross 
Domestic Product equaled, “$91.9 billion,” (“GDP and Other NIPA Series, United States 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2017), meaning the [industry] could maintain about 1.088 
percent of the United States economy. Additionally, if the ‘industry’ was inflated from 
1937 on the annual GDP increases from 1937 to 2017, then the industry would be worth 
$185.9 billion, as outlined in A-18. Additionally, the ‘high’ NORML, Gettman, and 
Colorado valuation methods averaged a 2017 valuation of $125.03 billion, leaving the 
difference between the expected growth of the ‘industry’ and the average of these ‘high’ 
valuation methods to be the valuation of hemp, not the value of the recreational 
marijuana market industry. Likewise, the sum GDP from 1972 to 2017 equaled, 
“$395,845 billion,” (St. Louis Federal Reserve, February 2018), meaning the ‘low and 
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high’ aggregate costs of enforcing marijuana laws and not pursuing/ recommending 
marijuana legalization for recreational use equals .6428 percent and .8411 percent, 
respectively, of the total summation of GDP in the United States from 1972 to 2017. 
Additionally, the prohibition of the possession, use, and sale of marijuana has led to the 
arrest of, “25.202 million Americans,” (Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime 
Reports 1972-2016, 2017), from 1972 to 2015, of which 21.435 million were for 
possession. The total number of marijuana arrests equal 49.8 percent of the, “53.656 
million drug arrests during the same time period,” (FBI Uniform Crime Reports). The 
guidance of the Shafer Commission in 1972 would have lessened the increase on the total 
incarceration rate considering the total marijuana arrests accounts for 4.423 percent of the 
569.787 million total arrests made from 1972 to 2015 (FBI Uniform Crime Reports). 
The political climate around the federal government allowing states to dodge the 
implications of the Schedule I classification of marijuana and all of its derivatives is 
maintained by only two pieces of ‘legislation,’ the Cole Memorandum and the 
Rohrabacher-Farr [Blumenauer] Amendment. The Cole Memorandum was a document 
written by former US Attorney General James Cole in 2013, guiding all US Attorneys to, 
“focus only on the following principles related to state-legal cannabis operations: 
Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; preventing revenue from the 
 sale of  marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 
 preventing the dispersion of marijuana from states where it is legal under state 
 law in some form to other states; preventing state-authorized marijuana activity 
 from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or 
 other illegal activity; preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation 
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 and distribution of marijuana; preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation of 
 other adverse public health consequences associated with marijuana use; 
 preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands and the attendant public 
 safety and environmental dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; 
 and preventing marijuana possession or use on federal property, (Cole, The 
 United States Department of Justice, 2013).  
The Cole Memorandum was modeled after, “a similar memorandum issued by 
Deputy Attorney General David Ogden in 2009 that directing US attorneys to ‘not focus 
federal resources in your states on individual whose actions are in clear and unambiguous 
compliance with existing laws providing for the medical use of marijuana,’” (Rough, 
Leafly, 2017). The Cole Memo states, “For states that have enacted laws to authorize the 
production, distribution, and possession of marijuana, the Department [of Justice] expects 
these states to establish strict regulatory schemes that protect the eight federal interests 
identified in the Department’s guidance. These schemes must be tough in practice…and 
include strong, state-based enforcement efforts, backed by adequate funding. Based on 
assurances that those states will impose an appropriately strict regulatory system, the 
Department has informed the governors of states that it is deferring its right to challenge 
their legalization laws at this time,” (Cole, The United States Department of Justice, 
2013). The first protection in the eyes of users in compliance with state laws is the Cole 
Memo--, “a suggested, but not legally binding, moratorium on federal interference in 
state-approved recreational [marijuana]. Because the Cole Memo can be rescinded by 
Sessions at will, the country’s ever-expanding adult-use cannabis community has been 
waiting for the other foot to drop since Sessions’ confirmation,” (Harris, Merry Jane, 
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2017). While the Cole Memo is just a guiding statement made by a previous 
administration’s Deputy Attorney General, this position is second in power with regards 
to the Justice Department under only the Attorney General. 
The Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment was first introduced in 2001, prohibiting the 
Justice Department from impeding on states’ rights with regards to legalizing the use of 
medical marijuana. The RF Amendment has been introduced to the House floor nine 
times since 2001. The Amendment died in committee in 2001; did not reach a majority in 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, or 2012; and finally gained a majority in 2014 and 2015. 
The Cole Memo’s ‘eight federal interests’ and the RF Amendment’s verbiage [of], “none 
of the funds made available in this act to the Department of Justice may be used, with 
respect to the [fifty states and the District of Columbia] to prevent such states from 
implement their own laws authorizing the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of 
medical [or recreational] marijuana,” (Rohrabacher-Farr[Blumenauer] Amendment, 
2015). With the current Trump administration and Attorney General Jefferson Sessions, 
the Amendment has been in hot water as of late. For example, “on September 6 [2017], 
the U.S. House Committee on Rules blocked a vote on the amendment, due to 
Republican leadership viewing it as too divisive, but was renewed on September 8 as part 
of an emergency aid package, and again through a pair of stopgap spending bills on 
December 8 and 22, expired on January 20 [2018], but was renewed again just two days 
later as part of another stopgap bill, and renewed again on February 9, through March 
23,” (Schroyer, Marijuana Business Daily, 2018). The delicate safety net that those 
aiding in the ‘use, distribution, possession, or cultivation’ for either recreational users or 
medical patients is in constant turmoil with the Amendment only being passed as an 
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attempt to avoid a federal government shutdown. Millions of patients are at risk in a 
majority of states at an almost monthly basis. The GOP controlled House puts medical 
marijuana patients in a situation that could, once again, to be prosecuted by federal law. 
This point is exemplified by California Representative Dana Rohrabacher, “one of the 
originators of the amendment, reminding his Republican cohorts, ‘if we bury state 
autonomy in order to deny patients an alternative to opioids, and ominously federalize 
our police, our hypocrisy will deserve the American people’s contempt,’” (Adams, Merry 
Jane, 2017). The Cole Memorandum along with the Rohrabacher-Farr [Blumenauer] 
Amendment are the only federal protections aiding medical patients and recreational 
users along with those aiding in the ‘production, distribution, and possession’ of 
marijuana. 
The consistently shifting acceptance of the RF Amendment and its inclusion in 
bills like the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, could in fact allow the 
‘federalization’ of police to states that allow both medical and recreational marijuana 
because such Act as passed to the Senate only ensures that, “none of the funds made 
available under this Act to the Department of Justice may be used, with respect to any of 
the States…, or with respect to the District of Columbia, Guam, or Puerto Rico, to 
prevent any of them from implementing their own laws that authorize the use, 
distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical [not recreational] marijuana,” 
(Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, 115th United States Congress, March 2018). The 
lack of protecting States from implementing their own laws authorizing the ‘use, 
distribution, possession, or cultivation’ of recreational marijuana, stifles the tax-
generating, progressive forms of legislation passed in the States of Washington, Oregon, 
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California, Alaska, Nevada, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Maine as well as the District 
of Columbia; thereby restricting, “a steadily growing number of banks [that] are willing 
to open accounts for marijuana businesses,” (Angell, Forbes Magazine, January 2018). 
Since the inauguration of President Donald Trump and the seemingly regressive regime 
leading the Department of Justice when compared to the Obama administration with 
special regards to the Attorney Generals Loretta Lynch, Eric Holder, and James Cole, 
“the number of depository institutions that are actively banking the cannabis industry has 
increased roughly 18 percent since the beginning of 2017. [With an increase from] 340 
financial services providers [in January 2017] to 400 by the end of September 2017, [an 
annualized increase of 24 percent],” (Angell, Forbes Magazine).  
 Since 2000, the United States heroin and non-heroin opioid death rates per 100 
thousand people has increased from, “.7 to 4.1 and 2.5 to 7.6,” (Planalp, SHADAC, June 
2017),” and currently heroin and non-heroin opioids are at fault for over 50 thousand 
overdoses per year. Currently opioids are classified as a Schedule II drug as outlined by 
the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 having, “a lessened potential for abuse when 
compared to Schedule I drugs, currently have accepted medical treatment in the United 
States, and abuse of the drugs in this schedule may lead to severe psychological and 
physical dependency,” (CSA). The likelihood of addiction to such substances is 
dependent on factors like the duration of which the drug is used, how the drug is ingested, 
and other psychological factors independent for each user. It is noted in The Opioid 
Epidemic that Research Fellow Colin Planalp notes, “repeated use of opioids can affect 
the chemistry and wiring in the brain, causing addiction that prompts people to crave and 
use opioids habitually and can cause symptoms of withdrawal if people stop using 
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opioids [abruptly],” (Planalp, 2017). The number of America, opioid drug fatalities 
should incite great concern when these numbers are put in perspective. For example, the 
53 thousand deaths caused by opioids outnumbers, “the 35 thousand motor vehicle deaths 
in 2015, the 51 thousand AIDS-related deaths in the worst year of the crisis in 1995, and 
the 24.7 thousand Americans murdered in the peak year of homicides in 1991,” (Welch, 
CBS News, 2017). Currently, the cause of the existing opioid epidemic stems from the 
expansion of Medicare Part D as noted earlier in Chapter 1, but will be covered briefly 
here. The NBER paper How Increasing Medical Access to Opioids Contributes to the 
Opioid Epidemic Economists Pacula, Powell, and Taylor found, “that a ten percent 
increase in medical opioid distribution leads to a 7.4 increase in opioid-related deaths and 
a 14.1 percent increase in substance abuse treatment admission rates for the Medicare-
ineligible population,” (Pacula, Powell, and Taylor; NBER, 2015). The data from their 
study reveals the inference that the more legal and accessible a substance becomes, the 
more likely the abuse of such substance will occur. The inference made by the team of 
the National Bureau of Economic Research extends to the marijuana market according to 
the research of JAMA Internal Medicine contributors Marcus Bachhuber, MD; and 
Brendan Saloner, PhD. In their report, Medical Cannabis Laws and Opioid Analgesic 
Overdose Mortality in the US, they found that the thirteen, “states having medical 
cannabis laws [prior to 2010] had a 24.8 lower mean of opioid mortality rate (95 percent 
confidence interval, -37.5% to -9.5%; P= .003) compared to states without medical 
cannabis laws,” (Bachhuber, Saloner; JAMA Internal Medicine, 2014). If the same 
inference of the expansion opioid legalization through Medicare Part D can be extended 
to marijuana legalization and such medicinal properties of opioids like analgesia can be 
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achieved by using marijuana and pushes some users to use it ‘recreationally’ instead of 
either heroin or non-heroin opioids, then legalization for both medical and recreational 
purposes should be condoned especially when, “the association between medical 
cannabis laws and opioid analgesic overdose mortality in each year after implementation 
of the law showed that such laws were associated with a lower rate of overdose mortality 
that generally strengthened over time,” (JAMA Internal Medicine, 2014). Additionally, 
further expansion and acceptance of the legalization of marijuana for both medical and 
recreational use would fund drug prevention and rehabilitation as seen with the state 
budgets of Colorado, Washington, and Oregon; and could be modified to further assist 
the states whose opioid epidemics is more exhaustive to other state funding resources.  
 While the focus of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 
better known as the Controlled Substances Act, with regards to ‘marihuana’ is more 
generally aimed at the ‘narcotic’ drug; and not of marijuana’s industrial use in the form 
of hemp. Marihuana as described in the Schedule I classification in the Controlled 
Substances Act, “means all parts of the plant Cannabis sativa L., whether growing or not; 
the seeds thereof; the resin extracted from any part of such plant; and every compound, 
manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds or resin. 
Such term does not include the mature stalks of such plant, fiber produced from such 
stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, 
salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin extracted 
therefrom), fiber, oil, or cake, or the sterilized seed of such plant which is incapable of 
germination,” (CSA, 1970). The literature does not make a distinction between 
marijuana, with its medical/ recreational uses, or hemp, with its industrial uses. Hemp can 
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best be described as, “the standard fiber of the world having great tensile strength and 
durability and used to produce more than 5 thousand projects, ranging from rope to fine 
laces, and the ‘hurds’ remaining from the fiber…can be used to produce more than 25 
thousand products, ranging from dynamite to Cellophane,” (Popular Mechanics 
Magazine, 1938). This article by Popular Mechanics Magazine describes the economic 
and agrarian benefits that could be made with the innovation made from the hemp 
decorticator which could separate the outer fiber from the inner woody core called hurd, 
which contains, “seventy-seven percent cellulose,” (Popular Mechanics Magazine, 
1938).  This high percentile yield of cellulose makes it an ideal source material for 
biofuels, paper, fabric, and textiles. Regardless of how effective hemp ‘could have been’, 
“an obstacle in the march of hemp is the reluctance of farmers to try new crops 
[especially when] it is impossible to grow hemp without producing the blossom of 
[marijuana] and federal regulations being drawn requiring registration of hemp growers,” 
(1938). The lack of dichotomy between hemp and the ‘blossomed’ marijuana in both the 
Marihuana Tax Stamp Act and the Controlled Substances has hindered the, “legitimate 
culture of hemp and such federal regulations by [not] protecting the public, limiting the 
immeasurable [benefit] this new crop can add to American agriculture and industry. 
Patent WO2013056269A2 filed by John C. Phillips on November 13, 2012, claims, “a 
method of producing combustible fuel from cannabis plants which when combusted 
emits at least 70 percent less carbon dioxide, and between 90 and 100 percent less sulfur 
dioxide than traditional fossil fuels,” (Phillips, Industrial Hemp/ Cannabis Sativa, 2013). 
The ability to literally grow a domestic supply of biofuels instead of the use of oil from 
the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) could lessen the $71.52 
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billion relative trade deficit with the use of, “450 million acres of United States farmland 
needed to meet 70 percent of oil consumption,” (Phillips, 2013). Additionally, “until 
1883, around 75 to 90 percent of all paper in the world was made with cannabis hemp 
fiber,” (Phillips, 2013), from a harvest that could be made four times per year instead of 
the multi-decades needed for tress to grow to produce an equivalent amount of wood 
pulp, the primary raw material used today for the production of paper. The ability for 
hemp fibers to be used for fabrics and textiles is another source of the encouraging future. 
Currently, cotton is the most widely used fabric for fiber production, and, “has enjoyed 
[such] top billing since 1958, with annual production projected to quadruple by the year 
2050,” (“Hemp v. Cotton, Leafly, 2015). While cotton is prevalent for fabric and textiles, 
it is not the most efficient crop to hold its position. For example, “[it] accounts for less 
than 2.5 percent of cropland worldwide, cotton uses 16 percent of the world’s pesticides; 
while, hemp production, in comparison, can use similar amounts of pesticides as cotton 
production, requiring only half the territory as cotton to produce a ton of the finished 
textile,” (Leafly, 2015). Furthermore, while being more efficient in the use of pesticides, 
hemp, “uses only 3 to 5 hundred liters of water to produce a kilogram of dry hemp 
matter, while cotton is estimated to use 10 thousand liters to grow the same amount of 
material,” (2015). The difference in water usage at this moment in time is extremely 
crucial because aquifers like the Ogallala are being depleted quickly. A report made by 
“PNAS, led by David Steward of Kansas State University found that 30 percent of the 
Kansas portion of the Ogallala Aquifer has already been pumped out, and another 39 
percent will get used up in the next [50 years] at existing rates, causing farmers would 
have to cut their groundwater pumping by 80 percent today – to bring depletions in line 
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with rainwater recharge, (Plumer, The Washington Post, 2013). In this chapter, I have, to 
the best of my ability with the evaluations available, approximated the aggregate 
economic costs associated with the Schedule I classification of Cannabis sativa, and 
show how the questionable classification could have addressed the growing opioid 
epidemic as well seek to aid in the potential federal government budget cuts associated 
with the current administration. 
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Conclusion 
The Marihuana Tax Stamp Act of 1937 set a precedent for the eventual “War on 
Drugs” by making the claims of it being, “the most violence-causing drug in the history 
of mankind,” (Gerber, 2004), while also, “lead[ing] to pacifism,” (Anslinger, 2005). Such 
diverging effects cannabis has on its users might lead to some questionable motives 
behind the move in the legality of Cannabis sativa. Additionally, in the Marihuana 
Conference of 1938, Dr. Bromberg, Senior Psychiatrist, Department of Hospitals, New 
York City, adds, “Cannabis [sativa] does not bring out the motor excitement or hysterical 
symptoms among Anglo-Saxon users that occurs among natives [Indians],” (Marihuana 
Conference, 1938). Tactics made by the Federal Bureau of Narcotics made the general 
public more apt to believe that cannabis users typically, “Mexicans, Greeks, Turks, 
Filipinos, Spaniards, Latin Americans, and Negroes,” (Bonnie, 1999), would commit 
violent criminal acts that are more typical of users of other narcotics [cocaine and 
heroin]. This assumption of cannabis and its effects on its users relative to harder drugs 
like cocaine and heroin and its effects on its users is seen with the Boggs Act introduced 
in 1952. The Boggs Act outlined hasher mandatory minimum sentences for cocaine, 
heroin, and cannabis where, “simple possession of such narcotics carry a two-year 
sentence,” (Tilem and Associates, 2009). Subsequently, the Narcotics Control Act of 
1956, “increased the mandatory minimums for related first-time drug offenders from two 
to five years and any subsequent offenses from five to ten years,” (Tilem and Associates, 
2009). The Prettyman and Katzenbach Commissions’ intent was to, “develop a far 
broader range of alternatives for dealing with [drug] offenders- is based on the belief that, 
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while there are some who must be completely segregated from society, there are many 
instances where segregation [through incarceration] does more harm than good,” (The 
Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, 1966). The goals of these Commissions was to 
develop a ‘broader range of alternatives for dealing with offenders’, were realized from a 
12.3 percent decrease in the total prison population from 1964 to 1968. Shortly thereafter, 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act was passed to, “provide the 
legal basis for the government’s war on drugs [which] consolidated [states’] laws on 
possessing, manufacturing, and distributing of drugs of all kinds,” (Controlled Substances 
Act, 1970). The ‘consolidation’ of such laws on possessing, manufacturing, and 
distributing drugs would indirectly limit the hopes of developing the broader range of 
alternatives. The lack of developing the range of alternatives can be seen with the 
increase of marijuana arrests in the following year, “from 292 thousand in 1972 to 421 
thousand in 1973,” (FBI Uniform Crime Reports, 1972-2000), alongside the rejection of 
the Shafer Commission’s recommendation of the, “decriminalization of possession and 
non-profit transfer of marijuana,” (Shafer Commission, 1972). Since this rejection of 
what is the ‘broadest’ alternative to incarceration, the total number of arrests for 
marijuana possession from 1973 to 2016 has amounted to 25.4 million of the 52.2 million 
drug arrests,” (FBI Uniform Crime Report, 1972-2000) 
 From 1937 to 2018, the legal standing of Cannabis sativa and all of its derivatives 
has been an impediment to technological, social, historical, and economic change that 
could greatly benefit or could have benefited millions of people, in the United States and 
abroad. The legalization of cannabis in states like Colorado, Washington, and Oregon 
have shown, despite the federal Schedule I classification of cannabis, can be a ‘cash’ crop 
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of a state and its taxation can benefit state departments of education, state police forces, 
and aid in the rehabilitation and treatment of addicts of more harmful substances like the 
ongoing opioid epidemic. The claims of the Schedule I classification have been ousted by 
the LaGuardia Commission in 1944 for the state of New York and the Schafer 
Commission in 1972 for the United States collectively. Additionally, the illegality of 
hemp through the propaganda of Reefer Madness and the Schedule I classification of 
Cannabis sativa with the Controlled Substances Act has ubiquitously usurped the 
opportunities the traditionally agrarian economy of the United States could have achieved 
since 1937. The ongoing acceptance of the use of Cannabis sativa and all of its 
derivatives with the passing of Proposition 215 in California in 1996 and the 28 other 
states as well as the District of Columbia as well as the 16 states that approve the use of 
Cannabis (CBD) oil for the use of treatment resistant epilepsy shows the perpetual flaw in 
the first of the three ‘qualifiers’ of what is necessary to be classified as a Schedule I 
controlled substance, namely, the ‘lack of accepted medical use for treatment in the 
United States.’ Secondly, the Shafer Commission of 1972 found that the second qualifier 
necessary to be considered a Schedule I controlled substance, namely, ‘having a high 
potential for abuse’ is disqualified with regards to Cannabis sativa and all of its 
derivatives by stating, “Both [of the LaGuardia and Shafer Commissions] sets of findings 
are strikingly similar in the three areas that have historically created public apprehension 
about marihuana use, namely that marihuana, in itself, is physically addictive, produces 
insanity, and leads to crime. Both reports [LaGuardia and Shafer Commissions] dispelled 
such allegations and myths,” (Pike, Marijuana, 2014). Lastly, Henningfield and 
Benowitz of the National Institute on Drug Abuse found that the ‘third qualifier’ 
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necessary to be considered a Schedule I controlled substance, namely, a ‘lack of accepted 
safety for use under medical supervision’ is null because Cannabis sativa and all its 
derivatives should be regarded as safer than many if not all other controlled substances 
and, even, to be accepted as safe for use under, not only, medical, but also no or 
recreational supervision like alcohol or nicotine, with their report considering marijuana 
as being as safe as caffeine.  
 With this thesis, I have achieved the task of noting the forces incepting to the 
“War on Drugs” from the Marihuana Tax Stamp Act. The historic rhetoric behind the 
“War on Drugs” is imperative when analyzing the factors behind cannabis law reform. 
This analysis alludes to how governmental agencies have been wrong with regards to 
cannabis’ legal standing. If legalized and rescheduled, cannabis could be used as a tool in 
researching a wide array of ailments in disease. If public need is an appropriate purpose 
for writing such thesis, I could not have written a more legitimate and relevant thesis than 
the one at hand. Rarely in American history has there been, “a phenomenon more 
divisive, more misunderstood, more fraught with impact on family, personal, and 
community relationships, [and on the criminal justice system as a whole] than the 
marihuana phenomenon,” (Marihuana: A Signal of Misunderstanding, 1972). The next 
step for cannabis law reform is for municipalities, states, and the federal government to 
decriminalize the possession and non-profit transfer of Cannabis sativa and all its 
derivatives. Additionally, it would be necessary for the respective governmental agencies 
to initiate proceedings to not only reschedule Cannabis sativa and all its derivatives from 
Schedule I to a place outside the scope of the Controlled Substances Act similar in 
fashion to alcohol, nicotine, and caffeine. Finally, if such changes are made to the 
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standing of Cannabis sativa, then it would be fit that the criminal record of all cannabis 
offenses be expunged and dismissed and all under local, state, and federal supervision be 
released from incarceration, parole, or probation. Cannabis sativa would then be legally 
able to serve utility.  
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APPENDIX 1: On the Costs of Enforcement as Estimated from 1972 to 2016 ($ in 
millions) by The War on Marijuana, ACLU 
 
Year	 GDP	Deflator	 High	Est.	 Low	Est.	 Mid	Est.	
1972	 100.00	 702.80	 139.32	 421.02	
1973	 111.04	 780.39	 154.70	 467.50	
1974	 120.35	 845.79	 167.66	 506.67	
1975	 132.57	 931.72	 184.70	 558.15	
1976	 145.52	 1022.75	 202.74	 612.68	
1977	 162.81	 1144.26	 226.83	 685.47	
1978	 186.36	 1309.72	 259.63	 784.59	
1979	 205.01	 1440.82	 285.62	 863.13	
1980	 224.73	 1579.42	 313.09	 946.16	
1981	 246.51	 1732.47	 343.43	 1037.84	
1982	 255.85	 1798.13	 356.45	 1077.18	
1983	 284.99	 2002.94	 397.05	 1199.87	
1984	 311.38	 2188.41	 433.82	 1310.98	
1985	 334.33	 2349.70	 465.79	 1407.60	
1986	 350.58	 2463.89	 488.42	 1476.00	
1987	 377.12	 2650.41	 525.40	 1587.74	
1988	 406.38	 2856.08	 566.17	 1710.95	
1989	 432.72	 3041.15	 602.86	 1821.82	
1990	 452.23	 3178.31	 630.05	 1903.98	
1991	 471.45	 3313.39	 656.82	 1984.90	
1992	 502.85	 3534.06	 700.57	 2117.09	
1993	 527.99	 3710.76	 735.60	 2222.95	
1994	 561.31	 3944.91	 782.01	 2363.22	
1995	 585.56	 4115.33	 815.79	 2465.31	
1996	 622.16	 4372.54	 866.78	 2619.39	
1997	 659.80	 4637.08	 919.22	 2777.86	
1998	 700.11	 4920.40	 975.39	 2947.59	
1999	 745.20	 5237.28	 1038.20	 3137.41	
2000	 786.18	 5525.33	 1095.30	 3309.97	
2001	 803.40	 5646.33	 1119.29	 3382.46	
2002	 833.61	 5858.64	 1161.37	 3509.64	
2003	 887.13	 6234.76	 1235.93	 3734.96	
2004	 943.10	 6628.17	 1313.92	 3970.64	
2005	 1004.59	 7060.33	 1399.59	 4229.52	
2006	 1056.03	 7421.82	 1471.25	 4446.07	
2007	 1102.49	 7748.38	 1535.98	 4641.70	
2008	 1092.35	 7677.09	 1521.85	 4599.00	
2009	 1093.55	 7685.54	 1523.53	 4604.06	
2010	 1143.42	 8036.00	 1593.00	 4814.00	
2011	 1185.04	 8328.51	 1650.99	 4989.23	
2012	 1223.43	 8598.35	 1704.48	 5150.88	
2013	 1276.16	 8968.94	 1777.94	 5372.88	
2014	 1331.42	 9357.30	 1854.92	 5605.53	
2015	 1372.83	 9648.31	 1912.61	 5779.86	
2016	 1435.43	 10088.27	 1999.83	 6043.42	
Total	from	1972-	2016	 202317.02	 40105.90	 121198.87	
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APPENDIX 2: A Report of Total Marijuana Arrests from 1972 to 2016($ in millions), 
and the Relative Fine Difference in Accordance to the Shafer Commission 
 
Year	 MJ	Poss	
High	Cons.	
Est.		
	High	Adj.	
Est.		
Low	Cons.	
Est.	
Low	Adj.	
Est.	
Mid	Cons.	
Est.	
Mid	Adj.	
Est.	
1972	 248,499	 149.80	 149.80	 9.77	 9.77	 79.79	 79.79	
1973	 357,834	 243.47	 239.52	 19.57	 15.62	 131.54	 127.59	
1974	 378,997	 282.65	 274.94	 25.64	 17.93	 154.17	 146.46	
1975	 353,952	 294.39	 282.86	 29.98	 18.45	 162.21	 150.68	
1976	 375,307	 346.32	 329.23	 38.56	 21.47	 192.46	 175.38	
1977	 395,260	 412.75	 387.93	 50.13	 25.30	 231.47	 206.64	
1978	 385,393	 466.22	 432.93	 61.52	 28.24	 263.90	 230.62	
1979	 341,864	 458.38	 422.48	 63.46	 27.56	 260.95	 225.05	
1980	 338,665	 501.03	 458.79	 72.17	 29.93	 286.63	 244.39	
1981	 344,339	 562.12	 511.67	 83.82	 33.37	 323.01	 272.56	
1982	 383,292	 650.88	 591.14	 98.29	 38.56	 374.63	 314.89	
1983	 333,346	 634.34	 572.67	 99.02	 37.35	 366.72	 305.05	
1984	 342,157	 714.56	 642.24	 114.22	 41.89	 414.44	 342.11	
1985	 365,941	 823.26	 737.50	 133.86	 48.11	 478.61	 392.86	
1986	 296,676	 701.31	 626.97	 115.24	 40.90	 408.32	 333.98	
1987	 313,092	 798.51	 711.75	 133.19	 46.43	 465.90	 379.14	
1988	 326,922	 901.02	 800.86	 152.40	 52.24	 526.77	 426.61	
1989	 314,553	 925.15	 820.49	 158.18	 53.52	 541.72	 437.06	
1990	 260,390	 801.56	 709.84	 138.02	 46.30	 469.84	 378.12	
1991	 226,240	 727.00	 642.96	 125.98	 41.94	 426.53	 342.50	
1992	 271,932	 933.83	 824.28	 163.31	 53.77	 548.63	 439.08	
1993	 310,858	 1122.43	 989.39	 197.58	 64.53	 660.08	 527.03	
1994	 402,717	 1548.41	 1362.63	 274.66	 88.88	 911.63	 725.86	
1995	 503,350	 2021.12	 1776.71	 360.30	 115.89	 1190.84	 946.43	
1996	 546,751	 2336.02	 2050.53	 419.24	 133.75	 1377.78	 1092.29	
1997	 606,519	 2751.82	 2412.30	 496.87	 157.35	 1624.52	 1285.00	
1998	 598,694	 2885.95	 2526.67	 524.09	 164.81	 1705.20	 1345.92	
1999	 630,625	 3239.70	 2832.82	 591.65	 184.78	 1915.88	 1509.00	
2000	 646,042	 3504.99	 3061.69	 643.01	 199.70	 2074.22	 1630.92	
2001	 641,109	 3555.80	 3104.85	 653.48	 202.52	 2104.87	 1653.91	
2002	 613,986	 3535.72	 3085.30	 651.67	 201.24	 2093.92	 1643.49	
2003	 662,886	 4066.65	 3544.87	 753.00	 231.22	 2410.08	 1888.30	
2004	 686,402	 4480.95	 3902.24	 833.24	 254.53	 2657.38	 2078.67	
2005	 696,074	 4844.91	 4215.24	 904.61	 274.95	 2875.06	 2245.40	
2006	 738,916	 5410.21	 4703.78	 1013.24	 306.81	 3212.07	 2505.64	
2007	 775,137	 5928.54	 5151.47	 1113.08	 336.01	 3521.19	 2744.12	
2008	 754,223	 5714.82	 4966.36	 1072.39	 323.94	 3393.97	 2645.51	
2009	 758,593	 5754.34	 5000.63	 1079.88	 326.18	 3417.47	 2663.77	
2010	 750,592	 5956.70	 5173.52	 1120.63	 337.45	 3539.04	 2755.86	
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2011	 663,032	 5455.77	 4736.35	 1028.35	 308.94	 3242.40	 2522.99	
2012	 658,232	 5593.89	 4854.41	 1056.12	 316.64	 3325.36	 2585.87	
2013	 609,424	 5404.95	 4688.16	 1022.58	 305.79	 3214.10	 2497.32	
2014	 619,809	 5737.76	 4974.51	 1087.72	 324.47	 3413.10	 2649.85	
2015	 574,641	 5486.85	 4755.43	 1041.60	 310.18	 3264.57	 2533.15	
2016	 587,700	 5787.89	 5014.75	 1100.23	 327.10	 3444.42	 2671.29	
	 	 114454.71	 95040.72	 20925.53	 6199.20	 67697.38	 53298.15	
	 	 104747.72	 	 13562.37	 	 60497.76	 	
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APPENDIX 3: NORML’s 1997 United States Farm and Retail Value Estimates, ($ in 
millions) 
 
Med	Farm	Value	(mill)	 Med	Retail	Value	(mill)	
Alabama	 693	 1154.5	
Alaska	 99.85	 166.5	
Arizona	 136.5	 227.5	
Arkansas	 661.5	 1104	
California	 6065	 10125	
Colorado	 183	 304.5	
Connecticut	 27.95	 46.55	
Delaware	 24.6	 41	
Florida	 910.5	 1520	
Georgia	 285	 475.5	
Hawaii	 968.5	 1615	
Idaho	 292.5	 487.5	
Illinois	 383.5	 638.5	
Indiana	 530	 884.5	
Iowa	 55.9	 93.3	
Kansas	 52.45	 87.6	
Kentucky	 1775	 2960	
Louisiana	 166.5	 278	
Maine	 168	 280.5	
Maryland	 48.9	 81.35	
Massachusetts	 52.4	 87.6	
Michigan	 201.5	 335.5	
Minnesota	 262.5	 437	
Mississippi	 284.5	 474.5	
Missouri	 441	 735	
Montana	 76.6	 127.6	
Nebraska	 26	 43.4	
Nevada	 21.6	 36	
New	Hampshire	 12.76	 21.3	
New	Jersey	 19.1	 31.85	
New	Mexico	 67.7	 112.9	
New	York	 364	 607	
North	Carolina	 160	 267	
North	Dakota	 7.295	 12.175	
Oklahoma	 401.5	 669.5	
Oregon	 215.5	 359 
Pennsylvania	 90.3	 151	
Rhode	Island	 19.85	 33.05	
South	Carolina	 147	 245.5	
South	Dakota	 12.505	 20.8	
Tennessee	 2355	 3925	
Texas		 267.5	 446	
Utah	 54.1	 90.15	
Vermont	 57.35	 95.8	
Virginia	 256	 426.5	
Washington	 341.5	 569.5	
West	Virginia	 350	 583	
Wisconsin	 153.5	 256.5	
Wyoming	 2.55	 4.255	
Total	 20,249	 33,776	
Data Gathered from norml.org State Info Crop Estimates 
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APPENDIX 4: The Progression of Acceptance of Medical Marijuana in the United 
States from 1996 to 2017 
 States 
Introducing 
Legislation 
Added 
Population in 
Support 
(millions) 
States w/ 
Medical 
Cannabis Pop 
(millions) 
Total US 
Population 
States % US 
Population 
% change 
in MJ 
support 
1996 CA 32.02 -- 269.4 11.89% -- 
1997 -- -- 32.02 272.6 11.75% -- 
1998 AK, OR, WA 9.74 41.76 275.9 15.08% 28.40% 
1999 ME 1.27 43.03 279 15.37% 1.88% 
2000 CO, HI, NV 7.56 50.59 282.2 17.86% 16.25% 
2001   50.59 285.3 17.67%  
2002   50.59 287.6 17.53%  
2003   50.59 290.1 17.38%  
2004 MT, VT 1.549 52.139 292.8 17.75% 2.12% 
2005   52.139 295.5 17.58%  
2006 RI 1.06 53.199 298.4 17.77% 1.05% 
2007 NM 1.99 55.189 301.2 18.26% 2.79% 
2008 MI 9.95 65.139 304.1 21.36% 16.96% 
2009   65.139 306.8 21.17%  
2010 AZ, NJ, DC 15.814 80.953 309.3 26.11% 23.32% 
2011 DE 0.908 81.861 311.7 26.20% 0.34% 
2012 CT, MA 10.258 92.119 314.1 29.24% 11.63% 
2013 IL, NH 14.213 106.332 316.2 33.51% 14.58% 
2014 MD, MN, NY 31.197 137.529 318.6 42.99% 28.28% 
2015   137.529 319.93 42.81%  
2016 AR, FL, ND, 
OH, PA 
48.816 186.345 322.18 57.56% 34.47% 
2017 WV 1.82 188.165 324.46 57.72% 0.27% 
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APPENDIX 5: The ‘NORML’ Low Valuation Estimate Model, ($ in billions) 
NORML	Valuation	1996-2013	Med	MJ	Deflator	
Year	 Valuation	 %	change	Med	MJ	
1997	 	$																27.013	 28.40	
1998	 	$																34.685	 1.88	
1999	 	$																35.337	 16.25	
2000	 	$																41.079	
	
2001	 	$																41.079	
2002	 	$																41.079	
2003	 	$																41.079	
2004	 	$																41.950	 2.12	
2005	 	$																41.950	
	2006	 	$																42.390	 1.05	
2007	 	$																43.573	 2.79	
2008	 	$																50.963	 16.96	
2009	 	$																50.963	
	2010	 	$																62.848	 23.32	
2011	 	$																63.061	 .34	
2012	 	$																70.395	 11.63	
2013	 	$																80.659	 14.58	
 
Average of 1997 Estimates inflated to 2013 Projected Valuation estimate: $80.659 billion 
and will serve as 2013 base estimate in Total Valuation Model in Appendix 7 
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APPENDIX 6: The ‘Gettman’ Low Valuation Estimate Model, ($ in billions) 
 
 
 
2006 Valuation Gathered from Gettman’s Marijuana Production in the United States 
(2006) 
 
2006 Estimate inflated to 2014 Projected Valuation estimate: $87.393 billion and will 
serve as 2014 base estimate in Total Valuation Model in Appendix 8 
 
 
 
	
	
Gettman	Valuation	2006-2014	Med	MJ	Deflator	
Year	 Valuation		 %	change	in	Med	MJ	
2006	 $														35.804	
	
2007	 $														36.803	 2.79	
2008	 $														43.045	 16.96	
2009	 $														43.045	
	
2010	 $														53.083	 23.32	
2011	 $														53.263	 .34	
2012	 $														59.458	 11.63	
2013	 $													68.127	 14.58	
2014	 $														87.393	 28.28	
182	 	
APPENDIX 7: NORML Low Estimate ($ in billions); Using 2013 Valuation as a Base, 
Inflated/ Deflated from GDP Growth from 1972 to 2017 
1972	 	$														6.320		
1973	 	$														7.018		
1974	 	$														7.606		
1975	 	$														8.379		
1976	 	$														9.198		
1977	 	$												10.290		
1978	 	$												11.778		
1979	 	$												12.957		
1980	 	$												14.204		
1981	 	$												15.580		
1982	 	$												16.171		
1983	 	$												18.013		
1984	 	$												19.681		
1985	 	$												21.131		
1986	 	$												22.158		
1987	 	$												23.836		
1988	 	$												25.685		
1989	 	$												27.350		
1990	 	$												28.583		
1991	 	$												29.798		
1992	 	$												31.782		
1993	 	$												33.371		
1994	 	$												35.477		
1995	 	$												37.010		
1996	 	$												39.323		
1997	 	$												41.702		
1998	 	$												44.250		
1999	 	$												47.100		
2000	 	$												49.690		
2001	 	$												50.778		
2002	 	$												52.688		
2003	 	$												56.070		
2004	 	$												59.608		
2005	 	$												63.495		
2006	 	$												66.745		
2007	 	$												69.682		
2008	 	$												69.041		
2009	 	$												69.117		
2010	 	$												72.269		
2011	 	$												74.899		
2012	 	$												77.326		
2013	 	$												80.659		
2014	 	$												84.152		
2015	 	$												86.769		
2016	 	$												90.725		
2017	 	$												94.028		
	
	$							1,913.494		
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APPENDIX 8: Gettman Low Valuation Estimate ($ in billions); Using 2014 Valuation 
as Base, Inflated/ Deflated from GDP Growth from 1972 to 2017 
1972	 	$														6.564		
1973	 	$														7.289		
1974	 	$														7.899		
1975	 	$														8.702		
1976	 	$														9.552		
1977	 	$												10.687		
1978	 	$												12.232		
1979	 	$												13.457		
1980	 	$												14.751		
1981	 	$												16.181		
1982	 	$												16.794		
1983	 	$												18.707		
1984	 	$												20.439		
1985	 	$												21.945		
1986	 	$												23.012		
1987	 	$												24.754		
1988	 	$												26.675		
1989	 	$												28.403		
1990	 	$												29.684		
1991	 	$												30.946		
1992	 	$												33.007		
1993	 	$												34.657		
1994	 	$												36.844		
1995	 	$												38.435		
1996	 	$												40.838		
1997	 	$												43.308		
1998	 	$												45.954		
1999	 	$												48.914		
2000	 	$												51.604		
2001	 	$												52.734		
2002	 	$												54.717		
2003	 	$												58.230		
2004	 	$												61.904		
2005	 	$												65.940		
2006	 	$												69.316		
2007	 	$												72.366		
2008	 	$												71.701		
2009	 	$												71.780		
2010	 	$												75.053		
2011	 	$												77.785		
2012	 	$												80.305		
2013	 	$												83.766		
2014	 	$												87.393		
2015	 	$												90.111		
2016	 	$												94.220		
2017	 	$												97.650		
	
$							1,987.200	
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APPENDIX 9: 2015 Colorado Valuation Estimate ($ in billions); Using 2015 Valuation 
as Base, Inflated/ Deflated from GDP Growth from 1972 to 2017 
1972	 $														5.797	
1973	 $														6.437	
1974	 $														6.976	
1975	 $														7.685	
1976	 $														8.436	
1977	 $														9.438	
1978	 $												10.803	
1979	 $												11.884	
1980	 $												13.028	
1981	 $												14.290	
1982	 $												14.832	
1983	 $												16.521	
1984	 $												18.051	
1985	 $												19.381	
1986	 $												20.323	
1987	 $												21.862	
1988	 $												23.558	
1989	 $												25.085	
1990	 $												26.216	
1991	 $												27.330	
1992	 $												29.150	
1993	 $												30.608	
1994	 $												32.539	
1995	 $												33.945	
1996	 $												36.066	
1997	 $												38.248	
1998	 $												40.585	
1999	 $												43.199	
2000	 $												45.575	
2001	 $												46.573	
2002	 $												48.324	
2003	 $												51.427	
2004	 $												54.672	
2005	 $												58.236	
2006	 $												61.218	
2007	 $												63.912	
2008	 $												63.324	
2009	 $												63.393	
2010	 $												66.284	
2011	 $												68.697	
2012	 $												70.923	
2013	 $												73.979	
2014	 $												77.183	
2015	 $												79.583	
2016	 $												83.212	
2017	 $												86.241	
	
$							1,755.030	
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APPENDIX 10: The Annual Budget for the Drug Enforcement Administration from 
1972 to 2016, ($ in millions) 
 
1972	 99.3	
1973	 110.2	
1974	 122.3	
1975	 135.7	
1976	 155	
1977	 168.2	
1978	 188.3	
1979	 193.7	
1980	 204	
1981	 216.2	
1982	 241.7	
1983	 280.5	
1984	 324.5	
1985	 353.8	
1986	 363.7	
1987	 490.2	
1988	 494.1	
1989	 534.5	
1990	 617.3	
1991	 788.9	
1992	 825.1	
1993	 853.7	
1994	 886.4	
1995	 910	
1996	 963.8	
1997	 1172	
1998	 1312	
1999	 1415.5	
2000	 1456.4	
2001	 1568	
2002	 1679.2	
2003	 1779	
2004	 1954.8	
2005	 2147.9	
2006	 2360.1	
2007	 2593.3	
2008	 2849.5	
2009	 3131.0	
2010	 3440.4	
2011	 3780.3	
2012	 4153.8	
2013	 4564.2	
2014	 5015.1	
2015	 5510.6	
2016	 6055.1	
	
68459.2	
Data gathered from: Department of Justice: Budget Trend Data, 2002 
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APPENDIX 11: The Annual Change in Acceptance for Recreational Marijuana from 
2012- 2017 
 
 States Introducing 
Legislation 
Added Pop for 
REC MJ (mill) 
States’ pop for 
REC MJ (mill) 
Total 
US Pop 
(mill) 
% change in 
REC MJ 
Support 
2012 
 
CO, WA 12.006 12.006 314.1 -- 
2013 -- -- -- 316.2 -- 
2014 AL, DC 1.397 13.403 318.6 5.82 
2015 -- -- -- 319.9 -- 
2016 CA, NV, OR, MA, 
ME 
54.48 67.882 322.2 203.23 
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APPENDIX 12: The Gettman High Valuation Estimate Model 
 
	
Valuation	(bill)	 %	growth	in	Med	MJ	 %	growth	in	Rec	MJ	
2006	 	$35.804		
	 	
2007	 	$35.804		 2.79	
	
2008	 	$36.803		 16.96	
	
2009	 	$43.045		
	 	
2010	 	$43.045		 23.32	
	
2011	 	$53.083		 0.34	
	
2012	 	$53.263		 11.63	
	
2013	 	$59.458		
	
-	
2014	 	$59.458		
	
-	
2015	 	$59.458		
	
5.82	
2016	 	$62.918		
	 	
2017	 	$127.868		
	
203.23	
2006 Estimate inflate to 2017 Projected Valuation estimate: 127.868 billion and will 
serve as 2017 base estimate in Total Valuation Model in Appendix 15 
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APPENDIX 13: Calculating NORML’s 1997-Weighted Average Eradication Rate 
	
Population	
(mill)	 %	of	total	
Est.	1997	Eradication	
Rate	
Contribution	to	
Total	
Alabama	 4.30	 1.71	 20%	 0.34%	
Alaska	 0.60	 0.24	 15%	 0.04%	
Arizona	 4.31	 1.71	 40%	 0.68%	
Arkansas	 2.49	 0.99	 15%	 0.15%	
California	 31.60	 12.57	 25%	 3.14%	
Colorado	 3.75	 1.49	 25%	 0.37%	
Connecticut	 3.27	 1.30	 15%	 0.20%	
Delaware	 0.72	 0.29	 35%	 0.10%	
Florida	 14.20	 5.65	 20%	 1.13%	
Georgia	 7.21	 2.87	 25%	 0.72%	
Hawaii	 1.18	 0.47	 60%	 0.28%	
Idaho	 1.17	 0.46	 45%	 0.21%	
Illinois	 11.80	 4.69	 5%	 0.23%	
Indiana	 5.80	 2.31	 15%	 0.35%	
Iowa	 2.84	 1.13	 5%	 0.06%	
Kansas	 2.56	 1.02	 30%	 0.31%	
Kentucky	 3.86	 1.53	 35%	 0.54%	
Louisiana	 4.34	 1.72	 15%	 0.26%	
Maine	 1.24	 0.49	 15%	 0.07%	
Maryland	 5.04	 2.00	 20%	 0.40%	
Massachusetts	 6.07	 2.41	 10%	 0.24%	
Michigan	 9.54	 3.79	 20%	 0.76%	
Minnesota	 4.62	 1.84	 10%	 0.18%	
Mississippi	 2.70	 1.07	 10%	 0.11%	
Missouri	 5.32	 2.12	 20%	 0.42%	
Montana	 0.87	 0.35	 10%	 0.03%	
Nebraska	 1.64	 0.65	 15%	 0.10%	
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Nevada	 1.53	 0.61	 5%	 0.03%	
New	
Hampshire	 1.15	 0.46	 15%	 0.07%	
New	Jersey	 7.95	 3.16	 25%	 0.79%	
New	Mexico	 1.69	 0.67	 15%	 0.10%	
New	York	 18.20	 7.24	 25%	 1.81%	
North	Carolina	 7.32	 2.91	 40%	 1.16%	
North	Dakota	 0.64	 0.26	 10%	 0.03%	
Ohio	  0.00	
 
0.00%	
Oklahoma	 3.28	 1.30	 35%	 0.46%	
Oregon	 3.15	 1.25	 30%	 0.38%	
Pennsylvania	 12.10	 4.81	 15%	 0.72%	
Rhode	Island	 0.99	 0.39	 10%	 0.04%	
South	Carolina	 3.67	 1.46	 15%	 0.22%	
South	Dakota	 0.73	 0.29	 5%	 0.01%	
Tennessee	 5.25	 2.09	 50%	 1.04%	
Texas		 18.80	 7.48	 35%	 2.62%	
Utah	 1.96	 0.78	 5%	 0.04%	
Vermont	 0.59	 0.23	 15%	 0.03%	
Virginia	 6.62	 2.63	 15%	 0.39%	
Washington	 5.45	 2.17	 15%	 0.32%	
West	Virginia	 1.83	 0.73	 25%	 0.18%	
Wisconsin	 5.12	 2.04	 10%	 0.20%	
Wyoming	 0.48	 0.19%	 5%	 0.01%	
	
251.54	
	 	
22.07%	
 
 
Data Gathered from norml.org’s State Crop Estimates 
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APPENDIX 14: NORML’s High Valuation Estimate Model with Weighted Average 
Eradication Rate 
	 	
1997	Median	Farm	Value	
($	billions)	
1997	Median	Retail	
Value	
($	billions)	
	 	
	20.249	 	33.776	
	
Average	 27.013	
Weighted	Average	ER	 22.07%	
Estimated	Valuation	 122.395	
 
 
The Average1997 Median Estimates inflated to 2017 Projection: $122.395 billion and 
will serve as 2017 base amount in Total Valuation Model in Appendix 16 
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APPENDIX 15: Aggregate Gettman High Model ($ in billions); Using Average as 2017 
Base, Inflated/ Deflated from GDP Growth from 1972 to 2017 
1972	 	$														8.596		
1973	 	$														9.545		
1974	 	$												10.345		
1975	 	$												11.396		
1976	 	$												12.509		
1977	 	$												13.995		
1978	 	$												16.019		
1979	 	$												17.622		
1980	 	$												19.317		
1981	 	$												21.189		
1982	 	$												21.992		
1983	 	$												24.497		
1984	 	$												26.766		
1985	 	$												28.738		
1986	 	$												30.135		
1987	 	$												32.416		
1988	 	$												34.932		
1989	 	$												37.195		
1990	 	$												38.873		
1991	 	$												40.525		
1992	 	$												43.224		
1993	 	$												45.385		
1994	 	$												48.249		
1995	 	$												50.333		
1996	 	$												53.479		
1997	 	$												56.715		
1998	 	$												60.180		
1999	 	$												64.056		
2000	 	$												67.579		
2001	 	$												69.059		
2002	 	$												71.655		
2003	 	$												76.256		
2004	 	$												81.067		
2005	 	$												86.353		
2006	 	$												90.774		
2007	 	$												94.768		
2008	 	$												93.896		
2009	 	$												94.000		
2010	 	$												98.286		
2011	 	$										101.864		
2012	 	$										105.164		
2013	 	$										109.697		
2014	 	$										114.446		
2015	 	$										118.006		
2016	 	$										123.387		
2017	 	$										127.868		
	
$							2,602.348	
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APPENDIX 16: Aggregate NORML High Model ($ in billions); Using Average as 2017 
Base, Inflated/ Deflated from GDP Growth from 1972 to 2017 
1972	 	$														8.227		
1973	 	$														9.136		
1974	 	$														9.901		
1975	 	$												10.907		
1976	 	$												11.973		
1977	 	$												13.395		
1978	 	$												15.332		
1979	 	$												16.867		
1980	 	$												18.489		
1981	 	$												20.281		
1982	 	$												21.049		
1983	 	$												23.447		
1984	 	$												25.618		
1985	 	$												27.506		
1986	 	$												28.843		
1987	 	$												31.026		
1988	 	$												33.434		
1989	 	$												35.601		
1990	 	$												37.206		
1991	 	$												38.787		
1992	 	$												41.371		
1993	 	$												43.439		
1994	 	$												46.180		
1995	 	$												48.175		
1996	 	$												51.186		
1997	 	$												54.283		
1998	 	$												57.600		
1999	 	$												61.309		
2000	 	$												64.681		
2001	 	$												66.098		
2002	 	$												68.583		
2003	 	$												72.986		
2004	 	$												77.591		
2005	 	$												82.650		
2006	 	$												86.882		
2007	 	$												90.705		
2008	 	$												89.870		
2009	 	$												89.969		
2010	 	$												94.072		
2011	 	$												97.496		
2012	 	$										100.655		
2013	 	$										104.993		
2014	 	$										109.539		
2015	 	$										112.946		
2016	 	$										118.096		
2017	 	$										122.395		
	
$							2,490.777	
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APPENDIX 17: Aggregate Colorado High Model ($ in billions); Using Average as 2017 
Base, Deflated from GDP Growth from 1972 to 2017 
1972	 	$								8.391		
1973	 	$								9.317		
1974	 	$						10.098		
1975	 	$						11.124		
1976	 	$						12.211		
1977	 	$						13.661		
1978	 	$						15.637		
1979	 	$						17.202		
1980	 	$						18.857		
1981	 	$						20.684		
1982	 	$						21.468		
1983	 	$						23.913		
1984	 	$						26.127		
1985	 	$						28.053		
1986	 	$						29.416		
1987	 	$						31.643		
1988	 	$						34.099		
1989	 	$						36.308		
1990	 	$						37.946		
1991	 	$						39.558		
1992	 	$						42.193		
1993	 	$						44.302		
1994	 	$						47.098		
1995	 	$						49.133		
1996	 	$						52.203		
1997	 	$						55.362		
1998	 	$						58.744		
1999	 	$						62.527		
2000	 	$						65.966		
2001	 	$						67.411		
2002	 	$						69.946		
2003	 	$						74.436		
2004	 	$						79.133		
2005	 	$						84.293		
2006	 	$						88.608		
2007	 	$						92.507		
2008	 	$						91.656		
2009	 	$						91.757		
2010	 	$						95.941		
2011	 	$						99.433		
2012	 	$				102.655		
2013	 	$				107.079		
2014	 	$				111.716		
2015	 	$				115.190		
2016	 	$				120.443		
2017	 	$				124.827		
	
	$	2,540.270		
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APPENDIX 18: Aggregate Hemp/ Marijuana Valuation ($ in billions); Using 1937 as 
base; Inflated from GDP Growth to from 1937 to 2017 
1937	 $1.0000		
1938	 $1.2499		
1939	 $1.5489		
1940	 $1.8492		
1941	 $2.4726		
1942	 $4.0652		
1943	 $7.2445		
1944	 $12.8134		
1945	 $19.0688		
1946	 $21.1035		
1947	 $21.1014		
1948	 $21.9032		
1949	 $21.5747		
1950	 $24.4657		
1951	 $25.8089		
1952	 $27.1896		
1953	 $27.3337		
1954	 $28.0827		
1955	 $29.9277		
1956	 $30.5233		
1957	 $30.6332		
1958	 $31.4511		
1959	 $32.8789		
1960	 $33.1617		
1961	 $35.2741		
1962	 $36.7838		
1963	 $38.6892		
1964	 $40.6817		
1965	 $44.1315		
1966	 $46.1219		
1967	 $47.3672		
1968	 $49.7213		
1969	 $50.7505		
1970	 $50.6744		
1971	 $52.8939		
1972	 $56.5225		
1973	 $58.7947		
1974	 $57.6599		
1975	 $59.1360		
1976	 $61.6966		
1977	 $64.7691		
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1978	 $69.0957		
1979	 $69.9939		
1980	 $69.9659		
1981	 $70.8685		
1982	 $69.8763		
1983	 $75.3477		
1984	 $79.5897		
1985	 $82.9962		
1986	 $85.4363		
1987	 $89.2382		
1988	 $92.6649		
1989	 $95.2410		
1990	 $95.8601		
1991	 $97.0296		
1992	 $101.2309		
1993	 $103.8933		
1994	 $108.1841		
1995	 $110.6507		
1996	 $115.5747		
1997	 $120.6484		
1998	 $126.6808		
1999	 $132.6221		
2000	 $136.4549		
2001	 $136.7415		
2002	 $139.5310		
2003	 $145.6146		
2004	 $150.1577		
2005	 $154.7075		
2006	 $158.4050		
2007	 $161.3989		
2008	 $156.9281		
2009	 $156.5515		
2010	 $160.8254		
2011	 $163.5272		
2012	 $165.6204		
2013	 $170.0259		
2014	 $174.6166		
2015	 $178.1438		
2016	 $181.4217		
2017	 $185.9391		
Data derived from FRED.stlouisfed.org and Popular Mechanics, Next Billion Dollar 
Crop 
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